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PREFACE 
To some extent the style adopted in a legal exposition 
is determined by the object of the work and the nature 
of the subject matter. I have here attempted a critical 
restatement of the law relating to the liability of 
i 
local authorities for escapes, as explained in the 
Introduction. Several of the leading cases discussed 
have been particularly troublesome, largely due to the 
number and complexity of the issues raised, and I have 
been obliged·to devote much time to analysis of judgments 
·not notable for accuracy, clarity or perception. For 
these reasons also, I have been driven to rely on more 
extracts from judgments and more detailed descriptions 
of facts than would otherwise have been necessary. 
In discussing the theory of enterprise liability I have 
purloined the ideas of others and convertedthem to my 
own use, without acknowledgment. In this respect, I 
make no claim either to originality or to.have accurately 
presented or interpreted the views of anyone. 
My research commenced in ~arnest in the third academic 
term of 1973 and continued during 1974. During that time 
I had the advantage of a Teaching Fellowship in the Law 
School. Since 1975 I have practised as a Barrister and 
Solicitor in Hamilton and have substantially revised 
and rewritten the early drafts in the time available. 
I record my appreciation to several persons. First, 
to Dr D. E. Pat.erson, with whose help and .advice the 
topic was settled and with whom early discussions on 
the project took place. My thanks also to Dr John 
Smillie and Professor Peter Burns for their encourage-
ment and advice. Their influence has materially · 
affeGted my thinking on the Law of Torts generally. 
I am indebted to the Dean, Professor P.~.A. Sim, for 
his invaluable guidance and assistance during my tenure 
at the Law School. Special thanks are due to my wife, 
Penelope, for carrying out the unenviable task of 
deciphering the drafts and typing the final copy with 
meticulous care and for her unflagging support and 
·patience. 
ii 
This survey is confined to English, Australian and New 
Zealand law. Current interest was given to the subject 
matter by the decisions in J.W. Birnie Ltd v Taupo 
Borough (Unreported, Wellington, 11 June 1975, Haslarn J, 
Hamilton A.l53/70~ Rotorua A.l79/73) some mention of 
which has been introduced where possible, and Powrie v 
Nelson City Corporation [1976] 2 NZLR 249 which was 
reported too late for inclusion, except for footnote 
references. The latter decision should be referred to 
on the question of drainage nuisances generally, but 
particularly in regard to the defence of statutory 
authority and the availability of statutory compensation. 
G.S.M. 
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A. Subject Matter and Scope 
The raison d'etre of this work lies in the decisions 
and judgments in three cases, Irvine v·Dunedin City 
Corporation,1 Smeaton v Ilford Corporation2 and Dunne 
v North Western Gas Board~ 3 Those cases concerned, 
respectively, liability for escapes of water, sewage 
and gas from the mains of local or regional authorities. 
A reading of the reports disclosed a number of common 
problems and apparent inconsistencies. It indicated 
that the various areas of the common law discussed were 
fraught with unresolved difficulties and it appeared 
that many precedents and various lines of conflicting 
authority were not satisfactorily explained. In 
Smeaton v Ilford Corporation Upjohn J confessed that 
he found it impossible to reconcile the cases but said 
that he did not propose to add to the many pages of 
the law reports which had been devoted to attempts to 
explain them.4 The writer proposes to take up that 
task, to attempt to impose some order upon the chaos of 
contradictory authority. 
1. [1939] NZLR 741 CA. 
2. [1953] 1 Ch 450. It was reported in the Law Journal 
(1954) p.l69 that the defendant corporation subsequently 
made a substantial payment t.o the plaintiff in return for 
his not proceeding with his appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
3. [1964] 2 QB 806 CA. 
4. [1954] 1 Ch at 474. 
1 
Whilst a number of diverse issues were raised by the 
cases, each possibly justifying separate, more widely 
based research, it seemed that in the context of this 
particular class of case some confusion existed in 
relation to the principles applicable to these distinct 
issues. A comparative approach was justified, if not 
a necessity. In these circumstances it was thought 
desirable to make a comprehensive study of all the 
common law problems relevant to this class of fact 
situation. The scope of this work, therefore, is most 
usefully defined in these terms. 
The typical fact situation, then, concerns damage 
arising in consequence of an escape of water, se111age 
or gas from a piped or channelled system controlled by 
a local authority. In certain respects this basic test 
must be read subject to qualifications, of both a 
limiting and extending nature. 
By an "escape" is meant an involuntary loss of the 
substance causing damage, an unintended flow or leakage 
from the confines of the pipes or channels, as opposed 
to a "discharge", a deliberate or intended release. 
Cases relating to discharges will be considered only 
where they have some special relevance. Escapes may 
occur as a consequence of defective pipes or of non-
repair, of overloading or fractures caused by persons, 
climatic conditions, or other external forces which might 
or might not be within the control cif the local authority. 
2 
An escape might also be caused by the inadequacy of the 
whole or part of ·the system, such inadequacy resulting 
from defective design, failure to maintain existing 
capacity, or from failure to expand capacity to meet 
increasing needs or demands. 
The nature of the escaping substance is· a significant 
variable, particularly in regard to risk. It is not 
proposed to consider cases concerning escapes of 
substances other than water (including stormwater) , 
sewage and gas, except where the principles discussed 
are in point. 
The criterion of "piped or channelled systems" is some-
what arbitrary. Water and gas supply systems are 
necessari~y piped and modern stormwater drainage and 
sewerage systems are usually piped. It is intended to 
include open drainage channels forming part of such 
systems and to extend the discussion generally to 
artificial and natural water courses. 
3 
The term "local authority" is intended to include all 
regional authorities and specialist statutory authorities. 
It includes also commercial enterprises fulfilling 
either of the functions of water or gas supply. 
These, then, are the unifying elements of the diverse 
problems to be discussed. The legal problems fall into 
broad categories: the availability of remedies upon 
the ordinary principles of the torts of Breach of 
Statutory Duty, Negligence, Nuisance and the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher; the availability of statutory 
compensation; the effect of the defence of Statutory 
Authority; the role of the conception of Nonfeasance. 
It is also proposed to ascertain the extent to which 
the development of the law has been affected by 
considerations of policy, whether arising in regard to 
the functions of local authorities specifically or in 
regard to the exercise of statutory powers generally. 
B. Liability of Local Authorities In Tort 
Local authorities have no general immunity from liability 
in tort, whether arising from the public nature of their 
works and services or from their limited powers in 
respect of the property vested in them. It is irrelevant 
that such authorities act for public purposes, without 
reward, and that no profit is derived from the works. 
These principles were settled in 1866 by the decision 
of the House of Lords in Mersey Docks Trustees v Gibbs? 
where it was held that a corporation under a statutory 
duty to maintain public docks was liable in damages 
to persons who suffered from the neglect of their 
statutory duty, and by the decision of the Exchequer 
Chamber in Coe v Wise,6 where the defendant drainage 
5. (1866) LR 1 HL 93. 
6. (1866) LR 1 QB 171. 
4 
conunissioners were held liable for negligently failing 
to perform a statutory duty to maintain certain drainage 
works. 
Similarly, urban sewerage authorities are not relieved 
from liability in Nuisance by the fact that they are 
public bodies and do not have their sewers vested in 
them for any purpose of profit.
7 Where sewers are vested 
in a local authority and are under its control, it is 
under the same liabilities and has the same defences 
as any private owner of a sewer
8 and the fact that it is 
a public body having public duties and having powers 
to perform those duties does not exempt it from liability 
for a nuisance caused.
9 
7. A-G v Basingstoke Corporation (1876) 45 LJ Ch 726. 
8. G1ossop v Heston and Isleworth Local Board (1879) 12 ChD 
102 at 110 per James LJ; Jones v L1anrwst UDC [1911] 
1 Ch 393. 
9. (1879) 12 ChD at 124 per Cotton LJ. 
5 
CHAPTER II 
BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY 
A. Introduction 
Where a drainage or sewerage authority is under a 
statutory obligation to perform certain functions and 
the failure to perform such duty results in a nuisance 
to private persons, the authority may be civilly liable 
for such breach of duty either under the terms of the 
statute or at common law. 
This cause of action was only occasionally the subject 
of reported decisions prior to the imposition of 
relevant duties upon urban sewerage authorities by 
general legislation. The powers of the original 
draina9e authorities in England, the Commissioners of 
Sewers, did not extend to the construction of new 
works unless those liable to contribute consented, 
at least until 1833, but were limited to the repair 
of existing works. There was no statutory or common 
law duty on the Commissioners to repair, but common 
law duties to repair, arising by tenure, by prescription, 
or from custom, fell upon individuals and the inhabitants 
of localities. An action for non-repair was properly 
brought against those bound by common law to repair, 
before the Commissioners in the Court of Sewers. From 
time to time, however, specific bodies of drainage 
Commissioners and other local authorities had such 
6 
powers conferred and duties imposed upon them by 
Local Acts. In 1930 the rural drainage boards created 
by the Land Drainage Ac·t of that year were granted 
wide powers in relation to the maintenance and improve-
ment of existing works and the construction of ne\.v 
1 works, but the imposition of duties, as distinct from 
mere powers, was confined to the maintenance functions. 
In contrast, the reforming Public Health legislation 
of the nineteenth century imposed comprehensive duties 
upon the sewerage authorities thereby established, the 
duties to provide such public sewers as might be 
necessary fo~ effectually draining their district, 
to make provision for effectually dealing with the 
contents of their sewers, to maintain, cleanse and 
empty all public sewers vested in them, and to discharge 
their functions so as not to create a nuisance. 2 
B. Statutory Right of Action 
It may be expressly provided by statute that a breach 
of statutory duty should render a drainage authority 
liable in damages to a private individual who suffers 
damage thereby. ·There are a few reported instances of 
actions based upon such provisions.3 In New Zealand 
1. 8.34 Land Drainage Act 1930. 
2. See now Public Health Act 1936, ss.l5, 23 and 31. 
(26 Geo 5 & 1 Edw 8 c.49). 
3. E.g. Ra1eigh Corporation v Wi11iams [1893] AC 540; 
Sefton-Ashley Drainage Board v Gorrie (1909) 29 
NZLR 383; Pearce v Manawatu Land Drainage Board 
(1912) 31 NZLR 985. 
7 
drainage boards are obliged to cause all water-
courses or drains to be constructed and kept so as 
not to be a nuisance or injurious to health and to be 
properly cleared and cleansed and maintained in proper 
4 order. A remedy in damages was originally given to 
the owners or occupiers of any land for damage done 
in consequence of a breach of these duties! but the 
law was ·later amended so as to restrict such remedy 
to damage arising from the disrepair of drains "actually 
constructed" by the boards,6 that is, to artifical 
water-courses? These provisions have been construed 
as imposing liability orily in respect of negligence and 
as not imposing an absolute duty.8 
C. The Action Upon the Statute 
1. General 
A breach of a statutory duty may give rise to 
a private cause of action in tort for damages. It is a 
distinct cause of action, not a species of common law 
9 negligence and should be pleaded separately. 
4. A duty to "repair" may apply to natural water-courses as 
well as to drains actually constructed: Sefton-Ashley 
Drainage Board v Gorrie (1909) 29 NZLR 383 at 387 per 
Sim J; cf. Aitcheson v Waitaki County (1880) OB & F-G 
(SC) 52, 55 per Williams J. 
5. S.25 Land Drainage Act 1908. 
6. S.47(2) Finance Act 1933. 
7. It seems that these restrictions were a response to the 
exceptionally adverse economic conditions prevailing at 
the time of the amendment. The restoration of the original 
provisions would now be justifiable. 
8. Pearce v Manawatu Land Drainage Board (1912) 31 NZLR 985, 
997 per Sim J. 
8 
. 10 
In Groves v Wimborne Vaughan Williams LJ stated the 
principles in this way: 
It cannot be doubted that, where a statute provides 
for the.performance by certain persons of a particular 
duty, and some one belonging to a class of persons 
for whose benefit and protection the statute imposes 
the duty is injured by failure to perform it, prima 
facie, and, if there be nothing to the contrary, an 
action by the person so injured will lie aga~t the 
person who has so failed to perform the duty. 
This tort is of particular importance where no·duty 
arises at common law. Thus, the present enquiry is to 
ascertain the extent to which an individual is entitled 
to a remedy against a local authority in respect of a 
nuisance created as a consequence of a breach of a 
statutory obligation. 
The courts have freely read into penal statutes, 
. 1 1 th . . d . 1 .lf 12 part1cu ar y ose concern1ng 1n ustr1a we are, 
the implication that an action in tort was also 
intended by Parliament. But, as Street observes, 
n[t]he courts will not readily allow an action in tort 
9 
where public bodies have violated their general statutory 
duties."
13 
Generally, the differing approaches to these 
classes of statute are attributable to judicial policy. 
9. London Passenger Board v Upson [1949] AC 155, 168 per 
Lord Wright; Murfin v United Steel Co. [1957] 1 WLR 104, 
111 per Singleton LJ; both cases followed Smith v Wilkins 
& Davies Constr. Co. [1958] NZLR 958. 
10. [1898] 2 QB 402. 
11. [1898] 2 QB at 415. 
12. See Glanville Williams Effect of Penal Legislation in Tort 
(1960) 23 Mod LR 233. 
13. Street Torts 5th ed 263. 
The cases discussed in the following pages clearly 
indicate that in respect of drainage and sewera9e 
authorities the courts will more readily accept as 
actionable breaches of duties which duplicate or are 
analogous to the duties imposed by the common law. 
These duties relate to the maintenance rather than to 
the construction of works. 
2. Duties of Construction 
10 
The courts have consistently rejected attempts 
to found actions for damages upon the breach by urban 
authorities <;>f statutory obligations to construct or 
improve sewerage or drainage works, largely upon the 
basis that a private action is an inappropriate remedy. 
The first of the leading cases on this point relates to 
the situation where a riparian proprietor seeks relief 
from injury caused by the discharge of sewage into 
streams rather than from damage caused by escapes. It 
is significant that in either case, discharge or escape, 
the plaintiff does not seek the provision of such a 
system so that he himself might use it, but so that he 
might be relieved of injury consequent upon the lack of 
an effectual scheme. 
Section 15 of the Public Health Act 1875 has beeri 
much litigated in this connection. It was provided 
therein that "Every local authority ••• shall cause 
to be made such sewers as may be necessary for 
effectually draining their district ••• ". The Court 
of Appeal first rejected the contention that a private 
action lay for breach of such duty in 1879 in Glossop v 
Heston and Isleworth Local Board. 14 The facts were 
(briefly) that the plaintiff complained of a nuisance 
to his property caused by the pollution of a river into 
which the defendants' sewers discharged. The defendants 
had only recently been constituted. They had to follow 
an elaborate procedure before they could put into force 
any of their statutory powers. There were various 
procedures relating to the compulsory purchase of land, 
notices to be given and consents to be acquired. 
Considering that the Board had been in existence for 
only a few months, the consensus of opinion of the Court 
was that they had not been guilty of neglect up till the 
time the action was brought. The Court went .on to hold, 
however, that even if the defendants had been guilty of 
neglect or refusal to take steps amounting to any 
mala fide delay, that was not a ground of action by 
any proprietor in the district who might be deprived 
11 
of the benefit he expected to derive from the performance 
of the duty. This conclusion was reached upon a ground 
to be discussed in detail presently, the existence of 
an alternative remedy, but James LJ was clearly conscious 
of the wider implications of the plaintiff's argument. 
He said: 
It is said that this is a very serious matter to 
the Plaintiff and to the public generally. It 
appears to me that if this action could be sustained, 
it would be a very serious matter indeed for every 
rate-payer in England in any district in which there 
14. (1879) 12 ChD 10.2. 
is any local authority upon which duties are 
cast for the benefit of the locality. If this 
action could be maintained, I do not see why it 
could not in a similar manner be.maintained by 
every owner of land in that district who could 
allege that if there had been a proper system 
of sewage his property would be very much 
improved.15 
12 
It is noted that while Brett LJ observed that no district 
could be said to be effectnally drained where any part 
of the drainage caused a nuisance, 16 Cotton LJ preferred 
the view that the local authority was directed to provide 
drainage for every house in the district, rather than to 
divert sewage from running streams, though that might 
be the result.17 
In 1897 the Court of Appeal again held that the neglect 
of the duty under s.l5 to construct sewers sufficient 
for the district did not give a right of action to an 
individual whose property was injured. In Robinson v 
Workington Corporation18 the injuries in respect of 
which damages were claimed arose because of the inadequacy 
of a sewer. The sewer, as constructed by the defendants,19 
had been sufficient for the district in which the 
plaintiff's houses were situated until a number of new 
houses were built which drained into the sewer. The 
sewer thereby became inadequate to carry off all the 
15. (1879) 12 ChD at 109. 
16. 12 ChD at 117, 118. 
17. 12 ChD at 129. 
18. [1897] 1 QB 619. 
19. That the system had been constructed by the defendants 
appears from the report at (1.897) 75 LT at 674. 
.sewage, some of which was bayed back. It overflowed 
through the connections into the plaintiff's houses and 
caused the injury complained of. It was admitted at 
the trial that the claim was founded on "nonfeasance" 
in that the defendants had not constructed a sewer, 
in the place of the existing sewer, of sufficient 
dimensions to carry off the sewage of the district in 
which the property of the plaintiff was situated. 
Again, the ratio of the decision clearly relates to 
the existence of an alternative remedy. The judgment 
of Lopes LJ, however, primarily rests on the wider 
proposition that no right of action is given in such 
a case against a local body in respect of an act of 
non feasance i . the statute did not create any duty 
towards any individual in respect of the construction 
20 of sewers, but merely to the locality at large. 
The presence .of the statutory remedy was treated as 
. 21 
a secondary reason. The learned judge assessed the 
utility of a private action in such cases in this way: 
There are insufficient sewers, and no doubt this 
may affect private individuals; but it also affects 
a whole district. If there is a right of action in 
individuals affected, there might be a number of 
actions in which they might obtain damages .•. but 
the mischief might still remain .22 
On the other hand, it is pointed out, the statutory 
13 
remedy would make good the sewerage of the whole district.23 · 
20~ [1897] 1 QB at 623. 
2.1. See [1897] 1 QB at 622. 
22. [1897] 1 QB at 622, 623. 
23. [1897] 1 QB at 623. 
Within a few months of delivering their judgments in 
Robinson's case
24
a similarly constituted Court of Appeal 
d . d d . 1 . 
25 h . . eca e Peebles v Oswa dtwlstle U.C. T lS case lS 
of interest in several respects. Although the remedy 
sought was not damages, but mandamus, the facts and 
issues were sufficiently similar to those in Robinson's 
26 
case for the Court to de~ide the case on the same 
principles. Moreover, these principles were discussed 
14 
by the House of Lords when the case again went on appeal. 
The facts were that the plaintiff was a manufacturer 
and he sought a mandamus commanding the defendants to 
cause to be made such sewers a~ might be necessa+y for 
effectually draining their district under s.lS and to 
give facilities for enabling the plaintiff to carry the 
effluent from his factories into the sewers under their 
control. 
The trial judge had granted a mandamus, but the Court 
of Appeal reversed his decision upon the grounds to be 
discussed presently. In the House of Lords, where the 
case was en ti tu led Pasmore v Oswaldtwis tle U. c., 
2 7 
the decision of the court of Appeal was affirmed. As 
to the remedy sought, the Earl of Halsbury LC said that 
there was no authority to add to the mandamus the require-
men t that the defendants drain the plaintiff's premises 
in particular, as well as the district. That was not 
justified by 'the whole purview, object and purpose of 
24. [ 189 7] 1 QB 619 . 
25. [1897] 1 QB 625. 
26. [1897] 1 QB 619. 
27. [1898] AC 387. 
the statute". 28 Their Lordships were agreed that the 
statutory remedy .deprived the plaintiff of any other 
form of remedy. 
. 29 
Referring to the Glossop case, 
Lord Macnaghten said that he was much more impressed 
by the language of James_LJ in regard to the waste of 
time and money, and the great inconvenience which would 
result from ordinary legal proceedings, than by his 
suggestion of the propriety of an application for a 
mandamus: "The evils of litigation·would, I think, 
be much the same in the one case as in the other. " 
30 
The principles enunciated in Robinson's case were 
expressly applied in Australia in Madell v Met;ropolitan 
W t S d D · Board •
31 Th d f d t a er, ewerage an ra1nage e e en an s 
were charged by statute with (inter alia) the 11 improve-
ment and e-xtension" of the works vested in them. The 
action was brought to recover damages in respect of 
escaping sewage. The cost of remedial works was 
approximately L160,000. The court held that: 
••• [S]uch an enactment can hardly be read to 
mean that any person injured by. a failure to 
alter or extend the sewerage system could 
maintain an action?2 
The court was clearly sympathetic to the view that the 
Act conferred a discretion on the defendants as to what 
works should be carried out. 
28. [ 1898] AC at 394. 
29. (1879) 12 ChD 102. 
30. [1898] AC at 398. 
31. (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 68. 
32. (1935) SR (NSW) 75. 
15 
16 
The reasoning of the courts in the cases mentioned 
is undoubtedly valid where, as in Pasmore's case, the 
plaintiff seeks the provision of a service, viz. the 
drainage of wastes from his premises. In Glossop's, 
Robinson's and Madell's cases the essence of the complaint 
was very different. In those cases the plaintiffs 3ought 
relief from or compensation for damage actually caused 
by the operation of the sewerage system. They did not 
seek relief from natural conditions nor some advantage 
not enjoyed by their neighbours. The courts did not 
notice the distinction. The actions might reasonably 
have been allowed, on proof of neglect of duty, with-
out materially affecting the general rule. If this 
class of action had been admitted, some of the complex-
ities which (as shall be shown in later chapters) 
subsequently .arose in regard to ordinary common law 
liability might have been avoided. In the circumstances 
indicated, the statutory remedy provided was an 
especially_ inadequate substitute for the compensatory 
common law remedy of damages. 
3. Duties of Maintenance 
Duties related to the maintenance of works . 
have been enforced by private action against rural and 
urban authorities alike. An early and authoritative 
example of an action against a rural authority is the 
17 
decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Coe v Wise
33 
where ·it was held that the defendant Drainage Commissioners 
were liable in respect of a negligent failure to perform 
a statutory duty to maintain a sluice and a cut whereby 
the sluice burst and the plaint~ff's land was flooded. 
The Court generally concurred in the dissenting judgment 
of Blackburn J in the Queen's Bench who had held that 
the common law gave a right of action against those· 
neglecting a duty cast upon them to those who, in 
consequence, sustain damage, and stated that the onus 
was on the defendant to show that the Legislature 
. d d h . h- 'f . 34 1nten e to prevent t e r1g t o act1on. 
More recently, damages were awarded against the defendants 
in Rex v Marshland Smeeth and Fen District Commissioners~5 
a case arising from the traverse of a return to a 
prerogative writ of mandamus. It was held that the 
empowering {local) Act gave rise to an imperative 
obligation to "effectually drain" the district although 
there was a discretion as to how the duty was to be ful-
filled. McCardie J described th~ nature of the duty in 
this way: 
33. (1866) LR 1 QB 711. 
34. (1864) 5 B & S at 464, 465. 
35. [1920] 1 KB 155. 
The.imposition of an imperative obligation is not 
unjust to the defendants. They are not required 
to do anything which is legally impossible or 
physically impossible. They are not required' 
to take absurd or unreasonable steps. They are 
not bound to provide for events of a wholly 
extraordinary character. Les non cogit ad 
impossibilia. But they are bound in my opinion 
to take all such steps as are required to 
provide for the drainage of the district in a 
reasonably effectual manner.36 
18 
Tnere was a continuous breach of duty by the defendants: 
The drains, which the defendants should have kept 
clear and in good order and at a proper level, 
were continuouslyobstructed and in bad order and 
at wrong levels, and the contiguous works of the 
defendants leading to the pumping station have 
been continuously defective·. As a result of 
these defaults the plaintiff's land has ••• been 
continuously and substantially damaged.37 
The learned judge accordingly issued a preremptory writ 
of mandamus and held that the breach of duty gave rise 
to an action for damage~ upon the principles enunciated 
by Vaughan William LJ in Groves v Wimborne. 38
 
In Bohen v Clements39 the Irish Court of Appeal held 
the defendant drainage board liable for breach of 
statutory duty for negligently failing to clean out 
and repair the bed of a river whereby the plaintiff's 
land was flooded. It was held that although the 
defendants were given a discretion as to the mode and 
manner in which to carry out their duties, they were 
36. [1920] 1 KB at 167. 
37. [1920] 1 KB at 173. The plaintiff was also entitled to 
recover upon the traverse of a false return to a mandamus 
by virtue of the procedure originally laid down in 
9 Ann c.20 and 1 Will 4 C.21, see [1920] 1 KB at 170. 
38. [1898] 2 QB 402. 
39. [1920) IR 117. 
19 
under an obligation to maintain the drainage works. 
The plaintiff had plainly suffered special damage 
from the defendant's admitted breach of their· 
40 
statutory duty. The statutory duty was imposed 
for the benefit of a class, and, there being no specific 
remedy enacted, an action lay for a breach.
41 It was 
affirmed that the principles of law relating to the 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasahce, omission 
d . . d 1" . 42 an comm1ss1on, ha no app 1cat1on. 
Similarly, in Boynton v Ancholme Drainage and Navigation 
Commissioners43 the English Court of Appeal held that 
as the defendants had been negligent in maintaining 
and repairing a drain, they were liable in damages to 
the plaintiff in respect of injurydone to his land 
by flooding which arose as a consequence. 
A more recent illustration of the application of these 
principles is provided by the decision in AG v St Ives 
44 
R.D.C. The plaintiff (and relator) sought a 
declaration that one or other of the two defendant 
councils was bound in law to maintain certain drains 
and keep them in repair, and to recover damages from 
40. [1920] IR at 123 per Ronan LJ. 
41. [1920] IR at 124 per O'Connor LJ. 
42. [1920] IR at 122 per Sir James Campbe11 c. 
43. [1921] 2 KB 213. 
44. [1960] 1 QB 312. 
one or other of them in respect of flooding arising from 
a breach of duty to repair. Salmon J held that the 
drains in question were part of the land drainage 
scheme and that the duty to repair originally imposed 
by an Enclosure Act upon a Surveyor of highways for a 
parish within the district devolved upon the first 
45 
defendants. The question then arose whether the 
breach of duty to maintain and repair gave the 
plaintiff a personal right to sue, or whether an 
action could only be brought by the Attorney-General 
on the relation of the plaintiff.
46 Referring to the 
criteria laid, down by the general lav1, Salmon J held 
that as no penalty or other sanction was imposed for 
non-compliance with the duty to maintain and repair 
drains, 47 and as the Act was passed and the award under 
it made for the benefit of the person whose land was 
immediately adjacent to the drains and through whose 
48 land the drains passed, the plaintiff was entitled 
to a declaration and damages. 
In Sephton v Lancashire River Board
49 
a statutory duty 
to maintain an existing drainage system had devolved 
from certain drainage commissioners (who had inherited 
45. Affirmed upon this point [1961] 1 QB 366 CA. 
46. [1960] 1 QB at 323. 
47. Referring to Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] 
AC 398 at 407. 
48. Applying dicta of Atkin LJ in Phillips v Britannia 
Hygienic Laundry [1923] 2 KB 832 at 841, and of 
A. L. Smith LJ in Groves v Lord \.Jimborne [ 189 8] 2 QB 
402 at 407. 
49. [1962] 1 WLR 623. 
20 
the obligations of certain trustees in this respect) 
to a catchment board and hence to the defe~dant river 
board. The duty was to "duly maintain" embankments and 
the drainage system and no sanction for breach of that 
duty was provided. Because of the defendants' neglect 
of their duty to maintain it, an embankment broke and 
the lands of the plaintiff were flooded and damaged. 
Lawton J rejected the defendants' argument that the · 
breach of duty could not found an action for damages by 
the plaintiff. He referred to the passage in Lord 
.simmons' judgment in Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium
50 to 
the effect that the only rule which in all the circum-
21 
stances is valid is that it depends upon a consideration 
of the whole of the Act and the circumstances, including 
the pre-e~isting law, in which it is enacted, but that 
there are indications which point with more or less force 
51 
to one answer or another. (The indications referred to 
relate to the presence or absence of an alternative 
remedy in the Act imposing the duty.) Taking this 
very broad approach, Lawton J concluded: 
For the purposes of this judgment the Act can, 
I think, be summarised in one sentence: the 
commissioners were under a duty to take ail 
reasonable steps to protect the protected lands 
and they were to do what they had to do at the 
expense of the occupiers. It seems to me fair 
and just that if they failed to do what they were 
bound to do and what the occupiers paid them to 
do, they should be liable to pay damages to any 
occupier of the protected lands who was injured 
by their breach of duty?2 
50. [1949] AC 398. 
51. [1947] AC at 407. 
52. [1962} WLR at 629. 
The learned judge was fortified in this view by the 
fact that it appeared that the trustees whom the 
commissioners had superceded might have been sued for 
breach of their duty to maintain the bank, and by the 
decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Coe v Wise.
53 
Subsequently, a very similar case went to the Court of 
22 
Appeal. In Rippingdale Farms Ltd v Black Sluice In~ernal 
Drainage Board 54 the plaintiff sought damages in respect 
of flooding arising from the defendants' failure to 
embank and keep in repair a certain dyke in accordance 
with their statutory duty. The trial judge, Paull J, 
finding negligence, gave judgment in favour of the 
plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. An express duty 
to embank the dyke and keep it in repair was imposed by 
the Black Sluice Drainage Act 1765 on the Black Sluice 
Commissioners
55 
and the Court held that the duty devolved 
upon the defendants by an order made under the Land 
Drainage Act 1930. In the course of his judgment, 
Lord Denning MR said that he was satisfied that the Act 
imposed on the Black Sluice Commissioners a positive 
duty to do the works specified in the Act. Russell LJ 
referred to the duty to embank and keep in repair the 
53. (1866) LR 1 QB 711. 
54. [1963] 1 WLR 1347. 
55. S.44 provided: "And be it further enacted, 
that the said commissioners ... shall ••• scour out, 
deepen, and embimk, rode and keep in repair, from time 
to time and at all times hereafter ••. the following 
drains, dykes or becks .•• " 
drain or dyke in these terms: 
Such duty was imposed to protect land in the area 
from flooding so as to benefit persons interested 
in such lands. A breach of this duty causing damage 
to such person would give him a right of action for 
damages for breach of the statutory duty.56 
The Court rejected certain other arguments to be 
considered in the following pages and the appeal failed. 
It might be noted that it has been recognised in the 
New Zealand case that a negligent failure to keep 
drains in repair in breach of a statutory duty will 
57 
render the drainage authority liable in damages. 
23 
The validity of actions against urban sewerage authorities 
in respect of maintenance functions has been acknowledged 
in a number of cases and is now well established, 
although the absence of proof of negligence has been 
fatal to the plaintiff's case in most reported instances. 
58 
The leading case is Harnmond v Vestry of St Pancras. 
It is clear from the judgments of the Court of Common 
Pleas that the Court was concerned only with a cause 
of action based upon breach of a statutory duty to 
repair a sewer and not with common law duties. This 
was emphatically affirmed by Denman J in a subsequent 
56. [1963] 1 WLR at 1356. 
57. Taieri County Council v Hall (1883) NZLR 1 SC 360, 
363 per Williams J (obiter). 
58. (1874) LR 9 CP 316. 
59 
case. .The decision in Hammond's case turned on 
60 
the construction .of a provision in a statute 
which imposed upon the vestry the duty of properly 
cleansing the sewers vested in them. The facts were 
that a sewer which had got out of repair by some means 
(the action of rats or of natural decay) , became choked 
up and the soil overflowed into the plaintiff's cellar 
and did damage. The jury found that the existence 
of the drain was unknown to the defendants but that it 
might have been known to them by the exercise of 
reasonable care and enquiry; but that the obstruction 
in the drain was also unknown and could not have been 
known by reasonable care. The Court of Common Pleas
61 
held that in the absence of negligence the defendants 
were not liable. 
24 
Hammond' s case was followed in Bateman v Poplar District, 
Council Board of Works (No.2)
62 
a decision on the same 
statutory provision. Here, the defendants knew of the 
nuisance but did not know that the drain from which it 
63 
emanated was a sewer vested in them, nor could they 
59. Humphries v Cousins (1877) 2 CPD 329. "The case of 
Hammond v St Pancras Vestry which was relied upon by counsel 
for the defendant, appears to us to have no real bearing 
upon the present case, inasmu~h as the whole argument and 
decision of that case turned upon the effect of the clauses 
of a particular Act of Parliament: imposing certain duties 
upon a public body; and no question arose as to the common 
law liability to occupiers of adjoining premises. 2 CPD 245. 
60. S.72 Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c.l20). 
61. Brett and Denman JJ. 
62. (1887) 37 ChD 27 2. 
63. The drain became a 'sewer' under the Act by reason of 
another drain being connected with it.. The connection was 
made illegally and without the knowledge of the Board. 
25 
have discovered that by the exercise of reasonable 
care. In the absence of negligence, it was held that 
the defendants were not liable. 
There are several reported decisions relating to 
actions based upon the duties imposed upon sewerage 
authorities by s.l9 of the English Public Health Act 
1857, viz, the duties to keep their sewers so that 
they should not be a nuisance or injurious to health and 
to cleanse and empty sewers vested in them. These duties 
related only to the physical condition of sewers as 
such and the section did not extend to nuisances caused 
by the discharge of sewage. 64 
65 
In Baron v Portslade uc the Court of Appeal held 
the defendant authority liable for a nuisance arising 
from the escape of sewage from a sewer which the authority 
had negligently failed to cleanse. The sewer complained 
of was, in the :relevant section·, an open sewer which 
discharged into a pond on the plaintiff's land. The 
preceding authority had cleansed the sewer at 
intervals so that no nuisance was caused. The defendants, 
the present authority, discontinued that practice which 
had been the usual course taken and the nuisance ensued. 
It was argued that as the defendants had nothing to 
do with the construction of the sewer and had done nothing 
to increase the burden upon it, there had simply been 
64. Earl of Harrington v Derb~ Corporation [1905] 1 Ch 205. 
65. [1900] 2 QB 588. 
a failure to carry out a duty imposed by the Act; this 
amounted only to.nonfeasance for which no ~ction would 
lie. The Court rejected this contention. The Earl 
of Halsbury LC, (A.L. Smith and Vaughan Williams L JJ 
concurring) distinguished between actions based upon 
duties to construct and actions based upon duties of 
maintenance in the following terms: 
There seems to me to be a wide difference between 
the obligation or duty to construct a new system 
of drainage and the obligation on a local authority 
to use sewers that are vested in them in a proper 
and reasonable manner. In this case there is no 
question as to providing any new sewer. The sewer 
is in existence and under the control of the local 
authority. The plaintiffs complain that the existing 
sewer, which from time to time has been cleaned out, 
is now neglected and uncleansed, and that this has 
caused the nuisanceft6 
The duty contained in s.l9 enjoining local authorities 
to "cause the sewers belonging to them to be 
constructed • • • and kept so as not to be a nuisance" 
has received considerable judicial attention. In 
S I b b , 67 tretton s Der y Brewery Co. v Der y Corporat1on 
the nuisance complained of was flooding due to the fact 
that sewers originally adequate had become insufficient 
to carry off the influx of water during heavy rain as 
a consequence of increas~d building. The case is 
26 
unusual because the flooding occured via the communications 
of the plaintiff's premises with the sewers. Romer J 
66. [1900] 2 QB at 590. 
67. [1894] 1 Ch 431. 
held accordingly that the Corporation were not liable 
as strangers (i.e. for common law nuisance) but only 
if liability was cast upon them by statute. The 
plaintiffs contended that the defendants were liable 
because in failing to keep the sewer so as not to be a 
nuisance they had infringed the provisions of s.l9. 
Romer_ J held that in the absence of negligence therA 
was no liability. The nonfeasance issue, though raised 
b 1 t d . d b h 1 d . d 
68 
. y counse , was no 1scusse · y t e earne JU ge. 
The poorly reported decision of the Court of Appeal·· 
in Jones v Barking U.D.c. 69 is of particular interest 
as it shows that the distinction between construction 
and maintenance was regarded as crucial to the issue of 
liability. The plaintiff sought to recover damages for 
27 
injury to a wall caused by an overflow of the defendant's 
sewer. A heavy fall of rain had filled the sewer with 
storm water v1hich was forced up a branch drain and 
flooded the plaintiff's land. It was contended that 
the defendants were negligent in not keeping the sewer 
in a proper condition within the meaning of s.l9. The 
plaintiff argued before the Court of Appeai
0 that the 
68. Although liability based on s.l5 (duty to construct) 
was not argued, Romer J assumed that it was the duty of 
the defendants to construct a new sewer or drainage system, 
but held that there was no actual negligence in their 
failing to do so. 
69. "The Times", 9 December 1898. 
70. A. L. Smith, Rigby and Collins L JJ. 
case was not like Robinson v Workington CorporatioJ1 
b > • 1 
72 h or Pee les v Ostwaldtw1st e U.D.C. w ere a new sewer 
or sewerage system was required, but that this was only 
a question of a very small expense for putting in a 
storm opener in the sewer. The Court found that four 
such openers were necessary and the facts showed that 
what was necessary to be done to put these in the 
sewers amounted to an alteration of, and an improvement 
in, the system of sewerage of the district for the 
28 
purposes of carrying off storm water. The case therefore 
came within Robinson's case and Peeble's case and the 
only remedy was the statutory remedy. 
S 19 . 1' d . c . 73 • was aga1n app 1e 1n A.G. v Lewes orporat1on 
in relation to the_ occasioning of a nuisance. 
Swinfen Eady J awarded damages to the relator and 
granted an injunction in respect of injury sustained 
by periodic flooding from a sewer out of repair. No 
question of negligence appears to have been raised. 
4. Statutory Remedy 
'd 74 In Doe v Br1 ges Lord Tenterden laid down 
two principles; he said: 
71. [1897] 1 QB 619. 
72. [1897] 1 QB 625. 
73. [1911] 2 Ch 495. 
74. (1831) 1 B & Ad 847. 
( 1) [W]here an Act creates an obligation and enforces 
the performance in a special manner, we take it to 
be a general rule that performance cannot be 
enforced in any other manner. 
(2) [I]f an obligatio·n is created, but no mode of 
enforcing its performance is ordained, the common 
·law may in general find a mode suited to the 
particular nature of the caseJ5 
The first quoted principle has been applied by· the 
courts to deny private individuals a remedy in·damages 
or by mandamus in cases where the gist of the complaint 
is the failure to fulfil a statutory duty to construct 
sewers. Thus, where the duty was imposed under s. 15 
Public Health Act 1875, as in the cases previously 
discussed, private individuals were precluded from 
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suing by s.299 which provided a remedy by way of complaint 
to the Local Government Board, the Board having power to 
make orders enforceable by mandamus or to appoint some 
person to perform the duty. 
The effect of these provisions was first considered in 
76 . 
G1ossop v Heston & Isleworth L. Bd where the avail-
ability of the alternative remedy was regarded as a 
factor which did not preclude the granting of a 
mandamus altogether but which "ought to induce the 
court to hesitate before granting a mandamus"
77 in 
such a case. The scope of s.299 was considered by 
Cotton LJ who concluded: 
75. (1831) 1 B & Ad 847-, 859. 
76. (1879) 12 ChD 102. 
77. (1879) 12 ChD at 116 per James LJ. 
'-·-
It cannot be said that that section could have 
taken away any jurisdiction, either to grant damages, 
or an injunction, if the act was one which the 
Plaintiff could complain of as a legal wrong done 
to him; nor do I suggest that the existence of 
that section takes away the power of the Court to 
interfere by decree to compel the Defendants to 
do their duty. But .•• [it] may influence the 
Court in deciding whether it will make a decree 
against the Defendants ,78 
Subsequently, in Robinson v Workington Corporation!9 
the Court of Appeal went further and held that the 
remedy under s.299 eKcluded all other remedies in 
respect of such defaults and specifically affirmed 
that the principle extended to preclude actions for 
damages. Lord Esher MR said: 
If it were not for the statute, ·there would be no 
duty on the defendants to do anything in the matter, 
and a default on their part is dealt with by a remedy 
provided by the·same statute. I have no hesitation 
in saying that that is the only remedy which is 
available. It has been laid down for many years that, 
if a duty is imposed by a statute which but for the 
statute would not exist, and a remedy for default or 
breach of that duty is provided by the statute that 
creates the duty, that is the only remedy. The 
remedy in this case is under s.299 which points 
directly to s.l5, and shews what is to be done for 
default of the duty imposed by that section. That is 
not the remedy sought for in this action, which is 
brought to recover damages. 80 
The learned Master of the Rolls made it clear that this 
reasoning was not to be limited to l_iabili ty for non-
feasance; he said that "if the statute had dealt with 
30 
.acts of misfeasance, and had given a remedy, that would 
have been the only one available. "
81 
Chitty LJ concurred 
78. (1879) 12 ChD at 129, 130. 
79. [1897] 1 QB 619. 
80. [1897] 1 QB at 621. 
81. [1897] 1 QB at 621. 
in the view that the answer to the complaint that 
sufficient sewers were not being made was that a remedy 
82 
was provided by s.299. 
83 
As a mandamus had not been sought in the Glossop case 
nor indeed had any default been shown, the Court's 
opinion of the effect of a statutory remedy upon the 
granting of such an order was strictly obiter. The 
question came squarely before the Court ·of Appeal in 
84 
Peebles v Oswaldtwistle U.C. where the plaintiff 
. 85 
argued that the "actual decision" in Robinson's case 
"was only that an action for damages would not lie in 
respect of nonfulfilment by a local authority of the 
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86 
duty to make sewers. " But Lord Esher MR insisted that 
the case was decided according.to the rule of construction 
that."if 'a new obligation is imposed by statute, and in 
the same statute a remedy is provided for non-fulfilment 
87 
of the obligation, that is the only remedy." The 
judgments of Lopes and Chitty L JJ are consistent with 
this view. 
In the House of Lords, the Earl of Halsbury LC confirmed 
that the statutory remedy deprived the plaintiff of any 
82. [1897] 1 QB at 623. 
83. (1879) 12 ChD 102. 
84. [1897] 1 QB 625. 
85. [1897] 1 QB 619. 
86. [1897] 1 QB at 626. 
87. [1897] 1 QB at 627. 
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other form of remedy and held that the first principle 
stated by Lord Tenterden in Doe v Bridges88 (cit-ed above) 
was applicable.89 Lord Macnaghten also expressed his 
agreement with the passage cited from Lord Tenterden's 
judgment and in rejecting the notion that the case was 
exceptional he said: 
Whether the general rule is to prevail, or an 
exception to the general rule is to be admitted, 
must depend on the scope and language of the Act 
which creates the obligation and on considerations 
of policy and convenience. It would be difficult 
to conceive any case in which there could be less 
reason for departing from the general rule than one 
like the present. 90 
In more recent times it has been affirmed in the House 
of Lords that the general rule may be subject to 
exceptions. In Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium91 Lord 
Simmonds said: 
It may be that, though a specific remedy is 
provided oy the Act, yet the person injured 
has a personal right of action in additionJ2 
It has been shown in the foregoing pages that while the 
courts have not been prepared to grant a remedy by 
private action in respect of duties of construction, 
they have done so in respect of what have been loosely 
termed duties of maintenance. In the case of urban 
88. (1831) 1 B & Ad 847. 
89. [1898] AC at 394. 
90. [1898] AC at 398. 
91. [1938] AC 398. 
92. [1938] AC at 407. 
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sewerage authorities, the courts have been reluctant 
to admit an exception to the general rule, ,to concede 
that an action for damages would lie, notwithstanding 
the existence of a statutory remedy. 
S.299 of the Public Health Act 1875 provided an 
alternative remedy in respect of the maintenance of 
existing sewers as well as in respect of the provision 
of new sewers. S.l5 imposed upon the local authority 
the duty to keep its sewers in repair as well as to 
construct new sewers. ·since s.299 precluded a private 
action in respect of construction, it might have been 
contended and appears to have been assumed that a private 
action in respect of repair ~as precluded also. For this 
reason, it seems, the practice was not to sue upon the 
duty to repair contained in s.l5, but to rely instead on 
s.l9 which imposed duties relating to the keeping of 
sewers so as not to create a nuisance. 
. 93 . 
In Baron v Portslade U.C. the trial judge, Mathew J, 
held that s.299, in dealing with the maintenance of 
sewers, did not apply to the duty of cleansing sewers 
imposed by s.l9 and consequently did not deprive the 
1 . t. ff f h . . ht f . 
94 
p a1n 1 s o t e1r r1g o act1on. The Court of 
Appeal. agreed. The Earl of Halsbury LC said: 
93. [1900] 2 QB 588. 
94. [1900] 2 QB at 589. 
I agree with the learned judge that the maintenance 
of a sewer is not the same thing as that which it is 
the duty of the local authority to do by virtue of 
s.l9 - that is, to keep the sewer so that it shall 
not be a nuisance or injurious to health, and to see 
that it is properly cleansed and emptied. Sect.299 
does not, in my opinion, touch the duty of the 
local authority to use proper diligence in the 
management of existing sewers, and I cannot see 
either in the section or in the cases cited anything 
to take away the right of action of a person who has 
sustained an injury through the neglect of the local 
authority ~5 
The inapplicability of s.299 to s.l9 might, perhaps, 
34 
have been better explained if it had been held that the· 
duties imposed by s.l5 were owed to those who used or 
who sought to use the drainage system, whereas the 
duties contained in s.l9 were owed to person who might 
be injured by the use of the system. Clearly, the 
statutory remedy is much more appropriate in the former 
case. 
It is to be noted that in A.G. v Lewes CorporatioJ
6 
Swinfen Eady J rejected the contention that insofar as 
s.l9 included repairing, s.299 applied. It is of 
particular interest that the learned judge preferred 
the view that a private action was not precluded as 
97 
s.299 gave no remedy in damages, although the weight 
of that consideration may be doubted in light of 
Robinson's case. 
The equivocal approach of the court in Baron's case 
might be compared with the more direct decision of 
95. [1900] 2 QB at 590, 591. 
96. [1911) 2 Ch 495. 
97. [1911) 2 Ch at 507. 
98 Lawton J in Sephton v Lancashire River Board. 
The defendants had contended that the provision in the 
River Boards Act 1948 of a remedy by way of complaint 
to a Minister (who was given powers of inquiry and 
direction where a board was in default) by implication 
removed any right to damages for breach of statutory 
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duty. Referring also to the narrower and less effective 
remedy contained in the Land Drainage Act 1930 (s.l2), 
Lawton J held that neither provision divested the 
occ~piers of any remedy against the local authority in 
f h . b h f d . . h b k 99 respect o t e1.r reac o · uty to ma1.nta1.n t e an . 
Finally, it should be noted that Lord Tenterden's 
second principle probably must be qualified in this 
respect, that it does not entitle an individual to 
enforce a duty to construct a sewerage system by 
private action where no statutory mode of enforcement 
is provided. When the point was raised in Pasmore v 
1 Oswaldtwistle u.c. (in regard to the situation prior 
to 1866 when no statutory remedy was provided) Lord 
Macnaghten expressed doubt as to whether the absence 
of a special remedy would justify recourse to legal 
proceedings and suggested that the case might properly 
be regarded as an exception to the general rule. 
98. [1962] 1 WLR 623. 
99. [1962] 1 WLR at 630~ 631. 
1. [1898] AC 387. 
5. The Content of the Duty 
It is now well established as a rule of. 
construction that duties imposed upon local authorities 
by statute in what appear to be absolute terms, require 
the exercise of reasonable care and are actionable only 
on proof of negligence. 
This view of the law was endorsed in recent English 
cases relating to rural drainage authorities. In 
Sephton v Lancashire River Board2 counsel for the 
plaintiff submitted that the duty to maintain the 
drainage system was an absolute duty and that liability 
was not dependent on the defendants having failed to 
exercise reasonable care. Lawton J rejected this 
contention without citing authority: 
In my judgment, the duty imposed ... on the 
commissioners ..• and upon the defendants as their 
successors, was not an absolute one. The section 
required the commissioners to exercise ·reasonable 
care in the performance of their duty and no more. 
The defendants, as the commissioners' successors, 
did not exercise reasonable care and it is because 
of their failure to do so that I adjudge them to 
have been in breach of their statutory duty.3 
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In the course of his judgment in Rippingdale Farms Ltd 
4 
v Black Sluice Internal Drainage Board Lord Denning MR 
said that the duty to embank and keep the dyke in repair 
was not an absolute duty, but a duty to take reasonable 
2. [1962] 1 WLR 623. 
3. [1962] 1 WLR at 626. 
4. [1963] 1 WLR 1347. 
care and said: 
The scope of the duty was well put in a case at 
the Lincoln Assizes, Hardwick v WilesS which 
arose out of a flood of 1872. The judge left to 
the jury the question "whether the commissioners 
took reasonable care that the bank in question 
should be in a reasonable fit and proper condition 
to protect the adjacent lands from water and 
floods reasonable to be anticipated." ••• I think 
that was the right way of putting the question.6 
This construction of a similar provision had earlier 
37 
been preferred in a New Zealand case. The Land Drainage 
Act 1908 (s.66) casts upon drainage authorities a duty 
to remove obstructions from streams. In McKinley v 
Whangarei County Council
7 Cooper J declined to give 
the section its strict literal meaning, upon the ground 
that it would be manifestly impossible for such an 
authority to effectively carry out the terms of the 
section. The learned judge held that liability arose 
. 8 
only where the authority had been negligent. 
A similar view has been established for a century in 
regard to sewerage authorities, that is, since the 
9 
decision in Harnmond v Vestry of St Pancras. The 
decision turned on the construction of a provision 
imposing upon the vestry the duty of properly cleansing 
the sewers vested in them. The Court found that the 
language used was capable of meaning that the defendants 
5. (1872) (Unreported) Wheeler's History of the Fens 
(2nd ed (1890) p.282). 
6. [1963] 1 WLR at 1354. 
7. (1913) 32 NZLR 791, 797, 798. 
8. See also Tricker v Wellington City Corporation [1920] 
NZLR 626 CA per Sim J. 
9. (1874) LR 9 CP 316. 
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were under an absolute duty or that they were only 
bound to exercise due and reasonable care, but preferred 
the latter view. 10 
It would seem to me to be contrary to natural 
justice to say that parliament intended to impose 
upon a public body a liability for a thing which 
no reasonable care and skill could obviate. The 
duty may notwithstanding be absolute: but, if so, 
it ought to be imposed in the clearest possible 
terms.l1 
This rule was applied in Bateman v Poplar District 
Board of Works (No. 2) •12 
h • 8 I b C b C t" 
13 T us 1n tretton s Der y Brewery o. v Der y orpora 10n 
Romer J held that it was settled law that liability in 
such cases, though not in form limited, was in fact: 
1imited to cases where the public authority was guilty 
of negligence. 
It is to be noted that the principle that statutory 
duties impose only an obligation to exercise due care 
does not extend to negate any strict or absolute 
duties actually imposed by the common law. The contrary 
10. This conclusion was reached with some difficulty. It 
was acknowledged that this decision seemed to be at 
variance with the decision of Wilde B (later Lord Penzance) 
in Meek v Whitchapel Board of Works (1860) 2 F & F 144; 
175 ER 998. Whether Wilde B intended to lay down a strict 
duty is not clear from the report. The present writer is 
inclined toward the view that he did. However, the judges 
in Hammond.were prepared to disagree with their learned 
predecessor. 
11. (1874) LR 9 CP at 322.: 
12. (1887) 37 ChD 272. 
13. [1894] 1 Ch 431. 
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conclusion was reached by Upjohn J in Smeaton v Ilford 
. . 14 
Corporat1on in respect of the obll.gation imposed upon 
the defendant by the Public Health Act 19 36 (s. 31) 
to so discharge their functions as not to create a 
nuisance. The learned judge referred to Hammond v 
Vestry of St Pancras15 and Stretton's Derby Brewery 
Co. v Derby CorporatioJ6 as authority for the 
proposition that: 
So far as this court is concerned, it must be taken 
as settled that the proper construction to be given 
to the section is to exclude liability for escapes 
in the absence of negligence and, therefore, to 
negative the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.l7 
But any immunity of this kind is derived not from such 
provisions but from the general defence of Statutory 
Authority. Indeed, to the extent that a duty not to 
. 18 
create a nuisance resembles a Nuisance clause, 
strict liability is indicated. 19 
14. (1954] 1 Ch 450. 
15. (1874) LR 9 CP 316. 
16. [1894] 1 Ch 431. 
17. [1954] 1 Ch at 477. 1 
18. See p.215 et seq. 
19. Cf. Pride of Derby case [1953] 1 Ch 149 - S.l09 Derby 
Corporation Act 1901 was a combination of this kind 
of provision and a nuisance clause; the Court of 
Appeal held that it imposed strict liability for 
nuisance. 
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6. Mere Powers 
Modern statutes constituting rural drainage 
authorities and authorising them to perform drainage 
functions typically do not impose duties in relation 
to the construction and maintenance of works, but 
merely empower. 
It is now well established that no action can be 
brought for negligent failure to exercise a statutory 
power. The action upon the statute depends upon the 
existence of a mandatory duty and unless some basis can 
be found for the imposition of common law liability, 
an action brought in such circumstances will fail. 
There are three clear illustrations of the application 
of this rule. 
S . h dl . . 20 In ma.t v Caw e Fen Comma.ssa.oners the plaintiff's 
land had been severely damaged by floods and it was 
alleged that the flooding was due to the failure of the 
defendants to keep the drainage works in their area in 
good repair. It was found that the main and substantial 
cause of the flooding was that a bank was too low and 
that there was negligence on the part of the defendants 
in this respect. Counsel for the plaintiff conceded 
that certain earlier statutes did not impose duties 
in respect of the work and du Parcq J held that the 
Land Drainage Act 1930 did not do so.21 
·20. [1938] 4 All ER 64. 
21. [1938] 4 All ER at 65. 
The learned judge held that the action failed 
in limine because the defendants were under no duty 
22 
to exercise their powers. 
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In Gillett v Kent Rivers Catchment Board23 the plaintiffs 
suffered considerable financial loss as the result of 
injury to land and crops as a consequence of flooding 
caused by the defendants' failure to clear a drain of 
weeds. Stable J held that the action failed. The 
plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants were 
1 . 24 neg 1gent, and the statute did not impose a duty on 
d .. h .. 25 the defen ants so as to create a r1g t of act1on. 
26 
Similarly in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent. 
The plaintiffs suffered damage by flooding as the 
result of the nonrepair of a wall on the bank of a tidal 
river. The wall had initially been breached by a very 
high tide. The defendants were empowered, but not 
obliged, to carry out repairs by the Land Drainage Act 
1930. The argument before the House of Lords proceeded 
on the basis that the defendants were not under a duty 
to undertake the repair of the breach which could be 
enforced by action. It was agreed that if the defendants 
had remained entirely passive, the plaintiffs could not 
22. [1938] 4 All ER at 69, 70. 
23. [1938] 4 All ER 810. 
24. [1938] 4 All ER at 813. 
25. [1938] 4 All ER at 813, 814. 
26. [1941] AC 74. If the Act had imposed upon the appellants
1 
the duty of repairing the wall instead of merely conferring 
upon them the power of doing so, they would without question 
have been liable for the damage: see Lord Romer at p.98. 
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have succeeded against them for nonfeasance. 27 
It follows from these principles that it is crucial to 
a plaintiff's case to establish that the Act under which 
the defendant acted imposed a duty and there are cases 
which have been fought on this issue.
28 
The decision 
29 of the Irish Court of Appeal in Bohen v elements 
is of particular interest in this respect, for as a 
matter of policy the court appears to have favoured 
liability. The terms of the statute provided that the 
defendants were "fully authorized" to carry out certain 
works and it was argued that the language of the section 
was, in its terms, permissive. The contention was 
rejected by O'Connor LJ in these terms: 
I am of opinion that this contention is not well 
founded. To hold otherwise would be to sanction 
the notion that persons who assume a statutory 
office can altogether ignore the functions for 
the performance.of which the office was created, 
and for which they were elected.30 
27. [1941] AC at 83 per Viscount Simon LC. 
28. Rex v Marshland Smeeth and Fen District Commissioners 
[1920] 1 KB 155; Boynton v Ancholme Drainage and 
Navigation Commissioners [1921] 2 KB 213 CA: 
Bohen v elements [1920] IR 117; and see 
Aitcheson v Waitaki County (1880) OB & F-G 52 
(expl'd in Taieri County Council v Hall (1883) 
NZLR 1 SC 360 at 363). 
29. [1920] IR 117. 




A. Meaning of "Negligence" 
It is sufficient for present purposes to briefly define 
~he ·tort of Negligence as the failure to take reasonable 
care to avoid acts or omissions which it might reasonably 
have been forseen would have been likely to cause damage 
to persons to whom a duty of care is owed. 1 In Blyth v 
2 Birmingham Waterworks eo. a water escape case, Alderson B 
laid down the classical formulation of "negligence" as: 
••• the omission to do som~thing which a reasonable 
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily 
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, ~r 
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man 
would not do. 3 
The legal concept of "negligence" has, however, acquired 
an extended meaning in respect of bodies having statutory 
powers or duties. In Geddis v Proprietors of Banrt 
Reservoir4 Lord Blackburn affirmed that an action lies 
for that which the Legislature has authorised, if it be 
done negligently, and said: 
1. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
2. (1856) 11 Ex 781. 
3. (1856) 11 Ex at 784. 
4. (1878) 3 App Cas 430. 
And I think that if by a reasonable exercise 
of the powers, either given by the statute to 
the promotors, or which they have at common 
law, the damage could be prevented it is, 
within this rule, "negligence" not to make . 
such reasonable exercise of their powers.5 
Thus in determining whether a statutory body has acted 
reasonably, without negligence, regard must be had to 
the availability of any special statutory powers by the 
exercise of which the damage might have been avoided. 
In Geddis' case it appears that the defendants were 
incorporated under a local Act. Pursuant to their 
statutory powers, they erected a reservoir, collected 
the waters of different streams and sent them through 
a certain channel. After a time they neglected to 
cleanse that channel, in consequence of which the water 
overflowed its banks and damaged the adjoining lands. 
44 
It was held that the defendants were under an obligation 
to take care that the due execution of the works and 
operations intended by statute should not be injurious 
to the adjoining lands. Lord Hatherley said: 
I apprehend that the true construction of all such 
powers given to companies is this: You may carry 
out your work to its full extent, and in some 
cases you must carry it out to its fullest extent, 
in the manner provided by the Act, but in so doing 
you shall not create any needless injury - you 
shall use all those precautions against injury to 
others which you would use against injury to 
yourselves in carrying on a similar work, and if 
5. (1878) 3 App Cas at 455. 
we find that in carrying out your powers damage 
has been done by you, the law will say that the 
powers which you can exercise shall be exercised 
for the prevention of mischief.Sa 
In Bligh v Rathangan Drainage Board 6 the defendants 
were expressly held liable upon the principle stated 
by Lord Blackburn in respect of damage caused by their 
negligent failure to cleanse a natural stream whereby 
flooding was caused to the plaintiff's land. The 
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necessity for the cleansing was caused by the defendants.' 
acts, such acts having been authorised. As the 
defendants had power to cleanse and scour the strea~ 
and as by a reasonable exercise of those powers they 
could have prevented the damage complained of, and by 
reason of their neglect in putting these powers into 
operation the damage arose, they were held responsible! 
A different kind of test applies where a local authority 
is engaged in the construction of public works. In 
Provender Millers (Winchester) Ltd v Southampton 8 
County Council the Court of Appeal accepted the trial 
Sa. (1878) 3 App Cas at 450. 
6. [1892] 2 IR 205 CA. 
7. [1898] 2 IR at 214. 
8. [1940] 1 Ch 131. 
judge's view in respect of statutory duties that: 
••• "[N]egligence" ••• means adopting a method which 
in fact results in damage to a third person, except 
in a case where there is no other way of performing 
the statutory duty. So that it is neglig(;!nt to 
carry out work in a manner which results in damage 
unless it can be shown that that, and that only, 
was the way in which the duty could be performed.9 
This rule must be modified where a statutory body is 
exercising statutory powers and compensation is 
provided for persons injuriously affected. In such a 
46 
case it is not sufficient that if the work had been done 
in a different way, the plaintiff would not have 
suffered damage; the decision of the Court of Appeal 
10 
in Marriage v East Norfolk Rivers Catchment Board 
shows that the standard of care in such a case is that 
of a reasonably competent person carrying out work 
of that kind with due regard to the rights of all 
persons likely to be affected. 
Where a statutory body has a discretion in respect of 
the ex~rcise of its power~ or performance of its duties, 
the forementioned principles are inapplicable. The 
principle in the Geqdis case, that the negligent 
exercise of statutory powers is actionable, applies 
only where the act or omission complained of is of a 
kind which itself would give rise to a cause of action 
at common law if not authorised by statute, and does 
not extend to give a remedy by way of civil action for 
negligence in the mere exercise of a discretion. 
These modifying principles appear from the recent 
9. [1940] 1 Chat 140 per Farwell J. 
10.. [1950] 1 KB 284 CA. 
decision of the House of Lords in Dorset Yacht eo. v 
11 . 
Home Office where Lord Diplock affirmed that the 
courts will decline to apply ordin~ry common law 
conceptions of negligence in cases where damage has 
been sustained as the result merely of the exercise 
by a public body of a statutory discretion. In such 
cas~s, the public law concept of ultra vires has 
replaced the civil law concept of negligence as the 
. . . 12 
test of l1ab1l1ty. 
B~ Standard of Care 
While the formulation of the test for negligence 
is a question of law, the issue of whether there has 
-
been a breach of duty is a question of fact to be 
determined having regard to all the circumstances of 
47 
the particular case. But judicial discussion or review 
of this factual matter is of considerable interest, 
for it is indicative of the standard of care imposed 
by the courts - what must be done to satisfy the test 
of reasonable care - and suggests a code of conduct 
to which the prudent authority will have regard. 
There must be a continuing awareness, however, that 
what is demanded in the way of precaution to achieve 
the expected degree of safety will tend to increase 
as the technologies develop and finances improve. 
ll. [ 1970] AC 1004. 
12. [1970] AC at 1066 et seq. 
At one time the law of tort recognised a special 
category of things "dangerous in themselves" to which 
a specific duty and high standard of care applied. 
In Dominion Natural Gas eo. v Collins and PerkinJ3 
the Judicial Committee brought natural gas and the 
48 
equipment usedin its supply within the ambit of the rule. 
The duty varied accordiriq to the subject matter of the· 
things involved and was never made clear, at least in 
relation to gas, although it seems that the degree of 
fault required for liability was minimal. However, 
14 after the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson where the 
House of Lords laid down a broad duty of care, the 
relev·ance of the classification for practical purposes 
disappeared. The case of· d·angerous things may now be 
regarded as a special instance of negligence where, to · 
adopt the words of Lord Macmillan, "the law exacts a 
degree of diligence so stringent as to amount 
practically to a guarantee of safety, J-5 and the 
t 1 . 1 1 16 ea egory no onger attracts specJ.a ·rues. 
1. Construction of Wo.rks 
Probably as a consequence of the availability 
of.a remedy by way of statutory compensation, there 
are relatively few reported cases relating to negligence 
in the construction, alteration or modification of 
13. [1909] AC 640. 
14. [1932] AC 562. 
15. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC at 511, 512. 
16. Beckett v Newa11s Insulation Co. [1953] 1 WtR 8 
(Escape of gas from cylinder.) 
drainage systems and associated works, but there are 
illustrations of some considerable importance dating 
from 1858. 
In respect of rural authoritie$, one case only may be 
cited, and this decision affirms that.due care must 
be taken in the construction of drainage works. In 
Collins v Middle Level.Cornn:i.issioners17 the defendants 
were held liable for negligence in the construction 
of a sluice whereby tidal water broke through the 
sluice and :t:looded the plaintiff's land. 
The law relating to urban authorities is more amply 
.illustrated. 
(a) Capacity of Drain Constructed 
49 
It is clear that a drain or sewer must be 
sufficient for the purpose for which it was constructed . 
. In Touzeau v Slough U.D.c. 18 the plaintiff suffered 
injury as the result of the irruption of sewage through 
a manhole whichhad been made in the vicinity of his 
home by the defendants. The question of liability 
was abandoned when in the course of the trial it 
became apparent that the sewer, the inadequacy of 
which caused the overflow, was insufficient when made. 
17. (1869) LR 4 CP 279. 
18. "The Times" 6th February 1896. 
so 
In Willoughby Municipal Corporation v Halstead
19 
the High Court of Australia held the defenqants liable 
for the negligent construction of a storm water drain 
which ran through the plaintiff's land. As a consequence 
of the drain's original incapacity, water accumulated 
on the plaintiff's land to her injury. 
But in constructing a drain a local authority is not 
required to provide for all possible eventualities. 
This is shown by the Australian case of Hawthorn 
Corporation v Kannuluik, a decision of particular 
20 interest as it went on appeal to the Full Court 
d t th. p . '121 an · o e r1vy Counc1 • The defendants had taken 
over a watercourse and made it into a public drain~ 
The drain ultimately gave rise to a nuisance by flooding. 
At first instance Williams J found negligence on the 
part of the defendants in two respects. {The second 
ground is discussed below.) He relied principally on 
the original faulty construction of the main drain. 
The learned judge held that there had been a lack of 
reasonable care on the part of the defen~~jts' 
engineer in designing and planning the work; the 
drain was of insufficient size and was badly graded. 
This ground of liability did not find favour in the 
Full Court. Hood J went so far as to disregard the 
19. (1916) 22 CLR 354. 
20. (1903) 29 VLR 308. 
21. [1906] AC 105. 
finding of negligence in regard to the construction 
of the main drain and said: 
It is going too far to say that there is an 
absence of reasonable care, calculation, and 
forethought because a man, in preparing a 
scheme for an isolated drain, not part of 
a comprehensive scheme, does not provide for 
unknown requirements, arising from an unknown 
use to which this drain may be turned.22 
(b) Capacity of Recipient Drains 
Where the construction·of a new drain or 
associated works or the diversion of existing drains 
will place a burden upon another part of the system, 
that too must be of sufficient· capacity to receive the 
flow without giving rise to flooding. Thus in 1858 in 
23 
Brown v Sargent a local board of health was held 
liable for damage sustained as a consequence of the 
51 
irruption of sewage from sewers which had been improperly 
constructed. The negligence was-in connecting a sewer 
with and causing it to discharge its contents into a 
sewer of a: smaller bore. The small sewer burst due to 
its incapacity. 
I D t B th C t 
. 24 
n en v ournemou orpora 1on the defendant 
authority was held liable for negligently bringing 
about the overloading of a sewer. The contents of 
a sewer had been diverted into another sewer already 
22. (1903) 29 VLR at 321. 
23. (1858) 1 F & F 111. 
24. (1897] 66 LJ QB 397. 
operating at capacity and as a result of the consequent 
surcharging, sewage escaped and did damage to the 
plaintiff's property. 
In New Zealand a highway authority has been held ·liable 
in an analogous situation. In Scott v Ellesmere Road 
Board25 the defendants were held liable for negligence 
in constructing a culvert without any provision for 
52 
carrying off the additional water which its construction 
brought onto the plaintiff's land. 
In Hawthorn Corporation v Kannuluik26 Williams J at 
first instance held as a second ground of liability 
that there was a further and more conspicuously 
manifested lack of care in the formation and construction 
of tributary channels leading into the main drain:
7 
h 11 
28 d th. d' . 1 . . 29 d T e Fu Court an e Ju 1c1a comm1ttee agree • 
Various subsidiary drains, gutters and ditches were 
constructed by the defendant municipality or by 
individuals with its permission. Building had 
progressed in the vicinity-at varying rates and the 
quantity of water and wastes discharged into the main 
drain by the subsidiary channels increased. The 
defendants became aware that the drain was not sufficient, 
25. (1887) NZLR 5 SC 283. 
26. (1903) 29 VLR 308; [1906] AC 105. 
27. (1903) 29 VLR at 309. 
28. (1903) 29 VLR 308. 
29. [ 1906] AC 105. 
but did not enlarge it or regrade it or improve it 
in any way, so as to abate the recurring and increasing 
nuisance. It appeared that the flooding caused might 
have been relieved by widening a small portion ·of the 
drain at the relatively small cost of L~OO. Lord 
Macnaghten said; in delivering the Board's opinion: 
••• [I]t is difficult to imagine a more conspicuous 
example of negligence than is shewn by repeatedly 
pouring offensive stuff into a receptacle or channel 
proved over and over again to be insufficient to 
hold it and pass it on. 30 
Proof that the work was sufficient when the water-
53 
course was turned into a public drain was not sufficient 
to exonerate the defendants:1 
It may be noted that a drainage authority may be held 
liable in respect of flooding from an inadequate drain 
where the works giving rise to the excess burden were 
constructed. in a capacity other than as a drainage 
authority. Thusin the recent New Zealand decision in 
32 the Spa Hotel case the defendant borough was held 
liable for flooding of a natural watercourse consequent 
upon the development of the locality which it drained. 
The defendants had themselves constructed certain works, 
baths and a highway, which resulted in increased rain-
30. [1906] AC at 108. 
31. [1906] AC at 108. 
32. J~w. Birnie v Taupo Borough Council (1975) (unreported). 
fall runoff into the stream. The nuisance might have 
been avoided by the defendants, had reasonable steps 
been taken to replace certain highway culverts which 
had thereby become inadequate and which caused the 
flooding. No attempt appears to have been made to 
hold the defendants responsible for development 
beyond those works actually carried out by themselves. 
(c) Failure to Construct Sewers or Drains 
54 
It has yet to be authoritatively decided 
whether a duty to construct or expand a drainage system 
may arise at common law where the existing system has 
become inadequate through uncontrolled development and 
whether a breach of such common law duty is actionable. 
There is authority. in the negative but the point remains 
open for reconsideration. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Hesketh v 
Birmingham Corporation33 lends some weight to the 
proposition that such negligence is not actionable. 
In that case the defendants were the owners of a 
sewer which ran alongside a natural stream. Forty 
years earlier they had made a number of sto~~-water 
outlets in the sewer to relieve the pressure on it in 
times of heavy rain by discharging the surplus water 
into the stream. At the time the outlets were made 
the stream was of sufficient capacity to carry off all 
the water that was discharged into it, but in the course 
33. [1924] 1 KB 260 CA. 
of time, owing to the neighbouring land having been 
almost entirely built over, it had become insufficient. 
In consequence of an exceptionally heavy storm so 
much surplus water was discharged from the sewer into 
the stream that the adjoining land was flooded and 
certain houses of the plaintiff on the banks of the 
stream were damaged. 
The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendants 
were guilty of negligence in continuing to discharge 
the sewage into the stream after it had become of 
insufficient capacity to carry it in consequence of 
the growth of population. The defendants were held 
not liable. Bankes LJ expressed no concluded opinion 
on the point, but indicated that the plaintiff was in 
great difficulty, "having regard to the cases which 
establish the non-liability of a local authority to 
an action for· mere non feasance. ~~ 4 Scrutton LJ was 
more confident; he said: 
[I]f the system of drainage, originally sufficient, 
became insufficient by reason of the growth of 
houses, the neglect of the defendants to improve 
the system so as to meet the altered requirements 
cannot be made the subject of an action.35 
Reference might be made also to the preceding decision 
of Shearman J in Craib v Woolwich Borough Council. 36 
w1lile that case is not of any great authority, it is 
34. That is, the cases relating to breach of statutory 
duty. 
35. [1924] 1 KB at 271. Eve J concurred in the opinions 
of his brethren. 
36. (1920) TI.R 630. 
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of interest because it was a true escape case, because 
negligence was proved and because it shows that 
nnonfeasance" might successfully be argued even where 
only a minor structural work was required to abate 
the nuisance. In brief, the defendants failed to 
prevent recurrences of periodic flooding from a sewer 
which had become inadequate. The defect might have 
been remedied by the enlargement of an outfall pipe 
from a manhole into which flowed storm-water and 
sewage. It was held that in failing to make this 
small improvement the defendants were negligent, 
but it was further held that the fault was in failing 
to exercise their statutory powers and for such non-
feasance there was no right of action. 
The authority of Hesketh' s case 37 might be attacked 
on three grounds; 38 Craib's case may be assailed on 
the second ground only. First, the Court of Appeal 
was unanimous in the view that there was in fact no 
evidence of negligence in the respects alleged and its 
views on the legal question of liability are therefore 
obiter dicta. Second, the Court failed to distinguish 
between causes of action based on statutory duties and 
those founded on common law duties. Third, it may be 
doubted that the case was properly regarded as a case 
of mere omission, for the defendants' conduct might 
have been described {as alleged) as a continuing 
37. (1924] 1 KB 260 CA. 
38. (1920) TLR 630. 
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activity of discharging the surplus water, whereas the 
court had regard only to their culpability in failing 
to improve the system. 
In contradiction of the principles accepted in these 
two cases, it is suggested that a common law duty to 
exercise statutory powers to improve qn existing 
drainage system might properly be derived from the 
conception of control; control arising· from the owner-
ship of the drainage system and the statutory and common 
law powers arising incidentally to such ownership, 
control assumed by the construction of the system and 
by subsequent modifications andmaintenance, control 
derived from their continuing responsibility for the 
disposal of the town's sewage and storm-water. 
39 
In Pride of Derby v Brit~sh Celanese it was argued by 
counsel that the neglect of a sewerage authority to 
construct new sewers was not actionable. Evershed MR 
considered the problem but preferred to leave the point 
open: 
[T]he cases do not seem to me actually to have 
decided that precise point, and I think that in 
this case it is unnecessary that I should express 
a concluded view upon it ••• 40 
(d) Proximity to Other Mains 
In constructing mains local authorities 
must, no doubt, take proper precautions in regard to any 
forseeable risks, but they .are not obliged to take 
39. [19S3] 1 Ch 153 CA. 
40. [1953] 1 Ch at 179. 
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account of an improbable series of events. This point 
is illustrated by Dunne v North Western Gas Board and 
L · 1 t · 
40a h d f h 1verpoo Corpora 10n were water escape rom t e. 
mains of the Corporation and caused the collapse of a 
sewer and hence the removal of the support of the Board's 
gas main. Gas escaped in consequence, causing damage. 
It was argued before the Court of Appeal that the 
Corporation was negligent in laying the water pipes in 
close proximity to the gas main and retaining them in 
that position. It was contended that as it was known 
that water pipes may leak notwithstanding reasonable 
care, the sequence of events, as in fact.occurred, was 
forseeable: 
The submission was that the water pipes were placed 
in too close proximity to the gas main and should 
have been placed far enough away to make it unlikely 
instead of probably that such an occurrence would 
take place.40b 
The evidence was that a leakage of water would normally 
reveal itself by a wet surface above it. Without any lack 
of care, none was observed in this case and the symptom 
may not have occurred. The trial judge found that such 
an accident would have been very difficult to forsee 
and would have had little weight in the balance of 
judgment of an engineer in deciding whether a special 
system of inspection should have been devised at points 
of such proximity. The appeal court took a similar view 
in regard to the initial layout. 
40a. [1964] 2 QB 806 CA. 
40b. [1964] 2 QB at 830. 
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2. Precautions Against Escapes 
There can be little doubt that the common 
law imposes upon drainage authorities a general duty 
to take all reasonable precautions to prevent escapes 
and consequent damage to other persons. There seems 
to be no reason why such a duty should not protect 
persons having communications with the drains. 
Thus a sewerage authority will be liable if it 
negligently removes a protective device. In 185 8 
in Ruck v Williams
41 
the plaintiff recovered damages 
from the Cheltenham Improvement Commissioners in respect 
of injury suffered in consequence of the irruption of 
river water into a burst sewer, whereby water and sewage 
matter was forced -into the plaintiff's premises which 
were drained by the sewer. The Exchequer Division held 
that the defendants were liable in negligence for 
having, in the course of altering the system, removed 
and not replaced a flap or penstock which had formerly 
protected the plaintiff's premises from such. in vas ions. 
It is noted that a plea of "nonfeasance" was not 
accepted and that nothing was made of the fact that 
the damage occurred through the plaintiff's communication 
41. (1858) 3_H & N 307. Cf. Stretton's Derby Brewery Co. v 
Derby Corporation [1894] 1 Ch 431 where Romer J 
suggested that the defendant corporation was liable 
to the plaintiff company, which suffered damage through 
its communication with a public sewer, only if liability 
was cast upon it by the empowering Act. 
with the sewer. 
3. Main ten an ce 
{a) Cleansing of Sewer and Drains 
A negligent failure to keep sewers, 
drains and natural watercourses cleansed and clear of 
obstructions may give rise to liability on the part of 
the drainage authority in which property or control is 
vested. It has already been noticed that liability 
60 
in the reported English cases has been based exclusively 
upon breach of statutory duty. There seems to be no 
practical difference between that cause of action and 
that based upon negligence at common law. In the New 
Zealand and Australian reports there are instances of 
actions based upon common law duties. 
In Tamaki West Road Board v Appleton 42 negligence 
was found against the appellant. board in failing to 
remove an obstruction of which they had knowledge from 
a culvert under a road whereby a portion of the 
respondent's land was flooded. Despite several clear 
warnings about the state of the culverts, the board 
failed to clear them. Then in Ham v Blenheim Borough43 
the defendant authority was held liable for negligence 
42. [1916] NZLR 183 per Cooper J. 
43. [1921] NZLR 358. 
in continuing to send drainage into a drain when it 
was insufficiently cleaned 7 thereby causing flooding 
to the plaintiff's land. 
The extent of the obligation on a municipal authority 
to cleanse its sewers has also been considered. In 
Sargood v Dunedin City Corporation44 the defendant 
corporation was exonerated of negligence in failing 
to cleanse a sewer in which silt had accumulated,-
causing flooding of the plaintiff's basement. 
Williams J expressed the defendant's duty in this 
way: 
There seems .•• no reason at all why the Corporation 
might not without negligence have allowed a certain 
quantity of silt to accumulate in the sewer. Their 
duty is to keep the sewer sufficiently free to carry 
off all the water that might be reasonably anticip-
ated would come into it, and it seems to me that if 
they leave clear the maximum space considered proper 
under the circumstances by the best authorities they 
have sufficiently performed their duty.45 
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It was argued before the Court of Appeal that Williams J 
had put the duty too low, but the decision was affirmed 
on the basis that negligence was not proved. 
The Australian cases are of particular interest insofar 
as they affirm that failure to cleanse and maintain 
artificial drains is not mere nonfeasance. In 
46 
Essendon Corporation v McSweeney one of the causes 
of injury to the plaintiff was alleged to be default 
44. (1888) 6 NZLR 489. 
45. (1888) 6 NZLR at 499, 500. 
46. (1914) 17 CLR 524~ 
on the part of the defendant authority in cleaning and 
maintaining the relevant drain so that debris 
accumulated and caused a nuisance by flooding. The 
High Court held that the defendants were bound to 
maintain the drain as originally constructed in an 
efficient condition and clear of obstructions and 
were liable for negligent maintenance. Isaacs J said: 
For a breach of its obligation to cleanse the drain 
within its own territory, Essendon, on ordinary 
principles, must repair any damage arising by 
reason of the consequent overflow of water 
reasonably anticipated, up to the limit of the 
drain's capacity. 47 
The restriction of liability to water flow within 
the drain's designed capacity is logical, for any 
nuisance in excess.does not arise from the obstruction 
but from the incapacity itself which may not be 
actionable. 
In Willoughby Municipal Council.v Halstead 48 the High 
Court referred to the Essendon case as authority for 
the proposition that: 
••• [I]f a constructing authority, although not in 
default in the original construction of a work, 
allows the work to fall into a defective condition, 49 
it is guilty of misfeasance and not mere nonfeasance. 
47. 17 CLR at 534. 
48. (1916) 22 CLR 354. 
49. 22 CLR at 356 per Griffith CJ. 
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In that case too, liability turned on negligent main-
tenance. The nature of the defects does not appear 
from the report, but the defects appear to have 
affected the capacity of the drain to allow the free 
flow of the water. 
In Campisi v Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission
50 
the defendants were held liable for a negligent failure 
to prevent a drain from becoming choked,· whereby the 
plaintiff's land became flooded. There was evidence 
that the drain had not been cleaned out for several 
years. It had become full of paspalum grass and water-
couch, with a considerable amount of silt. Jordan CJ 
distinguished those cases where the authority had 
failed to provide a sewerage or drainage system, or had 
failed to· extend it when it became inadequate, from 
the case where the authority constructs such a system 
but fails to take reasonable care to prevent damage 
arising from the water thus collected, and held: 
If [the authority] negligently allows its drain to 
become obstructed, and if, in the result, the water 
which has been collected into the drain overflows 
before reaching its destination and floods the other 
land, the owner of the land which has been damaged 
may maintain his action. This is not mere nonfeas-
ance. 51 
50. (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 631. 
51. (1936) 36 SR (NSW) at 639. 
However, the learned judge went on to suggest that in 
relation to the land actually drained, the .landowner 
has no action where through nonrepair, the drain becomes 
"less ameliorative" in its operation. 52 
Where, however, the watercourse in question is a natural 
watercourse and not artifically constructed, there is 
no duty at common law upon a drainage authority to 
cleanse the bed. But where the obstruction is brought 
about by the acts of the authority, such a duty may 
arise. 
In Bligh v Rathangan Drainage Board 53 th~ Irish Court 
of Appeal held the defendant board liable in respect of 
damage caused by flooding arising from their negligent 
failure t<? periodically cleanse a river bed, the 
necessity for which was wholly or mainly caused by the 
diversion into it of another stream and certain other 
alterations made by the defendants. The Court held 
that the case did not fall into the category of cases 
where mere nonfeasance was held to establish a ground 
64 
of immunity on the grounds that the common law rights of 
the riparian proprietors and occupiers had been infringed 
by the acts of the board. 54 
52. (1936) SR (NSW) 631. 
53. [1898] 1 IR 205. 
54. [1898] 2 IR at 213 per O'Brien LCJ. 
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- (b) Repairs of Sewers and Drains 
The duty to maintain existing .sewers and 
drains extends to the physical condition of the sewer 
or drain itself and it extends also to works constructed 
by the authority's predecessors, even to-the extent 
of repairing defects in the original construction. But 
it i·s not clear how far an authority must go to determine 
the condition of a drain. In Fleming v-Manchester 
C t . 
55 h d b d . . 1 orpora 1on a sewer a urst ur1ng a v1o ent 
thunderstorm. The water flooded the cellar and lower 
rooms of the plaintiff's house, finally causing the 
whole house to fall down. The sewer, built some forty 
years previously by the defendant's predecessors, burst 
because of defects in its original construction. The 
trial judge held
56 
that the defendants were under a 
common law duty to exercise their statutory powers to 
keep the sewer in repair, and to take reasonable means 
to inform themselves of its condition. Upon the jury's 
findings of negligence in these respects, the judge 
entered judgment for the plaintiff, but this was 
subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal on the 
ground that there was no evidence of negligence to go to 
the jury. 57 
. 58 
Then in Whitfield v Bishop Auckland U.D.C. the plaintiff 
55. (1881) 44 LT 517; "The Times" 27 June 1882 CA. 
56. (1881) 41+ LT 417. 
57. "Th-e Times" 27 June 1882. 
58. "The Times" 22 November 1897. 
sought to recover damages in respect of the flooding of 
his houses by sewage which escaped from the defendants' 
sewer. The jury found that the defendants' sewer had 
been badly constructed by their predecessors and that 
the sewer was improperly and negligently maintained by 
the defendants because in effecting earlier repairs to 
the sewer, they did not open up and examine the whole 
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of the sewer. It was contended that this was nonfeasance 
for which no action would lie. Wright J said "he.saw 
no ground of liability except misfeasance in the sense 
that there was something improper or negligent in the 
way in. which. the works of maintenance or repair were 
done." Judgment was entered for the plaintiff on the 
basis of the jury's finding that "it was negligent to 
do part of the work and not.the whole". 
4. Natural Conqitions 
In constructing and maintaining its reticulation 
systems, a local authority must make provision for 
ordinary conditions but not for extraordinary natural 
phenomena against which it cannot reasonably be expected 
to provide. The borderline may be difficult to discern. 
In Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co~ 9 the defendants 
were exonerated from liability as the escape was due to 
an abnormal phenomenon of nature, an unprecedented frost 
which caused a water main to burst despite all ordinary 
precautions. A large quantity of water escaped from the 
59. (1856) 11 Ex !781. 
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neck of.a main at a fire-plug and forced its way through 
the ground into ·the plaintiff's house. Su?h plugs 
operated as safety-valves to prevent the bursting of 
pipes, but on this occasion an accumulation of ice, 
resulting from a frost of extreme severity, prevented 
the plug from acting properly. The court held that this 
was a contingency for which the defendants could not 
reasonably be expected to provide. Alderson B said: 
The defendants had provided against such frosts as 
experience would have led men, acting prudently, to 
provide against; and. they are not guilty of neglig....: 
ence, because their precautions proved insufficient 
against the effects of the extreme severity of the 
frost of 1855 which penetrated to a greater depth 
than any which ordinarily occurs sough of the polar 
regions. 60 
In more recent times, a gas supply authority has been 
excused from liability in respect of an escape resulting 
from the effects of frost. 
In Pearson v North Western Gas Boar~1 the plaintiff 
sued in respect of an explosion which injured herself 
and her husband and which destroyed their home. The 
gas had escaped from a three inch metal gas main and 
had accumulated under the floor boards of the house. 
On the evidence, the cause of the escape of gas was 
the fracture of the gas main owing to the movement of 
earth caused by severe frost. The pipes were at a 
depth of two feet nine inches beneath the flagstones of 
the public footway. The main had been laid in 1878, 
60. (1856) 11 Ex at 784. 
61. [1968] 2 All ER 669. 
the metal was in good condition and the expectation of 
life of such a pipe was 120 years. The expert evidence 
adduced by the defendant gas board was that no reasonable . 
steps were open to safeguard the· public from the 
consequences of fractured gas mains. It was held that 
even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied so as 
to establish a prima facie case of negligence against 
the defendants, the expert evidence rebutted it and 
accordingly the action failed. 
It has been held that drainage authorities are not bound 
to provide for extraordinary .rainfall. In Brown v 
62 
Sargent counsel contended for the defendant board 
that they were only bound to construct sewers capable 
of carrying off ordinary drainage and not to bear the 
pressure of floods caused by extraordinary storms. 
Erle J held that the point was not raised by the evidence 
but indicated that if it had, he would have ruled that 
defendants were· not bound to provide for such storms, 
for such a storm would be an Act of God. The evidence 
merely showed that no such storm as on the day in 
question had occurred for six years previously and that 
was not sufficient to establish that it was "extraordinary". 
Then in the New Zealand case of Sargood v Dunedin City 
Corporation
63 
Williarns J held that the defendant 
corporation was not liable for flooding of the plaintiff's 
basement from a sewer which had become overloaded as the 
62. (1858) 1 F & F 112. 
63. (1888) 6 NZLR 489. 
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result of an "exceptionally heavy" fainfall. It was 
argued on appeal that this was not a case of vis major, 
but the decision was affirmed on the basis that negligence 
was not proved. 
Only limited precautions can be taken against such 
phenomena as earthquakes. It may be noted that in 1930 
in the New Zealand Supreme Court Myers CJ held in an 
action against the Wellington City Corporation64 that 
the Corporation was not liable for the escape of sewage 
from a sewage main into the basement of premises 
fronting the street under which the main was laid, as 
on the evidence the trouble had been caused by an 
earthquake. 
5. Inspection of Pipes 
It seems clear that in normal circumstances an 
authority will not be required or expected to excavate 
and inspect pipes laid under streets in order to detect 
d f k d . k 65 e ects. In Snoo v Gran Junct1on Waterwor s Co. 
the plaintiff sought damages in respect of injury caused 
to goods in his cellar by water which had escaped from 
the defendants• mains as the result of a fracture or 
burst. It was suggested that it was negligence on the 
part of the defendants not to have some system for 
inspecting and testing their pipes. In his address to 
64. Unreported - mentioned in Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation 
[1939] NZLR at 767 by Myers CJ. 
65. (1886) 2 TLR 308. 
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the jury, Huddleston B asked whether water companies 
could seriously be expected to do this: 
The defendants' pipes, it was proved, extenqed 
to some 300 or 400 miles in length. It was also 
proved that their inspection of the exterior of a 
pipe gave no reliable indication as to strength or 
weakness. How often such inspection should be 
carried out was not suggested; but as things now 
were the frequent disturbance of London streets -
from various causes - was bad enough without 
aggravating the evil by establishing such a 
practice as was suggested.66 
The jury found in favour of the defendants and the 
learned judge intimated that he considered their 
verdict proper. 
However, while an authority may not be required from 
time to time to open up and inspect the total length of 
its system, the occurrence of escapes in a particular 
section may be sufficient indication that inspection 
is warranted. 67 Thus in Whitfield v Bishop Auckland U.D.C. 
the defendant authority was held liable for having failed 
to open up and examine a sewer when executing repairs to 
part. 
6. Detection and Abatement of Escapes 
In Mose v Hastings and St Leonards Gas Co. 68 
the plaintiffs, who had no gas laid on in their house, 
detected a strong smell of gas on three successive days. 
At noon on the third day they sent word to the gas works. 
Workmen arrived in the afternoon and discovered that 
66. (1886) 2 TLR at 310. 
67. "The Times" 22 November 1897. 
68. (1864) 4 F & F 324. 
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there was an escape of gas from the main into the house, 
but before repairs could be executed an explosion 
occurred in the plaintiff's and two adjoining houses. 
It was found that gas had escaped from a hole at a 
junction pipe. The company was held liable for 
negligence. When summing-up, Pollock CB said that there 
was evidence from which the jury might come to the 
conclusion that there had not been due and reasonable 
care. Without saying that the company ought every day 
to send men over the entire district to ascertain 
whether there was any escape from the mains, it was for 
the jury to say whether the not sending anyone for 
several days during which, according to the evidence, 
the escape was discoverable,·-was reasonable care. It 
was clear that ~here ought to be some system of super-
vision and that men shouid ~lways be in readiness to 
repair any leakage which might be discovered, and that 
anything short of those precautions against accidents 
amounted to neglect for which the defendants were liable. 
In Manchester Corporation v Markland69 the House of Lords 
gave a firm indication of just how effective a system of 
detection of escapes must be in relation to a water 
supply authority. In that case, the defendants were 
held liable for failing for three days to attend to a 
leak from a service pipe whereby some of the escaped 
water froze and caused a traffic accident. It was 
not disputed that the defendants were under a duty to 
69. [1936] AC 360. 
72 
take all reasonable precautions to ensure that leaks 
in their system should be brought to their knowledge 
and be repaired with promptitude. The question at 
issue was whether they had failed in that duty. The 
area of supply was 130 square miles in extent. It 
contained 1,250 miles of mains and 200 miles of lead 
service pipes. There was said to be an average of about 
50 bursts per week. The defendants took certain 
precautions; in the words of Lord Tomlin (delivering 
the judgment of the House) : 
They had certain periodical examinations and tests 
made at the various stop-cocks and hydrants involving 
a visit to any given spot about once in nine days, 
but beyond this they did nothing. I adopt the words 
of Talbot J 70 "But as to anything more, they 
rely entirely on chance that some policeman or road 
officer, or other servant of another authority,_or 
.some householder or other person may give them 
information."· This was Q.. system or want of ·system· 
which the appellants' own officer ... did not 
apparently regard as satisfactory. 71 
Expressing his agreement with the majority in the Court 
of Appeal, Lord Tomlin held that the trial judge was 
entitled to come to the conclusion that these precarious, 
unreliable and unco-ordinated methods of receiving· 
information did not exonerate the defendants .
72 It is 
of interest to note, however, the strong dissent of 
Scrutton LJ in the Court of Appeal, \<Tho held that 
there was no negligence in taking the precautions 
70. [1934] 1 KB 585. 
71. [1936] AC at 364. 
72. [1934] AC at 364. 
usually.taken by water authorities and relying on the 
probability of information from other inte~ested 
authorities; it was a failure of their precautions, 
their sources of warning, but not a failure due to 
negligence on their part.73 
The approach of the High Court of Australia might be 
73 
compared. In Cox Bros (Australia) Ltd v Commissioner of 
Waterworks
74 the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
in respect of injury caused to premises as the result 
of the bursting of a water-main. The defendant had no 
s~stem of supervision or inspection of watermains, but 
relied on the public to report leaks and bursts, 
and paid rewards to those reporting them. The majority 
held that although the arrangements for the detection 
and abating of escapes was capable of improvement, there 
was no negligence either in the management or in the 
time taken to discover and shut off an escape. A less 
sympathetic view was taken by Starke J, dissenting, 
who said: 
It will not do for the Commissioner to allege that 
a better system of supervision and inspection is 
impracticable, because it would cost too much. 
In an undertaking in which dozens of bursts occur 
in mains every week, a good deal of supervision and 
inspection appears to be necessary. But the 
Commissioner trusts to the public to report leakages 
and bursts. They are under no duty to do so . The 
7 5 Commissioner takes the risks and must abide by them. 
73. [1934] 1 KB at 574. 
74. (1953) 50 CLR 108. 
15. (1933) 50 CLR at 120~ 
It may be noted also, that in Burniston v Bangor 
Corporation76 the defendants were held liable for 
negligently failing to stop flooding caused by a burst 
water main once they had been notified that the main 
had burst and was flooding the plaintiff's premises. 
The judgment of Rees J in Pearson v North Western Gas 
Board77 contains an interesting discussion of the 
duties of gas authorities in regard to the detection 
of escapes. Evidence was given that fractures of gas 
pipes due to extreme cold were common. The evidence 
was that there was no known method of ascertaining 
in advance whether a gas main would be likely to 
fracture, nor of preventing such a fracture from 
taking place. The· defendants took precautions. 
Maintenance men stood by ready to go to the scene of 
an escape. Whenever work was undertaken which involved 
the exposure of a main, the length of pipe so exposed 
74 
was inspected for visible defects. Mains were routinely 
tested to detect the escape of gas by the insertion into 
the earth of probes sensitive to gas at six-foot 
intervals. The learned judge commented: 
It perhaps hardly needs to be stated that neither 
the fortuitous inspection of small portions of some 
pipes by workmen, for the routine tests for leakage 
of gas from fractures which have already occurred 
or from existing defects in joints, is a practical 
76. [1932] NI 178. 
77. [1968] 2 All ER 669. 
means of safeguarding the public from death or 
injury arising as it did in this case. It may be 
that in some future case expert evidence coming 
from foreign gas engineers or drawn from experts 
in soil mechanics or other scientific fields may 
be available to contest the assertion of a gas 
board's experts that no reasonable steps are open 
to them to safeguard the public from the dire 
consequences which may follow from a fractured gas 
main. It might then appear that there are 
practical means of identifying the presence of 
cavities or voids close to gas mains or of 
protecting a gas main from the effects of frost, 
or of constructing a main of material which will 
accept without fracture the degree of earh move-
ment capable of being set up by frost. 78 
The judge went on to express the hope that the case 
might have practical consequences: 
At least this case will have served the public 
interest to the extent of drawing attention to 
the dangers to which a fractured gas main may 
give rise~ and also to possible lines of 
enquiry 'tvhich may lead to the discovery of a 
means of safeguarding the public from them or, 
possibly as a last resort, . or enabling those 
injured in future to establish liability and to 
recover compensation from gas undertakers. 79 
7. Activities of Third Persons 
It is well established that where a local 
authority knows or ought to know that its mains might 
be disturbed by third persons, it must take stringent 
precautions to preclude the possibility that damage 
might occur in consequence of an escape. 
78. [1968] 2 All ER at 671. 
79. [1968] 2 All ER at 671. 
75 
76 
In Price v South Metropolitan Gas Co.80 a gas main 
fractured as the result of excavations by the Commissioners 
of Sewers. Their failure to carefully replace the soil 
beneath the gas main deprived it of its support and the 
weight of traffic on the road caused a fracture. 
Escaping gas accumulated for two or three days and an 
explosion resulted by which the plaintiff was injured. 
The defendants employed men to go all over the district 
and to report escapes as soon as they could be detected. 
There was no evidence of a smell of escaping gas. The 
company was not aware of the escape, nor was it aware 
of the excavation of which it had no notice. Nevertheless, 
the court, Russell LCJ and Grantham J, held that there 
was evidence of negligence, that the company.ought to 
have .known that the ground had been excavated and that 
the soil had not been replaced, that the escape ought 
to have come to the knowledge of the comp~ny and the 
fracture repaired. Lord Russell was most emphatic 
that stringent precautions ought to be taken in the 
inspection and maintenance of gas pipes under highways. 
A similarly stringent duty was laid down by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Northwestern Utilities 
v London Guarantee and Accident Co.
81 
In that case 
a hotel was destroyed by fire when gas escaping from 
a welded joint in a main percolated through the soil and 
80. (1895) 65 LJQB 126 . 
. . 81. [1936] AC 108. 
penetrated into the hotel basement and ignited. The 
fracture was caused by the excavation and construction 
of a storm sewer under the gas main by the City 
authorities. The Board found that despite the 
tremendous responsibility of the appellants in 
carrying their highly inflammable gas at high pressure 
under the streets of the c;ty, they did nothing at all 
in all the facts of the case. They owed a duty to 
the respondents to exercise reasonable care and skill 
to prevent damage by the escape of gas and the degree 
of care which that duty involved is proportional to 
the degree of risk involved. It was held that they 
were negligent in failing to foresee and guard against 
the consequences to their main of the operations of the 
City. Lord Wright said; 
If they did not know of the City works their 
system of inspection must have been very 
deficient. If they did know they should have 
been on their guard: they might have ascertained 
what work was being done and carefully invest-
igated the position, or they might have examined 
the pipes likely to be affected so as to satisfy 
themselves that the bed on which they lay was 
not being disturbed. Their duty to the 
respondents was at the lowest to be on the 
watch and vigilant.82 
As it appeared that the appellants had given no thought 
to the matter, that they had left it all to chance, 
they were liable. 
82. [1936] AC at 118. 
77 
78 
This decision was applied by the Irish Court of Appeal 
. h 11 d lf t c t. 83 h 1n S e -Mex B.P. Lt v Be as orpora 10n . w ere 
an explosion which damaged the plaintiff's premises 
resulted from gas escaping from a fracture in a gas 
main which the defendant Corporation had laid under 
the surface of a private road. The fracture was due to 
the fact that subsequent to the laying of the main the 
owners of the road had excavated and placed a sewer 
running under the main, and after this excavation was 
filled in a certain amount of subsidence had taken place. 
It was proved that the defendant corporation had no 
system of collecting information about excavations in 
the vicinity of its mains un9er private roads, but it 
was content to rely on casual information and complaints 
to learn· of excavations (which an inspector would attend 
and supervise) or escapes. The Court held that there 
was evidence 'on which a jury could find the Corporation 
negligent. Porter LJ said that earlier escapes from 
the same section of main "should have served as a 
warning to the Corporation to take stringent precautions 
to prevent any further escapes from the main. "
84 
Further, the fact that there was no system of inspection 
to ascertain whether or not private streets were being 
83. [1952] NI 72 (CA). 
84. [1952] NI at 82. 
79 
opened showed a "complete misapprehension" of the 
defendants' duty to take every possible precaution to 
prevent injury to persons or damage to property by an 
escape of gas from the main. Nor could any reason be 
given why the Corporation should not have asked the 
local authority carrying out the excavation for 
information of any work which might disturb the main. 
If subsidence of the soil was inevitable, some method of 
underpinning or supporting the main might have prevented 
or lessened the possibility of a fracture~5 It was the 
duty of the Corporation to prevent damage from an escape 
of gas whether the main be in a private or a public 
street. Since, according to the evidence, the risk of 
a frac-ture in the main was g-reatest where the pipeline 
was laid under and across the road, that was the part 
which called for special care and vigilance.
86 
Where it is known that the lawful actions of third 
parties may cause subsidence of the soil beneath gas 
mains, but cannot be supervised, it may be necessary 
to make appropriate provision by the adoption of suit-
able materials and techniques. In Hanson v Wearmouth 
87 Coal Co. and Sunderland Gas eo. the plaintiff's 
85. [1952] NI at 82. 
86. [1952] NI at 84. As to the latter point see 
also p.89 per Black LJ. 
87. ( 19 39] 3 All ER 4 7. 
house was damaged by explosion of gas which had 
escaped from the fracture of a gas main in a street. 
The fracture was caused by the subsidence of soil 
caused by the working by the first defendant of a seam 
of coal 1,600 feet beneath the surface. The evidence 
showed that the second defendant took n·o steps to 
prevent the escape of gas in the event of subsidence. 
Goddard LJ said that the defendants had laid their 
pipe in a place from which'they knew support might 
be withdrawn, thus deliberately taking the risk of 
fracture by the subsidence of the soil. In producing 
no evidence that they did or tried to do anything or 
even considered whether or not there was anything they 
could do such as the use of mild steel pipes or 
flexible joints, the defendants failed to prove that 
they were not guilty of negligence. 
8. Service Pipes 
It ld b d t . 88 wou seem eyon ques 1on that supply 
authorities are under a duty to take all reasonable 
care in regard to the supply and maintenance of service 
pipes even where they extend into a consumers premises 
and whether or not there is a current supply. 
88. Lloyde v West Midlands Gas Board [1971] 2 All ER 
1240 CA. 
80 
Thus it was acknowledged in Bienkiron v Central Gas 
Consumers89 that in connecting service pipes with mains 
a gas supply authority must take all proper precautions, 
although it was held on the facts that the failure to 
cut off the mains supply while the main was tapped to 
admit a service pipe was not negligent. 
. 90 
But ·in Burrows v March Gas Co. where the defendant 
company negligently supplied a faulty service pipe and 
gas escaped and exploded, it was held liable for the· 
ensuing damage. 
The defendant gas supply authority was also held 
1 . bl . 1 kb c . 
91 
J.a e J.n Paterson v B ac urn orporatJ.on. In 
that case a service pipe had been left protruding into 
a consumer's cellar on discontinuance of the supply 
instead of being cut off at the main. The pipe was 
accidentally broken by third persons and a large 
quantity of gas escaped. In the resulting terrible 
explosion seven people were killed and much damage was 
caused. In the course of his judgment, Lord Esher MR 
said that "gas was so dangerous a thing that it 
required the greatest precautions¥ whether the supply 
89. (1860) 2 F & F 436. 
90. (1870) LR 5 Ex 6 7; aff' d (1872) LR 7 Ex 96. 
91. (1892) 9 TLR 55. 
was intended to be cut off permanently or ·even only 
temporarily. n92 
9. Control of Connections with Sewers 
and Drains 
Although the law in this respect is more 
amply illustrated in Nuisance, it would seem that 
cont~ol of communications by drainage authorities 
may also give rise to liability in Negligence. A 
typical instance would be the sanctioning of new 
connections where the recipient drains are insufficient 
to receive the additional flow. 
The decision in the Australian case of Madell v 
Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board93 
shows that proof of the origin of the excess flow and 
of the means of control is a prerequisite to the 
82 
. imposition of liability under this head. In that case,·. 
the defendants' sewer, which had been constructed some 
thirty years previously by a predecessor, served a low-
lying area in which the plaintiff's property was situated. 
Surcharging and flooding through a manhole on the 
plaintiff's property occurred after heavy rains. The 
flooding was serious, causing sewage to be carried in 
quantities through the property and causing damage. 
There was no evidence indicating any want of capacity 
in the existing pipes for the sole purpose of conveying 
92. (1892) 9 TLR at 56. 
93. (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 68. 
sewage, or of failure to keep the pipes free from 
obstruction; the only explanation of the surcharging 
was that it was caused by the flow of storm water 
from some undefined source. The defendants contended 
that the only method of dealing with the trouble wa.s 
by means of a pumping plant costing about L.l60.000 
and nothing could be done. It was claimed that the 
Board might, by the exercise of reasonable care, have 
found and remedied the cause of the damage, but there 
was no evidence to show how the storm water came into 
the sewers or how it might have been prevented. 
The court held that there was no evidence of negligence. 
It has notbeen decided whet~er a power to make by-
laws, as distinct from the enforcement of existing 
bylaws ,94 constitutes sufficient control for these 
purposes. This question was raised, though not 
resolved, in Madell's case95 where it was suggested 
· as a basis of li"abili ty that under its power of 
making bylaws; the defendant board might have prohibited 
the inhabitants from allowing stormwater to be carried 
into the sewers. The court noted that the power of 
making bylaws was subject to the approval of the 
Governor and held that in any case there wa~ no evidence 
94. Cf. Dutton v Bognor Regis U.D.C. [1972] 1 QB 373. 
95. (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 68. 
83 
that the Board had failed to have such bylaws made.
96 
The judgment offers no firm indication of how the 
contention would have been treated as a matter of 
law had it been substantiated by the evidence. 
While it seems doubtful that the negligent exercise or 
non-exercise of a legislative power aldne could be 
actionable, it may be different where the legislation 
relates to the control of property and is a formalised 
substitute for the exercise of equivalent common law 
powers. 
10. Intervening Cause 
The damage consequential upon an escape 
of gas from the mains of a gas authority is commonly 
disastrously extensive and on two occasions gas 
companies were driven to contending that such damage 
or part of such damage was too remote. In the result, 
the courts declined to admit that an intervening cause 
excused the defendants from liability; in the first 
instance in the case of an omission, and in the 
second in the case of an act. In .modern terminology, 
these cases may be seen as instances of the application 
96. (1935) 36 SR (NSW) at 74. 
84 
85 
of the general rule that "the operation of an intervening 
force will not ordinarily clear a defenda~t from further 
responsibility, if it can fairly be considered a not 
abnormal incident of the risk created by him 
Thus in Blenkiron v Great Central Gas Consumers
98 
the defendant company contended before the Queen's 
Bench that the physical damage suffered by the plaintiff 
was too remote. In that case a fire resulting upon 
the escape of gas might have been extinguished by the 
adjoining occupier but it was allowed to spread to the 
plaintiff's premises. Without actually deciding the 
point, the Court resorted to general principle and 
expressed the strong opinio_~ that "a person against 
whom an action is brought for an injury which flowed 
naturally from his wrongful act cannot be heard to 
say that, but for the intervention of another party, 
the wrongful act might have been prevented."
99 
Subsequently, in Burrows v March Gas eo!- the Court 
of Exchequer declined to allow the defendant to avoid 
liability where gas escaped as a result of the defendant's 
negligence but was ignited by a third person who 
97. F1eming Torts 4th ed. p.192. 
98. _ (1860) 3 LT 317. 
99. (1860) 3 LT 317. 
1. (1870) LR Ex 67; Aff'd (1872) LR 7 Ex 96. 
negligently sought the source of the escape whilst 
carrying a naked light. 
11. Contributory Negligence 
The question of contributory negligence 
has been considered in two cases of relevance in the 
present context. 
2 
In Brown v Sargent it was suggested that the plaintiff 
might have protected his premises from irruptions of 
sewage by constructing "sills" to his windows. Erle J 
ruled, however, that if there had been any want of due 
care on the part of the defendant board [in constructing 
their sewers] the plaintiff would not be bound to take 
any precaution to protect his premises from such 
possible consequences, nor to incur any expense for 
such purpose. 
The situation may be different where there is a 
86 
foreseeable possibility of flooding through the plaintiff's 
communications with the defendants' sewers. Thus in 
Sargood v Dunedin City Corporation
3 the plaintiff failed 
to recover damages in respect of injury to goods kept in 
a cellar which was flooded by the flow of water from 
the defendants' surcharged sewer. It was held that 
2.. (1858) 1 F & F 112. 
3. (1888) 6 NZLR 489. 
87 
there was contributory negligence in failing to 
install valves to prevent such an occurrence and 
(on the law as it then stood) recovery was 
precluded. 
12. Res Ipsa Loquitur 
The question of the applicability of the so-
called doctrine of res ipsa loquitur so as to establish 
a prima facie case of negligence against a gas authority 
in respect of any escape has been raised in two 
relatively recent cases. 
In Pearson v North Western Gas Board4 the plaintiff's 
case in negligence was based on the doctrine. It was 
argued that the offending gas main was under the 
control of the defendants and that it would not have 
fractured, in the ordinary course of things, if those 
responsible for it had used proper care. Rees J 
assumed, but did not decide, that the doctrine applied, 
but held that the defendants' evidence rebutted it. 
The learned judge found on a balance of probabilities 
that the explanation for the explosion put forward 
by the defendants had been established (frost 
damage) and that this explanation did not connote neglig-
. 5 
ence but pointed to its absence as being more probable. 
4. [1968] 2 All ER 669. 
5. [1968] 2 All ER 673. 
The doctrine was discussed at greater length by the 
Court of Appeal in Lloyde v West Midlands .Gas Board.
6 
In that case the gas apparatus from which an escape 
allegedly took place was actually on the plaintiff's 
premises. The applicability of res ipsa loquitur in 
88 
such circumstances was considered in detail by Megaw LJ. 
~he ·learned judge adopted the modern view that the 
"doctrine" is in essence no more than a. common sense 
approach, not limited by technical rules, to the 
assessment of the effect of evidence in certain 
circumstances: 
It means that a plaintiff prima facie establishes 
negligence where: (i) it is not possible for 
him to prove precisely wha~ was the relevant act 
or omission which set in train the events leading 
to the accident; but (ii) on the evidence as it 
stan4, at the relevant time it is more likely 
than not that the effective cause of the accident 
was some act or omission of the defendant or 
of someone for whom the defendant is responsible, 
which act or omission constitutes a failure to 
take proper case for the plaintiff's safety. 7 
Applying these principles, Megaw LJ held that the 
application of res ipsa loquitur is not necessarily 
excluded merely because there has been a possibility 
of outside interference with the thing through which 
the accident happened. However, where the apparatus 
said to have been defective was in his own house and 
could have been interfered with by someone for whom 
6. [1971] 2 All ER 1240 CA. 
7. [1971] 2 All ER at 1246. 
89 
the defendant was not responsible, the plaintiff would 
at least have to establish the improbability of such 
interference having caused the relevant defect 
in order to achieve the res ipsa loquitur situation~ 
8. [1971] 2 All ER at 1247. 
CHAPTER IV 
NUISANCE 
An eminent judge once remarked that the answer to the 
question, What is a nuisance? "is immersed in undefined 
uncertainty" •1 The establishment of a cause of action 
in the Tort of Nuisance depends upon the satisfaction 
of certain reasonably well-defined conditions of 
liability. 
There are two kinds of private action. A private 
nuisance is an indirect invasion of an occupier's 
interest in the beneficial use and enjoyment of land. 
A public nuisance is an interference with certain 
rights common.to a substantial portion of the public; 
a private individual may sue in public nuisance for 
"particular" damage, that is, a loss suffered over and 
above that suffered by· the public. The interference 
must in either case be substantial and unreasonable. 
Whether an invasion or interference is unreasonable 
turns on the fact of each case, but it may be observed 
that the damage to person or property usually sustained 
in cases of escapes of gas, water and sewage will 
usually be sufficient. Such damage is also sufficiently 
"particular" to enable a plaintiff to sue in public 
nuisance. Illustrations are provided by the cases 
discussed in the following pages. 
1. Erle CJ in Brand v Hammersmith Ry (1867) LR 2 QB 
223, 247. 
90 
It must also be proved that the defendant is in law 
responsible for the nuisance complained of. As shall 
be shown, it may be difficult or even impossible to 
establish a causal nexus between the defendant 
authority's conduct and an escape from its mains. 
Responsibility in Nuisance devolves upon anyone who 
actively "creates" a nuisance, whether or not that 
person is in occupation of the land from which is 
emanates, and continues so long as the offensive 
condition continues, regardless of ability to abate 
the harm. 
An occupier of land from which a nuisance emanates 
will also be liable if he "continues" a nuisance not 
created by him; he continues a nuisance if, with 
knowledge or means of knowledge of its existence, 
he fails to take reasonable steps to abate it, or if 
he "adopts" the ~uisance by making use of the thing 
which gives rise to it.2 
3 In Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan Lord Atkin sought 
to reduce the uncertainty as to the degree of respons-
ibility required by the terms "created" or "caused" and 
"continued" by reference to the conception of "use. 
His Lordship said: 
2. Sed1eigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880. 
3. [1940] AC 880. 
91 
92 
The occupier or owner is not an insurer; there 
must be something more than mere harm done to 
the neighbour's property to make the party 
responsible. Deliberate act or negligence is 
not an essential ingredient but some degree 
of personal responsibility is required, 
which is connoted in my definition by the word 
"use". This conception is implicit in all the 
decisions which impose liability only where the 
4 defendant has "caused or continued" the nuisance. 
The conception of "use" also serves to make clear the 
idea that the defendant need not have directly caused 
the nuisance by his immediate acts, but it is 
sufficient that he has brought into existence or main-
tained a state of affairs which has given rise to the 
nuisance. 
Supply authorities and drainage authorities will be 
considered separately. 
A. Gas and Water Supply Authorities 
The responsibility of gas and water supply authorities 
in regard to escapes has invariably been considered 
by the courts in terms of the "creation" of 
nuisances, although a case of "continuance" might 
occur. It may be noted that in this context at least, 
the terms "create" and "cause" may be used indifferently; 
it has been stated in a New Zealand case that there is 
4. [1940] AC at 897. 
no sufficient difference between the terms to warrant 
the conclusion that a water supply authority may 
"cause" an escape, but not "create" it.
5 
Where an escape occurs as the consequence of a 
spontaneous burst of a main, due to a latent defect 
or some such similar cause and not the result of 
interference by some extraneous force, the supply 
authority will be liable for a resulting nuisance. 
In Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co .. v Hydraulic 
6 
Power eo. the defendant company was held liable for 
damage sustained by the plaintiffs' cables in 
consequence of several bursts of the defendants' 
hydraulic mains. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Sumner 
made it clear that liability is not dependent upon an 
unlawful accumulation: 
It is not having the water in the pipes that is the 
legal wrong; it is not even submitting the water 
in the pipes to the very high pressure necessary for 
the defendants' undertaking that is the legal wrong; 
it is letting the water escape .. .7 
I I . d' . . 8 n rv1ne v Dune 1n C1ty corporat1on the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal held the defendant corporation 
liabie for damage caused to goods stored in a cellar, 
which damage was the result of the escape of water 
5. Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741 at 
778 per Smith J (CA). See also the terminology of 
Lord Atkin in Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] 
AC 880. 
6. [1914) 3 KB 772 CA. 
7. [1914] 3 KB at 782. 
8. [1939] NZLR 741 CA. 
93 
from a burst main forming part of the municipal 
supply. Smith J said that, viewing the whole of its 
operations, the defendant corporation should be said 
. 9 
to have "created" the nuisance. 
Where a nuisance results from the escape of water at 
high pressure from a fracture of a main; then, in the 
absence of any other relevant cause, the maintenance 
of the pressure in the main is a sufficient ground of 
liability. That is the effect of the Charing Cross 
10 
case, as explained by Lord Goddard CJ in Hanson v 
Wearmouth Coal eo. and Sunderland Gas Co.11 It is 
12 noted that in Benning v Wong Windeyer J would have 
held the defendants liable for the escape of gas from 
their mains upon the ground that" ••. by keeping up 
the pressure of gas in its pipes the Gas Company 
created and maintained a nuisance." 
It is not sufficient to negate liability that there 
were "jointly operating causes" as well as the 
defendant's own acts which led to the breakdown. In 
the Charing Cross13 Lord Sumner acknowledged that 
through subsidence of the adjacent soil, the immediate 
9. Ll939 J NZLR at 778. 
10. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
11. [1939] 3 All ER 47 at 49. 
12. (1969) 43 ALJR 467 at 492. 
13. [1914] 3 KB at 782. 
94 
cause of the fracture, though conduced to by traffic 
and vibrations caused by traffic, was the pipe's own 
weight when charged with water and suspended between 
two points instead of being continuously supported. 
But the cause of the discharge under pressure, "the 
thing which actually caused the water to squirt out", 
was the working of the defendants' engines: 
••• [I]f at the time of the fracture the engines 
had not been working;, or if it had been possible 
to cut off the pressure instantly, the damage 
would have been done in a very differ_ent way and 
to a very different extent, and much of the 14 
damage would have been of a very different kind. 
Where, hmvever, the fracture is solely and effectively 
caused bysome extraneous force, the supply authority 
will not be liable for damage caused by a consequent 
escape. The development and application of this 
competing principle by the Court of Appeal has greatly 
diminished the potentially \vide liability formerly 
. 15 
derivable from ·the Charing Cross case, particularly 
as the issue of causation falls to be determined as a 
question of fact and such a finding of fact, however 
lacking in perception, is virtually unchallengeable. 
As a result, it is difficult to discern the respects 
in v.rhich the defences raised and upheld in subsequent-
cases were any more meritorious than that based on the. 
14. [19141 3 KB at 782. 
15. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
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latent contributing causes referred to and excluded 
by Lord Sumner~ 
In Hanson v Wearmouth Coal Co. and Sunderland Gas Co. 
the Court of Appeal held, reversing the trial judge 
on this point, that the fact that the escaping substance 
was held under pressure ~s not a sufficient ground of 
liability where the escape was caused by the tortious 
act of another. In that case the defendant coal company 
had, in working its coal beneath the mains of the gas 
company, tortiously interfered with and broken the 
main. In delivering the judgment of the court, 
Lord Goddard interpreted the Charing Cross case
17 in 
this way: 
We think that the court meant no more than that 
the nuisance which resulted from the fracture 
in that case was the escape of water at high 
pressure, and that, as the hydraulic company 
maintained this pressure, they were responsible 
for the resulting nuisance. They had not in 
mind the possible liability of another party 
who, by a tortious act, enable the water to 
escape.l8 
The court accordingly rejected the trial judge's view 
that the Charing Cross case19 showed that the escape 
of gas must be regarded as proximately caused by the 
pressure of gas which the gas company maintained in the 
pipe and not by the fracture. Such a doctrine, it was 
said, would have "startling results"
20 but no indication 
was given as to the nature of ~uc~ results. 
16. 
17. 
[1939] 3 All ER 47. 
[1914] 3 KB 772. 
18. [1939] 3 All ER at 49. 
19. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
20. [1939] 3 All ER at 49. 
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Similar reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeal in 
Dunne v North Western Gas Board and Liverpool Corporation,
21 
the facts of which have already been referred· to. In 
regard to the liability of the Gas Board, the Charing 
C 
2 2 d . t . . h d th b . . f th ross case was 1s 1ngu1s e upon e as1s o e 
trial judge's finding that the leakage of the water 
from the Corporation's mains was the sole and effective 
cause of the accident, "an occurrence completely beyond 
the control of the gas board". 
22a In regard to the 
liability of the Corporation, the trial judge attached 
importance to the water being under pressure. On appeal, 
Sellers LJ d~sposed of the point in a superficial and 
unsatisfactory manner, commenting that there was no 
ab~normal pressure and it wa& in accordance with the 
Corporation's statutory powers. 
22b 
·B. Sewerage and Drainage Authorities 
The Law of Nuisance as it applies to urban drainage 
authorities is in an undeveloped and unsatisfactory 
state. It is frequently misunderstood and is subject 
to the unjustifiable intrusion of the immunity-
conferring conception of "nonfeasance". It is·perhaps 
uncertain because there has been no general statement 
of principle in an appellate court capable of being 
read as giving direction to the law relating to escapes. 
In particular, it is subject to or influenced by 
principles established in the pollution cases of last 
century when quite difference conditions prevailed. 
21. 
22. 
[1964] 2 QB 806 at 835. 
[1914] 3 KB 772. 
22a. [1964] 2 QB at 833,835. 
22b. [1964] 2 QB at 838. 
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Although drainage systems are outwardly similar to 
supply systems - both kinds of reticulation involve 
the conveyance of a potentially injurious substance 
through a network of pipes laid beneath the surface of 
public streets, highways and other land- the law of 
Nuisance has not yet taken cognisance of the resemblance. 
There are, of course, significant differences; in the 
one case the authority is concerned with the supply of . 
the substance conveyed and in the other with receipt 
and disposal. In the case of drainage systems the 
impetus of flow is provided largely by gravity and only 
exceptionally by mechanical means. 
As shall be shown, the common._ law has imposed a strict 
liability upon occupiers for the escape of sewage from 
private premises or sewers but not upon local authorities 
for escapes from public drains. The courts have hitherto 
declined to treat local authorities as the "user" of 
sewers or drains vested in them, or as otherwise 
responsible for the flow therein. If liability for 
an escape is to be established, it must be founded 
upon some anterior act, or upon some control which it has, 
or upon some other such responsibility; such factors 
as the construction of sewers, interference with 
existing sewers, control of private connections with 
public sewers and control of building in the locality, 
\ will suffice. Where direct cause on ·"creation" of 
the nuisance complained of cannot be proved, the 
plaintiff must show liability in terms ·of "continuance" 
or the action will fail. It will become apparent 
that there may be no liability in Nuisance in two 
principal situations, where the defendant authority ha·s 
~'~.inherited" the system (and possibly the nuisance) from 
a predecessor, and where the nuisance has arisen as 
a consequence of usage of the sewers by the inhabitants 
which usage is beyond the local authority's contr0l •. 
1. Liability of Private Owners 
It is of interest to consider, as a basis 
for comparison, the common law liability of private 
owners of sewers and drains for escapes. This 
particular area of the law has received very little 
judicial attention during t~~ last century and it is 
conceivable that the courts may yet restate the law of 
Nuisance so·as to take account of the modern reorient-
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ation towards fault liability. While there is authority 
d.irectly in point which holds occupiers liable without 
evidence of fault for escapes from sewers and drains, 
there are also broad dicta pronounced on high authority 
which indicate that negligence may yet become an 
essential element of liability. 
Strict liability was imposed upon private owners of 
sewers in the nineteenth century. ·Authority was 
ostensibly derived from the decision in 1704 in 
Tenant v Goldwin23 the first reported decision where 
23. (1704) 2 Ld Raym 1090. The plaintiff's declaration is 
set out at 3 Ld Raym 324; Also reported: 1 Salkeld 
360; 6 Mod 311; Holt KB 500. 
an occupier was held liable in an action on the case 
for damages resulting from the escape of sewage through 
h d . . f . 24 t e 1srepa1r o prem1ses. The plaintiff complained 
that the defendant had negligently failed, although 
requested to do so, to repair the wall of his privy 
and that filth flowed out of the privy through the 
decayed parts and breaches of the wall and overflowed 
25 
the plaintiff's cellar and caused him damage. 
Since, in the legal terminology of the times, this 
was a case of "nonfeasance", the plaintiff could only 
succeed if he could show that the defendant was under 
a legal duty to repair. No duty to repair arising by 
way of easement was pleaded nor formed the basis of 
th d . . 26 e ec1s1on. But Holt CJ held that tbe defendant 
was "of common right" bound to repair the wall:· 
[Every man] must keep in the filth of his house 
of office, that it may not flow in upon and 
damnify"his neighbour.27 
A general tortious duty to prevent escapes of 
lOO 
sewage and other harmful substances was thus recognised. 
The first reported case relating to escapes from 
. 28 
sewers was Russell v Shenton also an action on the 
case, decided in 1842. The plaintiff complained that 
24. Holdsworth History of English Law· Vo1.8 p.471. 
25. 3 Ld Raym 324, 325. 
26. 2 Ld Raym at 1093. 
27. 2 Ld Raym at 1093. 
28. (1842) 3 QB 449. 
the defendant had failed to cleanse and repair certain 
sewers on premises which he owned and that large 
quantities of sewage consequently flowed into the 
plaintiff's house, causing damage. As the cause of 
action was not properly pleaded, the action failed. 
That negligence was pleaded and admitted in Tenant v 
Goldwin was overlooked or ignored in subsequent cases, 
notably by Blackburn J in Hodgkinson v Ennoy29 and 
in Fletcher v Rylands 30 and the duty laid down by 
Holt CJ was taken to be strict. A similar error is 
apparent in the two cases now to be discussed. 
In Broder v Saillard 31 the defendant was held liable 
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for (inter alia) a leakage ·of a soil pipe on his premises, 
which leakage caused a nuisance by way of dampness to 
the plaintiff's adjacent house. This state of affairs 
was described by Jessel MR, in the course of his judgment, 
as an "act of omission". The leakage itself was not 
discovered until during the course of the trial, on 
investigation by a referee, and the defendant had no 
prior knowledge of it. Although the case wa.s one of 
extreme hardship to the. defendant, this was considered 
by the learned Judge to be irrelevant to the question 
of law. 
29. (1863) 4 B & S 229 at 241; 32 LJ KB at 326. 
30. (1866) LR 1 Ex 265. 
31. (1876) 2 ChD 692. 
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In 1877 in Humphries v Cousins 32 the Common Pleas 
Division clearly laid down the principles of liability 
applicable as between adjoining occupiers for the 
escape of sewage. The plaintiff was the occupier of a 
public-house and the defendant occupied an adjoining 
house. An old drain commenced on the defendant's 
premises, passed under and received the drainage of 
several other houses, turned back under the defendant's 
house, thence under the cellar of the plaintiff's 
premises and ultimately into a public sewer. That 
part of the return drain which passed through the 
defendant's premises had decayed, water and sewage 
escaped and flowed into the plaintiff's 'Cellar and 
did damage. The defendant·~as not aware of the 
existence of the return drain and consequently of 
its want of repair. At the trial before Blackburn J, 
the jury found that the defective state of the drain 
was not attributable to any negligence on the part of 
the defendant. The plaintiff moved for judgment before 
Denman and Lindley JJ. The nature of the rights of the 
plaintiff were described by Denman J, in delivering the 
judgment of the Court, and it was thus made clear that 
the conduct of the defendant is irrelevant: 
32. (1877) 2 CPD 239. 
The prima facie right of every occupier of a 
piece of land is, to enjoy that land free from 
all invasion of filth or other matter coming 
from any artifical structure on land adjoining • 
••• [T]his right of every occupier of land is 
an incident of possession, and does not depend 
on the acts or omissions of other people; it 
is independent of what they may know or not know 
of the state of their own property, and independent 
of the care or want of care which they may'take of 
it. 33 
The court also made it clear that the fact that the 
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defendant was bound to receive the sewage or part of the 
sewage did not affect his liability: 
••• [W]e are of op~m.on that, as between the plaintiff 
and defendant, it was the defendant.' s duty to keep the 
sewage which he was himself bound to receive from 
passing from his own premises to the plaintiff's 
premises, otherwise than along the old accustomed 
channel. 1his duty is incidental to the defendant's 
possession of land (see Russell v Shenton), and 
is the necessary consequence of the right of the 
plaintiff. That duty, like its correlative right, 
is independent of negligence on the part of the 
defendant, and independent of his knowledge or 
ignorance of the existence of the drain. The 
duty of the defendant himself to receive the 
sewage evidently did not depend on such knowledge; 
and the fact that he unknowingly received it affords 
no justification for allowing it to escape in a 
manner in which he had no right to let is pass )4 
Judgment was therefore entered for the plaintiff. The 
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal and in 
consequence of the defendant's contention that the 
sewer was vested in the local authority, a stet 
35 processus was assented to. 
33~ (1877) 2 CPD at 243, 244. 
34. (1877) 2 CPD at 244, 245. 
35. (1877) 2 CPD at 247 n(2). 
The notions of strict liability laid down in Broder 
v Saillard
36 and Humphries v Cousins 37 ma~ not escape 
the pervasive influence of the doctrine of "no 
liability without fault". It is suggested by 
Fleming
38 
that these two decisions impose a "more 
rigorous standard" than that which prevails today. 
Certainly, liability founded upon mere occupation of 
land does not easily accord with the modern formulation 
of the principles of responsibility in Nuisance. The 
conception of "continuance" is inappropriate, for 
negligence is an element of liability; an occupier 
only continues a nuisance if with knowledge or presumed 
knowledge of its existence he fails to take reasonable 
t t b , l' t t d"
39 
s eps o r1ng o an en . Nor do such circum-
stances amount to "creation" unless the notion of 
"user" (of the land or the sewer by the defendant 
occupier). is imported in order to show that the 
nuisance arose as an incident of active conduct 
on the part of the defendant. Knowledge on the part 
104 
of the "creator" of a nuisance has never been required~0 
41 
In Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan Lord Atkin 
36. (1876) 2 ChD 692. 
37. (1877) 2 CPD 239. 
38. Torts 4th ed 354. 
39. Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880. 
40. In modern law all that is required is that the nuisance 
should be foreseeable: The Wagon Mound (No.2) [1967] 
1 AC 617 (PC). 
41. [1940] AC 880. 
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evidently thought that the two older decisions were 
inconsistent with the modern principles of continuance, . 
but did not overrule them. He concluded merely that 
it was possible that the question how far a person is 
liable for injury to a neighbour's land from a cause 
emanating from his own land where he himself is ignorant 
of the cause or effect has still to b~ determined~2 
Where a nuisance was created by a previ?us occupier ,
43 
44 45 
a stranger, or a phenomenon of nature, an occupier's 
liability rests on "continuance"; but the general 
question whether latent defects fall into the same 
class remains open. 
46 
In Wringe v Cohen the Court of Appeal imposed strict 
liability for non-repair of premises, but the decision 
in the Sedleigh-Denfield case left the law in an 
. 47 
unsettled state. 
The principles of law stated in Humphries v Cousins
48 
have, however, since been applied in Canada, as recently 
as 1962. In the Ontario High Court in Esco v Fort Henry 
49 
Hotel eo. the defendant was held strictly liable for 
42. [1940] AC at 
43. Torette House v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637. 
44. Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880. 
45. Go1dman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645. 
46. [1940] 1 KB Z29. 
47. Lord Wright, for instance, indicated that where a 
nuisance is due to a latent defect, liability rests 
on continuance: [1940] A9 at 904. 
48. (1877) 2 CPD 239 . 
. 49. (1962) 35 DLR (2d) 206. 
the escape of sewage from a drain on private premises. 
On the authority· of Humphries v Cousins
50 McRuer CJ 
held: 
It is no answer to the plaintiff's claim .to 
say that the corporate defendant did not know 
of the condition [of the drain] or the means 
by which the sewage was conveyed across its 
property to the plaintiff's premises.51 
Whether liability in such terms will now be accepted 
in other jurisdictions is a matter of speculation. 
These principles may yet yield to a lower standard 
of responsibility. 
2. Duty to Confine as "User" 
On no reported occapion have the courts 
imposed upon drainage authorities a strict duty to 
confine the contents of their sewers or drains. In 
contrast to the case of water and gas supply mains and 
to the case of private sewers, it has yet to be held 
that a mere escape from public drains may be sufficient 
to attract liability in Nuisance. The apparent result 
of two decisions of the English Court of Appeal to be 
discussed shortly is that drainage authorities are not 
necessarily responsible in law for the accumulation of 
50. (1877) 2 CPD 239. 
51. (1962) 35 DLR (2d) at 211. 
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sewage or d~ainage water in their mains, nor for the 
flow therein; in the idiom of the law of Nuisance, 
a drainage authority is not per se the "user" of sewers 
or drains vested in it. This notion, which is implicit 
in the reasoning in the judgments of the cases mentioned, 
may confer immunity in two respects. First, in respect 
of nuisances inherited from a predecessor authority. 
Second, in respect of nuisances arising upon increased 
flows of sewage due to urban development. Such 
imrnuni ty is confined to the exceptional case where 
the local authority itself does or permits nothing which 
contributes to the nuisance. The nuisance must be due 
to usage beyond the local authority's control and not 
to the actual physical condition of the mains. 
The development of this aspect of the law, culminating 
in a solitary decision of the High Court where this 
reasoning was applied in respect of an escape of sewage 
from a local authority's sewer, is traced in the following 
paragraphs. The earlier decisions concerned nuisances 
caused by the discharge of sewage. 
There is some indication that the courts had previously 
assumed that sewerage authorities were legally responsible 
for the flow of sewage through their sewers. For 
1 
. . . 52 
exarnp e, 1n A-G v Bas1ngstoke Corporat1on liability 
52. (1876) 45 LJ Ch 726. 
was imposed upon the defendant corporation for having 
"conducted" and "allowed" sewage to pass through a 
drain under their con tro1.
53 
Similarly, in Glossop v Heston & Isleworth Local Board54 
Malins V-C at first instance found that there was good 
ground for complaint and granted an injunction 
restraining the defendants from (inter alia) "causing 
or permitting any sewage or other offensive matter to 
flow through the drains under their control into the 
river • . • [so as to cause a nuisance]". 
The notion that the responsibility of a sewerage 
authority for the flow of sewage through its sewers 
was restricted, was introduc·ed by the Court of Appeal 
. 55 
in the Glossop case. It was held that the defendants 
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had done no "act" of which the nuisance was a consequence 
and it was suggested that the nuisance was in fact 
caused by the inhabitants who had connections with the 
sewers. It will be recalled that the defendant board 
had been constituted for only a few months when this 
action was brought and that the plaintiff complained of 
pollution to a stream. Reversing the decision of 
Malins V-C primarily on other grounds, the Court of 
53. The attempt by Brett LJ in Glossop v Heston & Isleworth 
L. Bd (1878) 12 ChD 102 to explain this decision as 
probably turning on some enactment that carried down 
the obligation of what their predecessors had done to 
the defendants, is without foundation. 
54. (1878) 12 ChD 102. 
55. (1878) 12 ChD 102. 
Appeal also indicated that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to damages or to an injunction on the ground 
of a common law nuisance. James LJ took the view that 
the action was not based on any act whatsoever done 
56 
by the defendants i the nuisance was caused by 
certain persons who, largely in the exercise of 
prescriptive rights, used the sewer to discharge into 
57 
the sewer. Brett LJ agreed that the defendants 
58 
had not been gui 1 ty of any wrongful act. Similarly, 
Cotton LJ observed that it was not said that the 
defendants had done any act the consequence of which 
was t b . d . th . 59 o r1ng sewage own 1nto e r1ver. 
60 
The principles laid down in the Glossop case were 
·-
ff . d . . k' d' 61 a 1rme 1n A-G v Dor 1ng Guar 1ans. The plaintiff 
and relator alleged that the defendants discharged 
the sewage of the town of Dorking into a river and 
that because·of the increase in size of the town, 
the quantities of sewage had increased and caused a 
nuisance. The defendants had originally inherited the 
sewers from their predecessors. At first instance 
62 
Hall v-c held, on the authority of the Glossop case, 
56. (1878) 12 ChD at 102. 
57. (1878) 12 ChD at 110, 111. 
58. (1878) 12 ChD at 117. 
59. (1878) 12 ChD at 124. 
60. (1878) 12 ChD 102. 
61. {1882) 20 ChD 595. 
62. (1878) 12 ChD 102. 
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that the defendants were not liable; it had not been 
shown that they were "using" the sewers. This decision 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Jessel MR 
63 
pointed out that, as in the Glossop case, there were 
prescriptive rights to send drainage down the sewers 
and there had been a gradual increase in the nuisance 
because people who did not have prescriptive rights 
drains their houses into the sewer in question. 
Again, the defendants had done nothing as regards the 
. 1 . th . 64 part1cu ar sewer caus1ng e nu1sance . 
. While in both the Glossop and the Dorking decisions the 
local authorities had "inherited" their sewerage 
systems, in the Dorking case the problem had arisen 
in the defendants' time due to "development" in the 
locality. The "development" problem may appear alone, 
as where a sewerage system constructed by a local 
authority was sufficient when built, but later becomes 
inadequate. 
The extension of the immunity from the "inheritance" 
situation to the "development" situation is sign-
110 
ificant. In the former case, the local authority avoids 
immediate liability for a nuisance which arose before 
it assumed general control over the drainage system; 
in the latter case, it avoids immediate liability 
notwithstanding its control. 
63. (187 8) 12 ChD 102. 
64. (1882) 20 ChD at 601, 602. 
The reasoning which found favour with the Court of 
Appealwas extended to the.case of an escape from the 
sewer of a local authority in Smeaton v Ilford 
Corporation~65 That case illustrates the "development" 
problem in isolation. The plaintiff complained that 
on increasingly frequent occasions sewage erupted from 
a manhole in a street near to the house and fiowed 
into his premises. The excess flow arose upon the 
exercise by the inhabitants of their statutory rights 
to make connections with the sewer and was beyond the 
control of the defendant authority. Upjohn J pointed 
out that the nuisance did not ari~e from the physical 
condition of the sewers, nor from any act on the part 
of the Corporation: 
It is not the sewers that constitute the nuisance; 
it is the fact that they are overloaded. That 
overloading, however, arises not· ·from any act of 
the defendant corporation but because ••• they are 
bound to permit the occupiers of premises to make 
connexions to the sewer and to discharge their 
sewage therein ••.• 66 
It seems,therefore, that where connections are made 
pursuant to statutory rights so as to cause over-
loading of an existing sewer, the sewerage authority 
may not be liable for "creation" of a nuisance .caused 
thereby. 
65. [1954] 1 Ch 451; 
66. [1954] 1 Ch at 464, 465. 
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Cases in which drainage authorities may disclaim 
liabilfty upon these grounds must today be rare. In· 
the "inheritance" situation liability is now usualiy 
carried down by statute. In the-"developinent" situation 
it is likely that liability might be founded upon one or 
more of the grounds appearing in the pages immediately 
following. Furthermore, in either situation a recurring 
nuisance may, by the effluxion of time, fall within the 
principles of "Continuance". 
Where a sewer iswholly under the control of the local 
authority, however, the courts may take an entirely 
different view. In the Pride of Derby case 67 the 
defendant sanitary authority was held liable for a 
nuisance by pollut_ion arising from the discharge of 
effluent from a treatment station. Distinguishing the 
Glossop/Dorking line of cases, Evershed MR said: 
We are concerned, not with a drain or sewer down 
which there is sent by local inhabitants (having 
the right so to do) sewage matter which passes 
accordingly into a river; we are here concerned 
with sewage disposal works built on the corporaton's 
own land.68 
This reasoning is capable of considerable development. 
In the absence of a statutory or prescriptive right of 
inhabitants to make or maintain connections, ordinary 
common law liability might be applied. Moreover, it is 
anticipated that the existence of such rights may be 
eventually disregarded as immaterial. 
67. [1953] 1 Ch 149 CA. 
68. [1953] 1 Ch at 179. 
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3. Creation of Drainage Nuisance 
(a) Construction of Sewers and Drains 
If a local authority constructs sewers 
or drains, or additional sewers or drains, it will be 
liable for any escape caused and nuisance created 
thereby. 
The act of construction must be shown to have been 
causally related to the nuisance complained- of. The 
construction of a tributory drain, for instance, may 
impose an excess burden upon a recipient sewer and 
thereby cause an escape. It is not sufficient to 
prove merely that the local authority constructed 
the sewer from which th~ s~wage escaped; in Smeaton 
v Ilford Corporation
69 
it was admitted for the 
purposes of the action that the defendant corporation 
had constructed the sewer in questio"n, but the cause 
of the nuisance was not the act of construction but 
70 
the subsequent inadequacy of the sewer, and the 
defendants were not held liable on the ground of 
construction. 
That construction of sewers.may give rise to 
liability in Nuisance is well established by the 
pollution cases where the development of sewerage 
systems directly resulted in increasing quantities of 
effluent being discharged into streams or the sea. 
69. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
70. [1954] 1 Ch at 463. 
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There are many illustrations of cases at nisi prius 
where liability ·for such nuisances was imp.osed or was 
apparently imposed upon the ground of constructions 
d th . d 71 an ese cases are Cl. te below. It will suffice 
for present purposes to point out that three of these 
72 
decisions were affirmed by the Court of Appeal., 
~nd ·to refer briefly to the facts of the leading 
. . . h . 73 case, A-G v B1.rm1.ng am Corporat1.on, where the 
defendants had constructed a new drainage system, 
providing additional sewers for the town and 
constructing a large sewer from the town to the river 
through which the whole of the town's sewage was 
discharged. 
Certain observations may be made in respect of the 
pollution cases - or discharge cases - which are 
relevant to the escape situation. The fact that the 
inhabitants made and maintained connections with the 
71. Oldaker v Hunt (1854) 19 Beav 485; A-G v Luton Local 
Board (1856) 2 Jur NS 180; Manchester, Sheffield Ry 
v Worksop Board of Health (1857) 23 Beav 198; A-G v 
Birmingham Corporation (1858) 4 K & J 528; Bidder v 
Croydon Local Board (1862) 6 LT 778; Goldsmid v 
Tunbridge Wells Improvement Conunissioners (1865) LR 
1 Eq 161; A-G v Richmond (1866) LR 2 Eq 306; 35 LJ 
Ch 597; A-G v Halifax Corporation (1869) 39 LJ Ch 129; 
A-G v Leeds Corporation (1870) 39 LJ Ch 254; A-G v 
Tuns tall Local Board (1875) WN 66; Harrington v Derby 
Corporation [1905] 1 Ch 205 (Liable for proportion of 
nuisance attributable to construction of new sewers.); 
Hobart v South-end-on-Sea Corporation (1906) 75 LJKB 
305; Foster v Warblington U.D.C. [1906] 1 KB 649; 
Owen v Faversham Corporation (1908) 72 JP 404; Jones v 
Llanrwst U.D.C. [1911] 1 Ch 393. 
72. Goldsmid v Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners 
(1866) LR 1 Ch App 349; A-G v Leeds Corporation (1870) 
LR 5 Ch 583;. Foster v Warblington U.D.C. [1906] 1 KB 649. 
73. (1858) 4 K & J 528. 
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sewers constructed by the local authority, whether 
pursuant to statutory or prescriptive rights or other-
wise, was not admitted as a defence. Furthermore, no 
distinction was drawn between nuisances arising 
immediately upon construction and nuisances subsequently 
arising as a consequence of increased usage due to 
development of the locality. It is to be noted al~o, 
that this line of case extends before and after the 
Glossop/Dorking decisions of 1878 and 1882. 
Where a nuisance has been caused by the construction of 
sewers by a defendant authority, the principle of 
nonfeasance has no application. 
- 74 In Foster vWarblington U.D.C. Vaughan Williams LJ 
rejected a plea of 'nonfeasance' as there was ample 
evidence that the defendants had brought about the 
nuisance by their own acts as distinguished from any 
75 
omission of duty. The sewer from which the sewage 
was discharged had been constructed by the previous 
authority but the defendants had constructed new sewers 




In Jones v Llanrwst U.D.c. 77 Parker J took the view that 
74. [1906] 1 KB 649 CA. 
75. [1906] 1 KB at 663. 
76. See also Owen v Faversham Corporation (1908) 72 JP 
404 which appears to have been a similar case. 
77. [1911] 1 Ch 393. 
as the defendant council had themselves laid new 
and enlarged sewers, this alone took the case out of 
the class where only nonfeasance could b~ shown. 
(b) Defective Construction 
Liability will also be imposed upon a 
local authority for th~ creation of a nuisance where 
such nuisance is the re~ult ·of defective construction~ 
whether such defect should manifest itself in the 
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form of insufficient capacity, the lack of some 
protection against blockage by debris, or other similar 
fault. 
Thus, if a local authority constructs a sewer, drain 
or culvert which is inadequate at the time of 
construction, it may be liable for the damage caused 
thereby. In the Scottish case of Hanley v Edinburgh 
Corporation78 it was established that by reason of the 
insufficiency of a culvert constructed by the defendant 
Corporation, sewage was damned back and flowed onto the 
appellant's land. In the House of Lords, Lord Shaw 
said that: 
••• [I]t could hardly be doubted that the 
construction of such an obstacle necessarily 
followed by the creation of such a nuisance, 
were things which the person injured thereby 
had a good right of action. There was nothing 
peculiar by the law of Scotland in the situation 
78. (1913) 29 TLR 405. 
of a Corporation in this regard. They had no 
title at common law to divert the course of a 
sewage drain so as to make it overflow the . 
property of any citizen.79 
The principles upon which this case were decided 
are undoubtedly of general application. 
The failure to provide effective gridg and gratings 
where appropriate to prevent the accumulation of silt 
and debris is also actionable as the creation of a 
nuisance. This principle is illustrated by the 
recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Pemberton v 
Bright.80 In that case a local authority was held 
liable for damage arising from flooding caused by the 
blocking by debris of an ex~ension made some thirty 
years previously to an ancient culvert. The court 
held that the defendant County Council's failure to 
provide a grid or grating to protect the mouth of the 
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culvert had created a potential nuisance and the Council 
was liable for the damage re~ml ting when the potential 
nuisance became an actual nuisance. 
Support for the decision in Pemberton v Bright may 
be derived from the definitive judgments of the House 
of Lords in Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan~1 indeed, 
79. (1913) 29 TLR at 406. 
80. (1960] 1 WLR 436 •. 
81. [1940] AC 880. 
Sellers LJ applied certain dicta which appeared 
therein. In the earlier case, a local authority, 
which was not a party to the proceedings, had placed 
a pipe or culvert in a natural ditch. A grating was 
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provided, but it was placed in such a position as to be 
useless for the purpose of excluding debris ~~d flooding 
resulted. In the course of his judgment, Lord Atlrin 
observed that "the laying of a 15-inch pipe with an 
unprotected orifice was in the circumstances the 
creation of a nuisance or of that which would be likely 
to result in a nuisance. "
82 
The speeches of Lord Wright
83 
. 84 
and Lord Romer are to like effect. 
tc) Interference. with the Drainage System 
Interference by a local authority with 
an existing drainage or sewerage system whereby a 
nuisance is· created or increased may give rise to 
liability. 
Liability was first imposed upon this ground in a 
pollution case: 
85 
In A-G v Metropolitan Board of Works 
the relators (Conservators of the River Lea) complained 
that the defendants had diverted the contents of a 
sewer, which had formerly been discharged into the 
82. [1940] AC at 895, 896. 
83. [1940] AC at 902. 
84. [1940] AC at 912, 913. 
85. (1863) 9 LT 140. 
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river Thames, into a sewer which discharged into the 
river Lea. The court granted an injunction to 
restrain the defendants from continuing the nuisance 
thus caused. 
A similar principle has also been applied in escape 
cases, in England and Australia: In Dent v Bournemouth 
. 86 
Corporat1.on the plaintiff recovered damages in 
respect of a nuisance caused by the escape of sewage 
from a drain vested in the defendants. The Corporation 
had diverted the contents of a sewer so as to cause 
them to flow down a sewer already full and incapable 
·of absorbing the increased flow. 
·-
The decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in 
Smith v Penrith Municipal Counci~7 is an even clearer 
illustration of the rule. In that case the plaintiff 
complained of flooding of his land by a drainage 
system. There .was no evidence· as to who originally 
constructed the drains, but it was proved that the 
defendant council made alterations to it and cleansed 
the main drain and thereby facilitated the flow of 
water on to the plaintiff's land. Long Innes CJ held 
the council liable for that portion of the damage which 
ld b . b d h 1 . d 1 . 
88 
cou e attr1. ute to t e a terat1.ons an c eans1.ng. 
86. (1897) 66 LJ QB 397. 
87. (1936) 12 LGR 162. 
88. See also Ham v Blenheim Borough [1921] NZLR 358. 
(d) Physical Condition of Sewers and Drains 
It has been shown that the common law 
has imposed strict liability upon private persons 
for escapes from sewers out of repair. It is not 
clear whether drainage authorities are also under a 
strict obligation to ensure that their drains and 
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sewers are kept free of ol:lstructions such as accumulated 
silt and debris and in good repair. There are no 
reported cases where liability in Nuisance has.been 
imposed for escapes arising upon such defaults. The 
cases of nonrepair noticed under the head of Breach 
of Statutory Duty indicate that strict liability for 
nonrepair has been viewed with some disfavour by the 
courts. Some support for a-strict obligation may 
nevertheless be derived from the cases where the injury 
from a sewer or drain out of repair was sustained, not 
in consequence of an escape, but from the actual 
physical condition of the structure. 
Thus in two decisions of authority, strict liability 
was imposed the defendant local authorities in respect 
of the disrepair of a sewer or drain whereby injury 
was sustained by the plaintiff users of the 
superjacent highway. In White v Hindley Local Board89 
Blackburn J imposed liability upon the defendant Board 
for a "common law nuisance" and made no specific 
finding of negligence. Similarly, in Borough of 
89. (1875) LR 10 QB 219. 
Bathurst v MacPhersoJ
0 the Privy Council allowed 
recovery on the ground of Nuisance and negligence 
appears not to have been an essential element of 
liability. 
It is conceded, however, that some doubt has been 
cast upon the position by subsequent cases. In 
amb t f 
.91 
L er v Lowesto t Corporat1on a decision upon 
similar facts, Lord Alverstone CJ declined to hold 
the defendants liable in the absence of proof of 
negligence, distinguishing the Bathurst case on most 
92 
unsatisfactory grounds. If liability for nonrepair 
is strict in regard to the actual physical condition 
of drains, (and the prepond~rance of authority is in 
favour of that conclusion), it would be illogical and 
inconsistent if a contrary conclusion were to be 
reached in respect of escapes. 
90. (1879) 4 App .cas 256. 
91. [1901] 1 KB 590. 
92. See also Hocking v A-G where the trial judge ([1962] 
NZLR 118) seems to doubt the strictness of the 
Bathurst test. Sawer has suggested that if the duty 
laid down in Bathurst was a strict duty, it has now 
been "reduced" to a duty to take reasonable care: 
Nonfeasance Under Fire 2 NZULR 115 at 125; Nonfeasance 
in Relation to "Artifical Structures" on a Highway 12 
ALJ 231 at 233. But if that is so, which is doubtful, 
the "reduction" logically ought to be in terms of the 
defence of statutory authority. Alternatively, it may 
be that knowledge of the disrepair is sufficient: 
cf. Gilchrist v Oamaru Borough (1913) 32 NZLR 902. 
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(e) Control of Connections 
Urban sewerage and drainage may retain 
common law powers or have been granted statutory powers 
in respect of the connection, of private or domestic 
drains with the public drains under their control. 
Such common law powers, however, are ~ommonly 
limited or abrogated by the statutory right of house-
holders to make and maintain connections. But where a 
local authority might prevent or abate a nuisance by 
the exercise of its powers in this regard, it may be 
liable for its failure to do· so. This aspect of the 
law is illustrated by pollution cases and is summarised 
in the following two paragraphs. It may, however, 
provide a ground of liability in escape case and is 
potentially useful to plaintiffs in the "development" 
situation. 
h th th 
. . 93 T us, e au or1sa.t1on d
. . 94 or 1rect1on of the 
making of new connections where such connections cause 
a nuisance is a ground of liability for damages and the 
failure to stop up an illegally made connection may be 
d f 
. . . 95 
a groun or an lnJunctlon~ as may be the sanctioning 
f f 
. 96 
o uture connect1ons. 
93. Earl of Harrington v Derby Corporation [1905] 1 Ch 205. 
94. Gibbings v Hungerford and York Corporation [1904] IR 211 
CA. 
95. Charles v Finchley Local Board (1883) 23 ChD 767. 
96. A-G v Richmond (1866) LR 2 Eq 306. See also A-G v 
Acton Local Board (1882) 22 ChD 221. 
Where, however, the inhabitants have prescriptive 
rights to maintain connections with public. drains, the 
local authority cannot be held liable for failing to 
h d 
. 97 
stop up sue ra1ns. Similarly, a st~tutory right 
to make and maintain such connections precludes the 
imposition of liability on the ground of authorising 
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ouch· connections unless any conditions of the exercise 
of such right have not been fulfilled.
98 . These limiting 
principles clearly apply where the nuisance complained 
f . d b th d' h f . 
99 b t th o 1s cause y e 1sc arge o sewage: u · e 
decision in Smeaton v Ilford Corporation
1 indicates 
2 
that they are equally applicable in the case of an escape. 
(f) Control of Building 
The development of urban areas almost 
invariably increases the rate and volume of surface 
runoff as more of the land surface becomes impervious 
to rainfall and as increasing quantities of water are 
drawn off into public drains. The expansion of urban 
areas and the increasing density of settlement in 
existing built up areas affects the sewerage problem 
as the volume of sewage is proportionate to the population. 
97. A-G v Dorking Guardians (1882) 22 ChD 595. 
98. Charles v Finchley Local Board (1883) 23 ChD 767. 
99. Pride of Derby v British Celanese [1953] 1 Ch 149 CA. 
1. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
2. A private person who connects his drain to a public sewer 
may himself be liable for an ensuing nuisance, notwithstanding 
that he was directed to make the connection by the local 
authority - Gibbings v Hungerford and York Corporation [1904] 
1 IR 211 CA - and a statutory right to make such connection 
may not be a good defence at least where the terms of the 
right are not complied with - see Graham v Wroughton [1901] 
2 Ch 451 CA~ 
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It seems that the legal responsibility of. local 
authorities for drainage nuisances arising, in consequence 
·of such development may not stop at the construction of 
additional drains by the local authorities or with their 
permission, but may extend to the anterior construction 
of buildings. 
The English urban drainage and sewerage authorities of 
the nineteenth century were by and large special 
purpose authorities. Such authorities have since been 
superceded by municipal authorities having multiple 
functions. · These new authorities have greatly extended 
powers of construction of public works and housing. 
They have acquired, through ~own planning legislation, 
the power to control building within their boundaries. 
Both of these functions provide possible new grounds of 
liability. A local authority may be held to have 
created a nuisance arising from an overloaded drainage 
system where it caused or contributed to the problem by 
itself constructing buildings or where it permitted the 
construction of additional buildings in the locality 
when the existing drains were insufficient to absorb 
the increased flow. 
There is as yet no authority directly in point in 
regard to either aspect, but some judicial support 
may be derived from the Prid~ of Derby case.3 
3. [1953] 1 Ch 149 CA. 
No evidence had been adduced in that case as to the 
building or planning activities of the Der?y 
Corporation, but Denning Lj said by way of obiter 
dictum: 
[W]hen the local authority themselves do the 
increased building, or permit it to be done .•• 
they are then themselves guilty of the · 
. nuisance. They know (or ought to know) that 
the increase in building will cause the existing 
sewers to overflow, yet they allow it to go on 
without enlarging the capacity of the sewerage 
system. By.so doing, they th~mselves are helping 
to fill the system beyond its capacity, and are 
guilty of the nuisance.4 
The only reporte!a attempt to found liability on such 
a ground failed on the evidence. In Smeaton v Ilford 
Corporation5 it was contended that the overflow from 
a surcharged sewer was inpart due to the construction 
by the defendant corporation of an estate of over 300 
houses. It was held that there was no evidence that 
this sensibly increased the flooding complained of. 
4. Continuance of Drainage Nuisance 
Liability in Nuisance may devolve upon a 
person who, not having "created" the nuisance, 
"continues" it.
6 
A person may "continue" a nuisance 
by "adopting" it or in some circumstances by omitting 
to remedy it. 
4. [1953] 1 Ch at 190. 
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4a. See now J.W. Birnie Ltd v Taupo Borough Council (Unreported, 
Wellington, 11 June 1975, Haslam.J. Construction of baths 
and highway by defendant authority causing increased . 
runoff into stream, culverts inadequate to take additional 
flow. Liable for misfeasance.) 
5. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
6. Sed1eigh-Denfie1d v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880. 
(a) Application 
Although the earlier cases are perhaps 
inconclusive, it is now apparent that the continuance 
principle applies to sewerage and drainage authorities 
126 
to the same extent as to private individuals and that it 
applies in both the "inheritan·ce" and the "development" 
situations. 
It seems from the brief record of the case that the 
liability of the defendants in A-G v Barnsley Corporation 7 
was based on continuance. The original local board of 
health had constructed sewers and drained the dis·trict 
into a river, causing pollution. When the borough of 
Barnsley was incorporat.ed, the Corporation "continued" 
the same system of drainage. Hall V-C granted an 
injunction, restraining the defendants from draining 
the sewage of the borough into the river. The decision 
was affirmed ~n appeal.~ 
There is a strong implication in·the judgments of the 
Court .of Appeal in A-G v Birmingham, Tame and Rea 
9 
Drqinage Board that the rule that a new owner of land 
will be liable if he continues an existing nuisance, 
applies to a local sanitary authority. 
7. (1873) WN 228. 
8. (1874) WN 37. 
9. (1881) 17 ChD 685, see esp. Jessel MR at p.692. 
Express consideration has been given to the point by 
the English Court of Appeal and High Court and also by. 
an Australian State Court and these decisions provide 
clear authority for the proposition that a drainage 
authority may be liable .for continuing an existing 
nuisance, whether the nuisance arose in consequence 
of development in the locality or had been created 
by a preceding authority. 
10 
In the Pride of Derby case the defendant corporation 
were held liable for continuing a nuisance which had 
resulted from increased building in the locality as 
they had treated the sewage in their treatment works 
and discharged the effluent into the river. 
benning LJ said: 
Their act in pouring a polluting effluent into the 
river makes them guilty of nuisance. Even if they 
did not create the nuisance, they clearly adopted 
it within the ffinciples laid down in Sedleigh -Denfield 
v O'Calla~han, · and they are liable for it at common 
1 . law ..•. 
In Smeaton v Ilford Corporation
13 
Upjohn J referred to 
the continuance principle as l~l.id down in Sedleigh-
14 
Denfield v O'Callaghan · in considering the defendant 
10. [1953] 1 Ch 149 CA. 
11. [1940] AC 880. 
12. [1953] 1 Ch at 191. 
13. [1954] 1 Ch 450. , 
14. [1940] AC 880. 
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corporation's liability in respect of flooding from an 
overloaded sewer and clearly accepted that they would 
be liable if they knew of an existing nuisance 
emanating from their sewer but continued it by failing 
to take reasonable steps to abate it. 
The applicability of the principles in Sedleigh-
15 
Denfield v O'Callaghan to the "inheritance" situation 
was considered by McLelland J in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court in Stephenson v Ku-ring-gai Municipal 
.. 16 
Counc~l. In that case an increase in the flooding 
of the plaintiff's land was brought about by works -
in the surrounding area - for which the defendant 
council was responsible. The learned judge affirmed 
that the principles of 11 adoption" and "continuance 11 
are applicable to a case where a nuisance has been 
created by a predecessor in title of the person on 
whose land the nuisance exists and held that such 
principles exten-d to a local government authority. 
(b) Nature of Default 
128 
-It is not clear whether a drainage authority 
may continue a nuisance merely by doing nothing to 
enlarge or improve a system which has become inadequate 
building which the authority cannot control. In the 
17 . 
Pride of Derby case the court proceeded upon the 
15. [1940] AC 880. 
16. (1953) 19 LGR 137 • 
17. [1953] AC 880 at 894 per Viscount Maugham. 
the assumption that such conduct did not amount to 
continuance. While Denning LJ suggested that this 
accounted for the decisions in the drainage nonfeasance 
cases,18 in none of the cases cited was the point 
actually considered and the inference is totally 
without support in this respect. Furthermore, this 
reasoning is out of accord with the affirmation in 
19 Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan that a mere refusal 
or neglect to remove a nuisance may constitute a 
sufficient default. 
Quite apart from the question whether passive conduct 
is sufficient to amount to continuance, there is a 
difficulty as to the need fo~ an available remedy to 
which the defendant authority may resort. In 
Smeaton v Ilford CorporatioJ0 Upjohn J said: 
[I]n ordeJ; to establish liability for continuing 
a nuisance by failing to prevent it, one must 
necessarily prove that the person so failing 
must be in a position to take effective steps 
to that end.21 
The application of that relatively uncontentious state-
129 
ment of principle to the facts of the case is questionable. 
The flooding complained of had been known to exist by 
18. [1953] 1 Ch at 190. 
19. [1940] AC 880 at 894 per Viscount Maugham. 
20. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
21. [1954] 1 Ch at 462. 
the corporation for at least twenty years, although it 
had worsened in the last two years. Applying the test 
quoted above, Upjohn J concluded that the corporation 
could not be said to have continued the nuisance, for 
they had no power, by reason of the householders' 
statutory rights to make connections with the sewers, 
to prevent the ingress of sewage into the sewer in 
question;
2 
It may be doubted, however, whether the 
lack of a power to prevent the ingress of sewage is 
necessarily determinative in such a situation, for 
it is clear that the nuisance might have been abated 
by the exercise by the defendants of their statutory 
powers to construct new sewers. 
The proposition that a prima facie case of continuance 
may be established where the defendant authority 
might have abated the nuisance by the construction of 
new sewers is supported by the judgment of Shearman J 
in Craib v Woolwich Borough Cou~cil:3 In that case, 
the immediate cause of the nuisance was the inadequacy 
of an outfall sewer of a manhold which, during heavy 
rainfall, could not cope with the inflow into the 
manhole from sewers of larger capacity. Periodic 
flooding of increasing frequency had occurred as 
a result of the development of the locality. The 
butfall sewer had been constructed by the defendants' 
22. [1954] 1 Ch at 465. 
23. (1920) 36 TLR 63b. 
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predecessors, and was evidently defective when built, 
but the defendants failed to remedy the defect despite 
complaints over a period of twenty years. Shearman J 
considered that the nuisance resulting from the 
recurring escapes had been continued by the 
defendants; he said: 
I am satisfied that by not exerc1s1ng their 
statutory powers [the defendants] permitted 
the continuation of a nuisance which arose 24 
owing to the misfeasance of their predecessors. 
A bold approach to the question of continuance of 
drainage nuisances, based upon the continued operation 
131 
of the system, would be justified. Such an approach is 
suggested in relation to the inheritance situation by 
25 
the words of Hosking J in Fortescue v Te Awamutu Borough 
where, in the course of denying the relevance of the 
nonfeasance principles, he said: 
••• [N]either Glossop's case nor any other warrants, 
with regard to local authorities, the proposition 
that apart from statutory provision, where a work 
is a nuisance from the outset, a successor in title 
who makes use of it by suffering it to continue in 
operation is free from responsibility for damage 
resulting from its continued operation.26 
Such an approach has the advantage of simplicity and 
would recognise that the day to day functioning or 
"use" of a sewerage or drainage system is sufficient 
to attract the principles of strict .liability. 
24. (1920) 36 TLR at 634. 
25. [1920] NZLR 281 CA. 
26. [1920) NZLR at 301. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RULE IN RYLANDS v FLETCHER 
A. The Rule 
The modern tortious doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher 
has its origin in the leading case of that name which 
1 
went to the Exchequer Chamber (as Fletcher v Rylands) 
2 
and to the House of Lords. The facts were that the 
defendants employed a firm of independent contractors 
to construct a water reservoir on their land for the 
purpose of supplying water to their mills. On the site 
of the reservoir there were disused shafts of an 
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abandoned mine and the passages of this mine communicated 
with those of the plaintiff's mine. Water broke through 
these shafts, flooding the mine and flooding also the 
plaintiff's mine. It was found by an arbitrator that 
the defendants themselves were not negligent but they 
were held liable on the principle laid down by Blackburn J 
in the Exchequer Chamber: 
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person 
who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects 
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does 
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage 
which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can 
excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to 
the plaintiff's default; or, perhaps, that the escape 
was the consequence of vis major or the act of God; 
1. (1866) LR 1 Ex 265. 
2. (1868) LR HL 330. 
but as nothing of that sort exists here, it is 
unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be 
sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, 
seems on principle just.3 
This broad formulation was expressly approved by the 
House of Lords in affirming the decision, but Lord 
Cairns said that the rule applied only where the 
4 
defendant's use of land was a "non-natural 11 use, 
and subsequent judicial interpretat.ion of this phrase 
has substantially limited the scope of the rule. 
A number of doctrinal difficulties are associated with 
the rule. The case did not fall precisely within the 
established categories of tort liability of the time. 
It was not trespass, because the damage by flooding was 
not a direct and innnediate consequence of the defendant's 
activity. Nor was it an actionable nuisance because, 
apart from there being only an isolated escape and not 
a continuous or recurring invasion, it was not contem-
plated for another decade that the employer of an 
independent contractor might in some circumstances 
become liable for a nuisance created in the course 
of a job.5 





What was novel in Rylands v Fletcher, or at least 
clearly decided for the first time, was that as 
between adjacent occupiers an isolated escape 
is actionable. 6 
(1866) LR 1 Ex at 279, 280. 
(1868) LR 3 HL at 338-339. 
Fleming Torts 4th ed p.280. 
The Boundaries of Nuisance (1949) 65 LQR 480, 488. 
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The rul~ might have been absorbed by the law of Nuisance 
as an extension of liability under that head; indeed, 
for some purposes the law so regards it. But generally 
the two heads of strict liability are kept separate, 
although there is a great deal of overlapping. 
The trend of development of the Rylands v Fletcher 
doctrine has in general been toward the limitation of 
the wide and strict liability which it was seen as 
establishing. In the context of the liability of local 
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authorities, there are two factors which have influenced 
this trend. The first is the general judicial hostility 
towards strict liability and the second is the more 
specific aversion toward the-imposition of strict 
liability on local authorities and other statutory 
bodies. 
B. Negligence 
No negligence was imputed to the defendants in Rylands v 
Fle.tcher. That negligence was not an essential element 
of liability under the rule was affirmed in Dunn v 
Birmingham Canal coJ and that principle was not 
challenged until Dunne v North Western Gas Board.
8 
In that case Sellers LJ drew attention to the fact that 
there had been no negligence on the part of any of the 
parties and said: 
7 • (1872) LR 7 QB 244. 
8. [1964] 2 QB at 831. 
It is not a case of an independent contractor 
having been negligent, as was the case of 
Rylands v Fletcher. 9 
Jolowicz has quite rightly pointed out that if this 
were a valid ground of distinction, it would leave 
nothing of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher at a11.
10 
The dictum is inconsistent with the many cases which 
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have been decided upon the basis that negligence is 
irrelevant and it has not received any reported judicial 
support in the decade since it was uttered. 
c. Applicability to Statutory Bodies 
The question of the applicability of the rule will be 
considered in the chapter relating to the defence of 
statutory authority. It will suffice to say at this 
point that the ·weight of authority favours the view 
that statutory authorities are prima facie within the 
rule, subject to the defence of statutory authority, 
and are not entirely excluded by the mere fact that 
they exercise statutory powers. 
The significance of the prima facie application of the 
rule arises in three respects: First, where the defence 
of statutory authority is pleaded, the burden of proof 
in respect of negligence falls upon the defendant 
authority. Second, where the defence of statutory 
9, [1964] 2 QB at 831. 
10. Liability for Accidents [1968] CLJ 50, 52. 
authority is precluded by special provision, the rule 
applies in full strictness. Third, the rule may bring 
within the ambit of strict liabil~ty instances to which 
the law of Nuisance does not apply. 
The third aspect warrants further comment. In regard 
to Nuisance it has been ma~~ clear that in the case 
of sewage escapes it is necessary to go beyond the 
mere fact of escape from the defendant's sewer and 
consider responsibility for the fac-tors which gave .rise 
to or caused the escape. It has also been shown that 
questions of causation may also arise in regard to 
escapes of gas and water. However, if the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher applies, -then it is necessary only 
for the plaintiff to prove the escape. Causation is 
relevant to the rule, it seems, only insofar as the 
defences of Act of a Stranger or Act of God can be made 
out. Thus in Jones v Llanrwst U.D.c.11 Parker J 
expressed the view that the principle in Rylands v 
Fletcher would apply to the owner of a sewer, whether he 
made the sewer or not. His duty at common law would be 
136 
to see that the sewage in his sewer did not escape to the 
injury of others and mere neglect would give any person 
. . d d f . 12 ~nJure a goo cause o act1on. If these principles apply 
11. [1911) 1 Ch 393. 
12. [1911) 1 Ch at 405. 
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to local authorities, then the difficulties arising from 
the "inheritance" and the "development" problems are 
avoided. The mere vesting of a sewerage system in a 
local authority would be sufficient to give rise to a 
strict duty to prevent escapes. 
D. The Terms of the Rule 
A number of attempts have been made to ~ithdraw statutory 
authorities from the ambit of the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher by persuading the courts to construe the 
various words and phrases used by Blackburn J so as to 
preclude their application to the activities carried on 
by such authorities. None of these attempts has been 
successful, although in some respects an element of 
uncertainty has been introduced. The courts have also 
declined to accept that such activities amount to a 
"natural use" within the meaning of the qualification 
placed upon the rule by Lord Cairns. 
Reference should be made to the full statement of the 
rule quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 
1. "Own Purposes" 
On four occasions it has been contended that 
the defendant authority did not bring the substance 
(which subsequently escaped) within its control for its 
"own purposes". This phrase has been seen as the 
obverse of the defences of consent, common interest or 
13 
benefit, and as the obverse of the phrase "general 
benefit to the community." 
h th . 1 . . 
14 h . . 1 In t e Nor western Ut1 1t1es case t e Pr1vy Counc1 
rejected a defence based on the contention that the 
appellants and the owners of the properties destroyed 
had a "common interest" in maintaining. the potentially 
J.angerous installation, or that these owners had 
"consented" to such danger. Delivering·the opinion of 
the Board, Lord Wright said: 
It is true that in proper cases such may be good 
defences, but they do not seem to have any application 
to a case like the present, where the appellants are 
a commercial undertaking, though no doubtthey are 
acting under statutory powers, while those whose 
property has been destroyed are merely individual 
consumers who avail themselves of the supply of gas 
which is offered. These facts do not constitute f5 
common interest or consent in any relevant sense. 
In Irvine v Dunedin City Corporatiod-
6 
Smith J in the 
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Court of Appeal expressly extended this reasoning to the 
case of a municipal water supply authority. Referring 
to Lord Wright's judgment, he said: 
Similar reasoning applies, I think, to a municipal 
Corporation under our statute. Each citizen has to 
take his supply from the only available source. That 
negatives the notion of consent. The Council may 
sell its surplus water for motive power: s.252 
of the Municipal Corporations Act 1933. That gives 
the Corporation the character, in some measure, of 
13. "Common benefit" is a defence in domestic water-supply cases, 
notably as between tenants in the same building: Castairs v 
Taylor (1871) LR 6 Ex 217; Anderson v Oppenheimer (1880) 
5 QBD 602; Prosser & Son v Levy [1955] 1 WLR 1224. 
14. [1936] AC 108. 
·15. [1936] AC at 120. 
16. (1939] NZLR 741. 
a commercial undertaking, and negatives the idea 
~f a common interest. I am of opinion that the 
doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher is not excluded 
by the qualification that the user must be for 
the defendant's own purposes ••• l7 
It may be doubted, however, that the introduction of a 
commercial element in the activities of the defendant 
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authority is necessary to negative the idea of a common 
interest. If the plaintiff is a consumer, and that may 
not be the case, his interest is in the receipt of a 
supply sufficient for his purposes whereas the authority's 
interest is in a supply to the community at large • 
. k d h. 18 In R1c ar s v Lot 1an Lord Moulton indicated that 
where the defendant's activity amounts to such use of 
land "as is proper for the g-eneral behe fit of the 
community" it would fall outside the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher. Insofar as this phrase was intended to state 
the antithesis of the phrase "for his own purposes", 
as distinct from "non-natural user", it has been the 
subject of one judicial comment. In Irvine's case 
Smith J expressed the view that Lord Moulton's phrase 
did not establish that a municipal corporation carrying-
water in bulk under statutory authority would be doing 
f 
. 19 
so or purposes other than 1ts own. 
In Smeaton v Ilford Corporatio~0 defence counsel drew 
17. (1939] NZLR at 776-777. 
18. [1913] AC 263, 280. 
19. [1939] NZLR at 766. 
20. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
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attention to the use of the words "for his own purposes" 
in Fletcher v Rylands and in some subseque~t cases, .and 
he also contrasted that with uses "beneficial to the 
• 11 21 commun1ty . Considering this contention, Upjohn J 
saw much difficulty in drawing a line between the two 
types of user. He observed that: 
"[W]hat is beneficial to the community" cannot depend 
on the personality of the owner of the land who brings 
the substance on to it, but must depend en.tirely on the 
act under discussion. To collect and dispose of 
sewage is clearly beneficial to the community: so is 
the provision of water, and that must be so whether 
the undertaker providing the water does so as a 
local authority or for his own purposes in the sense 
of making a private profit. 22 
But the learned judge considered the authorities and 
concluded that they did not establish the proposition 
that a local authority is exempt from the principle 
of absolute liability on the ground that the use of 
land for sewage collection purposes is such a use as is 
. 23 
proper for the general benefit of the commun1ty. 
The point was again raised in the more recent case of 
24 
Dunne v North Western Gas Board in the Court of Appeal. 
In the course of delivering the judgment of the court, 
Sellers LJ observed that: 
21. [1954] 1 Ch at 468. 
22. [1954] 1 Ch at 469. 
23. [1954] 1 Ch at 470, 471. 
24. [1964] 2 QB 806. 
••• [I]n all the circumstances it scarcely seems 
accurate to h6ld that this nationalised industry 
·collects and distributes gas for its "own purposes."25 
Gas~ water and also electricity services as well nigh 
a necessity of modern life, or at least are generally 
demanded as a requirement of the common good ••.• It 
would seem odd that facilities so much sought after 
by the community and approved by their legislators 
should be actionable at common law because they 
have been brought to the places where they are 
required and have escaped without negligence by 
an unforseen sequence of mishaps.26 
The question whether the doctrine applies to local 
authorities was expressly left open at the instance 
of the defendants. It was accepted that there were 
to be found observations which might preclude the 
court from saying that the doctrine or rule may not 
27 
apply. 
2. "His Lands .. 
141 
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher, as originally 
enunciated by Blackburn J, applied as between occupiers 
of adjacent closes. The application of the rule to the 
case of_escapes from mains laid in or beneath highways 
required a deliberate extension of liability. Three 
kinds of situation may be identified: (a) Liability 
as between eo-licensees of the subsoil of the highway; 
(b) Liability as between an occupier or licensee of 
the highway and an occupier or licensee of adjacent 
land; (c) Liability as between an occupier and a· 
licensee of the same land • 
. 25. [1964] 2 QB at 832~ 
26. [1964] 2 QB at 832. 
27. [1964] 2 QB at 838. 
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(a) The decision of the Court of Appeal in Charing Cross 
28 Electricity Supply Co. v Hydraulic Power Co. is 
relevant to all three kinds of situation. The case 
affirms that where an authority lays or maintains mains 
in land vested in another authority, it is to be regarded 
as a·licensee. The plaintiff company and the defendant 
company were licensees. It will be recalled that the 
defendants' hydraulic mains had burst and damaged the 
plaintiffs' cables which had been laid under the same 
street. Lord Sumner held that the doctrine in Rylands 
v Fletcher extended to the case of licensees and that 
the ownership of t.he soil was not materia1.
29 
(b) 30 In the Northwestern Utilities case gas escaped 
from the defendants' main and damage was sustained by 
an occupier of adjacent land. The facts are accordingly 
closer to those of Rylands v Fletcher than the facts of 
the Charing Cross case but the case at least illustrates 
and affirms the rule that a statutory supply authority 
will, as licensee of the subsoil of a highway, be liable 
to an occupier of adjacent lands. Delivering the opinion 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Lord 
Wright held on the authority of the Charing Cross case 
that: 
284 [1914] 3 KB 772. 
29. (1914] 3 KB at 779-781. 
30. (1936] AC 108. 
(c) 
Th~ rule [in Rylands v Fletcher] is not limited 
to cases where the defendant has been carrying 
or accumulating the dangerous thing on his own 
land : it applies equally in a case like the' 
present where the appellants were carrying the 
gas in mains laid in the property of the City 
(that is in the sub-soil) in exercise of a 
franchise to do so ••• 31 
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32 
The decision of the House of Lords in Read v Lyons 
established that an occupier will not be liable under the 
..c; rule in Rylands v Fletcher to a licensee of his land and 
I 
/ it would seem on the principle of reciprocity that 
., 
n~ither will a licensee be liable to the occupier urider 
the Rule. It follows that where a local authority lays 
its mains through the. land of a private person pursuant 
to a statutory or contractual license, it will not be 
liable under the Rule to the occupier. 
A difficulty might arise, it is envisaged, where one of 
two parties having mainf? laid in the subsoil of a high-
way is also the highway authority. It is doubtful whether 
the mere vesting of a highway in a local authority 
makes it the "occupier" of the highway for these purposes. 
Even if it does, the courts may be prepared to draw the 
familiar distinction between functions and in respect 
of its public utility function treat the local authority 
1 . 33 as a 1censee, or, alternatively, as the "occupier" 
of that part of the land actually occupied by its mains. 
31. [1936] AC at 118. 
32. [1947] AC i56. 
33. We are not here concerned with damage to the highway 
which is likely to be governed by statute or contract. 
)o '-
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Support may be derived from Read v Lyons for a broad 
approach to such problems; in the course of his 
speech, Viscount Simon, on the authority of the Charing 
Cross and Northwestern Utilities cases, said that for 
the ·purpose of Rylands v Fletcher there must be an 
"escape from a place where the defendant has occupation 
or control over land to a place which is outside his 
34 
occupation or control." 
3. "Collect and Keep" 
In Smeaton v ilford Corporation 35 it was 
contended that the defendants did not "collect" 
sewage in their mains within the meaning of the rule 
in Rylands v·Fletcher, but merely laid a pipe into 
which others discharged sewage. Upjohn J preferred the 
view that as the sewer had been constructed by the 
defendants for the purpose of receiving sewage, was 
their property and under their control, they "collected" 
the sewage although they may have beeri under a duty to 
do so. 36 
The New Zealand case of Simpson v A. G.37 appears to 
be the only case in which the rule has been found 
34. [1947] AC at 168. 
35. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
36. [1954] 1 Ch at 468. 
37. [1959] NZLR 546. 
applicable to an open drain. The drain in question 
was used to carry off surface water from an·airfield. 
It was held that there is no special significance in 
the length of time that the substance (which escapes) 
has been kept on the defendant's .land. Although, for 
instance, there is no desire to.keep water in a drain 
any longer than is necessary but to get rid of it as 
soon as possible, it is sufficient that the water is 
kept in the drain for as long as it takes to convey 
the water from the point of intake to the point of 
discharge. Thus, "[f]or the purposes of the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher there is no difference in principle 
b t d . d . ..38 e ween a ra1n an a reservo1r. 
4. . "Likely To Do Mischief" 
Blackburn J's formulation of the rule extends 
strict liability to "anything likely to do mischief 
if it escapes". Although sewage might be described as 
"noxious n
39 
or "poisonous and harmful" 
40 
and gas as 
"inflammable and explosive" or even an "extraordinary 
41 
danger", the phrase "likely to do mischief" has not 
been taken to include only those substances which are 
inherently dangerous, and it seems d~void of any 
operative meaning. Whether a substance creates a risk 
of damage should it escape must depend on all the 
38. [1959] NZLR at 549. 
39, Hobart v Southend-on-Sea Corporation (1906) 75 LJ(KB) 
305. 
40. Pride of Derby v British Celanese [1952] 1 All ER 1326, 
1337. 
41. Northwestern Utilities v London Guarantee and Accident Co. 
[1936] AC 108, 118. 
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circumstances of the case and there must be very few 
substances which could never create some risk. In any 
event the identity of a substance is alone not a 
criterion of liability, but its qualities and its 
quantity are factors to be considered. 
5. Non-Natural User 
Whatever the correct answer to the question of 
what Lord Cairns actually meant 
the Privy Council in Rickards v 
42 
by "non-natural" user 
. . h" 43 f d Lot 1an pre erre a 
restrictive view and it was laid down that: 
It tnust be some special use bringing with it increased 
danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary 
use of land or such use as is proper for the general 
benefit of the community.44 
Although this decision "withdrew a wide range of 
activities from the ambit of strict liability" ,
45 
the 
activities of local .authorities in relation to gas and 
water supply, sewerage and probably drainage, have 
remained within it. However, what is a natural or 
146 
non-natural user of land awaits authoritative definition. 
(a) Gas 
. . 46 
In Batcheller V Tunbr1dge Wells Gas Co. 
the defendant company was held liable under the rule in 
42. Cf. Newark Non-natural User and Rylands v Fletcher 
(1961) 24 Mod LR 557. 
43. [1913] AC 263. 
44. [1913] AC at 280. 
45. Fleming Torts 4th ed p.282. 
46. (1901) 84 LT 765. 
Rylands v Fletcher for an escape of gas. It was 
reported of Farwell J's judgment that: 
••• [T]he learned judge considered that the gas pipe 
was clearly within the words of Lord Cairns in 
Rylands v Fletcher, where "gas" might be added after 
the words "beasts or water or filth or stenches." 
It was clearly a non-natural use of land to put gas 
pipes there, so that the defendants must keep them 
at their own peril.47 
48 
The Northwestern Utilities case supports the view 
that gas suppliers are to be regarded as non-natural 
users. It was held that the appellants were prima 
facie within the rule and it was emphasised by Lord 
Wright that .they were carrying in their mains an 
inflammable and explosive gas which constituted an 
49 "extraordinary danger". 
50 In his dissenting judgment in Benning v Wong 
Windeyer J expressed the view that the condition of 
liability on·"non-natural user" did not depend on any 
certain objective criteria, "but on whether it is a 
use of such a character that the defendant ought, in 
147 
the opinion of the court determining the particular case, 
to take the risk of having a dangerous thing where it 
was." 
47. (1901) 84 LT at 766. 
48. [1936] AC 108. 
49. [1936] AC at 118. 
50. (1969) 43 ALJR 467. 
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Although he thought that putting gas mains under streets 
was today a natural and ordinary user of land, (and 
thus within Lord Moulton's words in Rickards v Lothiad1 ) 
52 . 
he held (following Batcheller Is case ) that "for present 
purposes ••. bringing upon land something of a kind not 
naturally found there is to be called a non-natural 
use of the land," and that gas pipes and escapes of 
gas were within the rule. 
(b) Water 
53 . 
In the Charing Cross case ~ Scrutton J, at first 
·instance, suggested in a different context that 
" ••• it is now an ordinary use of a road to carry mains 
of water, ordinary or hydraulic, gas and electricity ... ,. 
but the "natural user" point was not taken and both 
courts merely accepted that the hydraulic mains were a 
source of danger. 
Similarly, in Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation55 
it was said that nothing could be more usual in New 
Zealand than the use of streets or of the land beneath 
them for the laying of. water mains, but the carrying 
of water in bulk renders its use dangerous and water 
carried for that purpose is not a natural or ordinary 
56 
use. 
51. [1913] AC 263. 
52. (1901) 84 LT 765. 
. 53. [1913] 3 KB 442; [1914] 3 KB 772 (CA) .. 
54. [1913] 3 KB at 449. 
55. [1939] NZLR 741 (CA). 
56. [1939] NZLR at 775 per Smith J and see p.790 per 
Johnston J. 
.. 54 
It is to be noted that a distinction has been drawn 
in relation to "natural user" between the use of 
water for domestic purposes, which is a natural use, 
and the keeping of water in bulk or in mains, which 
. 57 
1s a non-natural use. 
(c) Sewage 
h 'd 58 . In t e Pr1 e of Derby case, Denn1ng LJ 
doubted whether the Rylands v Fletcher doctrine applied 
to sewerage authorities on the ground that the use of· 
land for drainage purposes by a local authority is 
"such use as is proper for the general benefit of the 
community" and therefore within the definition of 
11 1 " 1 . d . . k d th . 59 b natura user a1 down 1n ~1c ar s v Lo 1an y 
60 
Lord Moulton. But in the same case Evershed MR 
said that he was not satisfied that local authorities 
have any special immunity from the rule~1 
I S t lf d . . 62 . h d n mea on v I or Corporat1on UpJO n J expresse 
the view that: 
To collect into a sewer a large volume of sewage, 
inherently noxious and dangerous and bound to 
cause great damage if not properly contained, 
cannot be described ••• as a natural user of 
land. 63 







All ER 106 (CA); Collingwood v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd 
[1936] 3 All ER 200 (CA); Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation 
[1939] NZLR 741. 
[1953] 1 Ch 149. 
(1913] AC 263; 
( 1953] 1 Ch at 189. 
[ 1953] 1 Ch at 176. 
[ 19 54] 1 Ch 450. 




In Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan Viscount 
Maugham suggested that the Rule does not apply to the 
"escape of water from an artificial watercourse", 
such as an agricultural ditch or culvert, as such is 
- 65 
an ordinary user of land. 
But it appears that the familiar distinction must be 
drawn between the drainage of "natural" waters, waters 
which would naturally flow onto the plaintiff's land, 





As has been mentioned, in Simpson v A-G Barrowclough CJ 
held that an open artificial drain fell within the Rule. 
The drain in question had been constructed for the sole 
purpose of carrying water from an airfield and was 
carrying foreign and artificially introduced water when 
it overflowed. 
E. Defences : Act of God and Act of Stranger 
68 
It was accepted by Blackburn J in Fletcher v Rylands 
64. [1940] AC 880. 
65. [1940] AC at 887, 888. 
66. Cf. Gibbons v Lenfesty (1915) 84 LJPC 158; Wi1sher v 
Corban [1955] NZLR 478; Strange v Andrews [1956] NZLR 948. 
67. [1959] NZLR 546. 
68. (1866) LR 1 Ex 265. 
that liability under the principles there enunciated 
would be excluded if it could be shown that the escape 
. 69 
was due to an Act of God or an Act of a Stranger. 
1. Act of God 
The phrase "Act of God" is devoid of theolog-
ical significance. This defence has been successfully 
invoked in the case of an extra-ordinary storm of 
precedented violence which could not reasonably have 
70 been anticipated by the defendant, but more authorit-
ative view is that the defence will not be made out 
unless the phenomena would not upon human foresight and 
d h b . d 'b'l' 71 pru ence ave een recogn1se as a poss1 1 1ty. 
2. Act of Stranger 
The defence of "Act of Stranger" is subject to 
72 a less stringent test. It was applied in Box v Jubb 
. 73 and, by the P~ivy Council, in Rickards v Loth1an. 
The degree of volition at first required on the part 
of the third person was malice, but subsequently the 
Board slightly relaxed its earlier test and in North-
'1' . d . d 74 western Ut1 1t1es v London Guarantee an Acc1 ent eo. 
indicated that it is sufficient if the act was concious 
69 • Both defences are also available in Nuisance: 
Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880 at 889 
per Viscount Maugham. 
70. Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1. 
71. Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Ry [1917] AC 556. 
72. 4 Ex 76. 
73. [1913] AC 263. 
74. [1936] AC 108. 
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or deliberate. This terminology was subsequently 
adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Hanson v 
Wearmouth Coal co?
5 
and by the Irish Court of Appeal 
in Shell-Mex & B.P. Ltd v Belfast Corporation?
6 
Thus, by way of illustration, it has been held 
sufficient to prima facie exonerate a defendant gas 
authority from strict liability for damage caused by 
an escape where the fracture was caused by the 
construction of a sewer in the vicinity of the 
defendant's mains, as in the Northwestern Utilities 
77 
case and the Shell-Mex B.P. casJ8 or the working of 
mines beneath the surface, as in Hansen's case?9 
75. [1939] 3 All ER 47 CA. 
76. [1952] NI 72 CA. 
77. [1936] AC 108. 
78. [1952] NI 72. 





Where a local authority is authorised by statute to 
carry out public works or to carry on activities whereby 
private property rights may be interfered with, the 
Legislature commonly provi~es a right of compensation 
in respect of such interference. Whether statutory 
compensation is available in any given instance depends 
upon the scope of the particular provisions, but there 
are certain principles of general application which may 
be referred to. In addition there are specific aspects 
of the law which are of special relevance to escapes in 
the present context. 
As might be anticipated, the question of compensation 
has arisen in respect of drainage authorities, but 
its applicability in the case of water supply authorities 
has also been considered. Statutory compensation is 
in general confined to damage arising upon the construction 
and maintenance of works, but, as shall be shown, at least 
in the case of drainage works, the remedy may extend to 
consequential damage such as flooding. The availability 
of a statutory remedy is of particular interest insofar 
as its abrogates the common law rights of a person injured 
by public works to seek a remedy by action for damages. 
Although the point cannot be said to have been finally 
determined, modern judicial opinion seems to be that 
where a person suffers damage which prima facie falls 
within a compensation provision, there is no necessity 
to show that the damage would have been actionable at 
common law. 
1 
In Marriage v East Norfolk Catchment Board 
Singleton LJ said: 
I am not sure that it matters whether a vLolation of 
a legal right was shown or not : my impression is 
that the intention of Parliament was to avoid lengthy 
and costly litigation of this kind and to ensure that 
anyone who suffered damage in consequence of work 
done under the powers given by the section should 
have a right to compensation. 
A. Nuisance 
Where there is a compensation clause, the courts will 
be more ready to hold that tqe creation of a nuisance 
is authorised. This is particularly so where wide 
statutory powers are given to the defendant, having 
a discretion as to the work undertaken, the time and 
manner of undertaking it, and where it is clear from 
the nature of the work that the doing of it will cause 
2 
a nuisance to a number of people. 
Compensation does not, however, extend to damage caused 
in contravention of the provisions of the empowering 
Act. It does not, for instance, extend to nuisances 
created where there is a provision prohibiting the 
creation of a nuisance.3 While the New Zealand courts 
1. [1950] 1 KB 284, 298. 
2. Marriage v East Norfolk Catchment Board [1950] 1 KB 284, 
297. 
3. Pride of Derby v British Celanese [1953] 1 KB 153, 169 CA. 
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have struggled to resolve an apparent conflict between 
a compensation clause and a nuisance clause. contained in 
a series of local government Acts, the better view is 
that such conflict is illusory and that the compensation 
clause has no application to nuisances. This aspect 
has been discussed elsewhere in this work.
4 
B. Negligence 
1. Construction of Drains 
It has been shown that at common law negligence 
in the exercise of statutory powers is actionable. It 
155 
is to be noted that in determining the issue of negligence 
in the exercise of statutory powers, (as opposed to 
negligence in the actual operation of carrying out of 
work) the ·courts review the reasonableness of the actions 
taken. Where, however, statutory compensation is provided 
for damage caused in the exercise of statutory powers, 
the courts will treat the common law action for negligence 
as being excluded. In the earlier cases, to be noted 
presently, the common law remedy is excluded upon the 
basis that the "negligence" alleged does not amount to 
an excess of the statutory powers. The more recent 
approach is to infer that the statute confers a discretion 
upon the local authority as to the exercise of the 
powers, so far as the statutory remedy extends to the 
damage resulting. Thus, what might be regarded as a 
negligent exercise of statutory powers and therefore 
4. See p. 228. 
actionable in the absence of a compensation provision, 
may be regarded as within the local authori~y's 
discretion where there is such a provision. 
The earlier approach is illustrated by two drainage 
cases which went on appeal to the Privy Council. 
Both of these cases, it is to be noted,.and also a 
subsequent New Zealand case to be discussed presently, 
illustrate the application of compensation provisions 
to damage caused by flooding resulting from the con-
struction of drains by local authorities. 
In Colac Corporation v Sumrnerfield 5 the plaintiff 
sought statutory compensation in respect of damage 
caused by the construction of a drain by the defendants 
whereby water escaped and flooded his land. The jury 
found that there was negligence in the design and 
construction of the drain. Judgment was entered for 
the plaintiff and an appeal to the Full Court was 
dismissed. On appeal to the Judicial Committee the 
appellant authority argued that the finding of 
negligence in the design and construction of.the drain 
showed that the works which occasioned damage were not 
constructed or maintained within their statutory powers 
and that the respondent could not, therefore, recover 
statutory compensation. The Board held that the 
respondent's averments of negligence were not intended 
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to charge and were not understood to charge the appellants 
with excess of their statutory powers, thus: 
5. [1893] AC 187. 
[A]s long as the [Appellants) act within their statutory 
pmvers, negligence is, in any question of compensation, 
immaterial, and cannot affect the extent of their 
liability, which is for all damage resulting from. the 
construction or maintenance of their works.6 
It is to be noted that the case "was conducted upon 
the footing that what the appellants had done was 
done in the exercise of the powers conferred upon 
them" and has no application to a case where the 
action is framed on the basis that the defendants' 
actions were an abuse or excess of statutory powers. 
[Colac Corporation v Summerfie1d] is not authority 
for the proposition that a careless and negligent 
exercise of a statutory power is a lawful 
exercise of that power.7 
In the same year, a differen~ly constituted Board came 
,157 
to a similar conclusion in Raleigh Corporation v Williams.8 
It was contended by the respondents that if a drainage 
work was constructed with an insufficient outlet or with 
some other defect which a competent engineer ought to 
have forseen and guarded against, or if it caused 
flooding, then this was actionable negligence on the 
part of the municipal authority. The opinion of the 
Board was delivered by Lord Macnaghten. It was held, 
9 reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
that this argument was "wholly untenable", that persons 
6. [1893] AC at 191 per Lord Watson. 
7. Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board v 
O.K. Elliot Ltd (1934) 52 CLR 13lf per Starke J. 
8. [1893] AC 540. 
9. 21 Sup. Court Rep 103. 
whose property may be injuriously affected by the 
construction of a drainage work must seek their remedy 
in the manner prescribed by the statute.
10 
The authority of these two decisions of the Privy 
Council was accepted in a number of New Zealand cases 
11 12 
in the Supreme Court and in the Court of Appeal. 
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A distinction was drawn between negligence in the design 
or mode of construction of public works, which is 
coropensatable, and negligence in the operation of 
construction of public works, which is actionable. 




The statutes authorise the construction of public 
works; and for damages caused by such public works, 
although the public body may have proceeded neg-
ligently in the design, or in the mode of 
constructing the work itself, the only remedy is a 
claim for compensation, because the public body has 
done, though negligently, that which it was authorised 
to do under the statutes. But the statutes do not 
authorise the public body, in the operation 
10. [1893] AC at 550. 
11. Inhabitants of Le Ban's Bay Road District v Oldridge (1898) 
17 NZLR 321 per Denniston J; Grey County v Frankpitt (1899) 
18 NZLR 111 per Edwards J; Lyttle v Hastings Borough [1917] 
NZLR 910 at 916 per Edwards J. 
12. Farrelly v Pahiatua County Council (1903) 22 NZLR 683 at 691; 
Fortescue v Te Awamutu Borough (1920] NZLR 281; And see 
Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741 at 770 per 
Ostler J. (Only remedy for negligent acts compensation 
unless local authority acted beyond statutory powers.) 
13. For an illustration of the latter kind of case, see Clothier v 
Webster (1862) 12 CBNS 798; 142 ER 1353; 31 LJCP 316 
(Defendants liable for negligent construction of sewer 
whereby plaintiff's property damaged by subsidence.) 
14. (1901) 20 NZLR 396- See also Inhabitants of Le Ban's Bay 
Road District v Oldridge (1898) 17 NZLR 321 at 326 per 
Denniston J; Grey County v Frankpitt (1899) 18 NZLR 111 
at 114 per Edwards J. 
constructing the public works, to negligently injure 
the property of others. If they do so negligently 
injure the property of others they are not operating 
under the authority of the statutes, and are 
consequently liable to an action at law.l5 
In that case, the appellant local authority had 
constructed additional drainage works and negligently 
failed to enlarge existing works which,. originally 
sufficient, became insufficient to carry off the 
additional flow, whereby the respondent's land was 
flooded. The statutory remedy of compensation was 
16 held to apply. 
It has been held also, that.where a work is authorised 
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and statutory compensation provided it is not sufficient 
to establish a ground of action at common law to show 
that the scheme adopted caused injury to private persons 
whereas another scheme might have avoided the damage, 
b t th d . t' 17 u e reme y 1s. compensa 1on. 
Where, therefore, a local authority has powers which 
might properly be viewed as discretionary and where a 
remedy by compensation is provided, a remedy by common 
law action for negligence is available only in 
15 • (1901) 20 NZLR at 404, 405. 
16. Cf. Hawthorn Corporation v Kannuluik (1903) 29 VLR 308; 
[1906] AC 105 where a common law action for negligence 
succeeded on very similar facts. The question of 
compensation appears to have been raised. 
17. Farrelly v Pahiatua County (1Q03) 22 NZLR 683. 
exceptional circumstances. 
In Marriage v East Norfolk Catchment BoarJ8 Jenkins LJ 
suggested that the limits outside which the ordinary 
rights of action remain are these: 
(a) The injury· must be the product of an exercise of the 
[defendants'] powers as such, as opposed to the product 
of some negligent act occurring in the course of some 
exercise of the [defendants'] powers but not in itself 
an act which the [defendants] are authorised to do. 
(b) The injury must be the product of the operation which 
the [defendants] intended to carry out, and not some 
unintended occurrence brought about in the course of 
carrying out .of the work owing to negligence in carrying 
it out. 
(c) The operation must not be one which on the face of it 
is so capricious or unreasonable, or so fraught with 
manifest danger to others, that no [such defendant] 
acting bona fide and ratioqally, no recklessly, would 
ever have undertaken it.19 
Thus·an error of judgment or lack of foresight on the 
part of the statutory authority in the planning of an 
operation within their powers does not suffice to make 
an injury resulting from the operation, when completed 
as planned, a matter for action, but it is a matter for 
. 20 compensat1on. 
2. Escapes from Mains 
The applicability of a compensation clause 
to damage caused by an escape from the mains of a local 
18. [1950] 1 KB 284 CA. 
19. [1950] 1 KB at 309. 
20. [1950] 1 KB at 310. 
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authority was considered obiter by the High Court of 
Australia in Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage 
Board v 0. K. Elliot Ltd~l In that case the Court 
held (and this was the main issue) that the action was 
an action in tort and not for statutory compensation. 
The plaintiff alleged nuisance and negligence in 
respect of damage caused to its property through an 
invasion of water which had escaped from a burst water-
main, situated under a public road and constructed some 
f~rty years previously by the defendants' predecessors. 
But the Court clearly indicated that it preferred the 
view that the statutory remedy did not extend to this 
kind of case and imposed a restrictive construction 
upon the compensation clause: 
While the clause provided full compensation to all 
parties interested for all damage sustained by them 
.· through the e·xercise of the powers conferred, Dixon J 
·confined the remedy to the exercise of the powers of 
construction and maintenance and held it inapplicable 
to the case, as: 
An outburst of water in the street results, not from 
some active work of maintenance, but from the failure 
of the pipe to withstand the pressure of the water 
with which it is charged. 22 
21. (1934) 52 CLR 134. 
22. (1934) 52 CLR at 150. 
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The learned judge preferred the view that while a 
compensation clause may extend to maintena~ce of works 
as well as their construction, it does not follow that 
a local authority incurs an absolute statutory 
liability to make compensation to the occupiers of 
premises adjoining streets for damage sustained to their 
aoods or premises by reason of outbursts of substances 
23 
from mains in a roadway. Clear expres.sion would be 
needed before such provisions would be construed "to 
impose an absolute liability upon an Authority for every 
accidental loss which may be_suffered in the course of 
24 
its daily conduct." Starke J, it is to be noted, 
preferred the view that the appropriate remedy for 
damage caused by the escape of water from mains alleged 
to have b~en negligently constructed, managed or main-
. d b f . 25 ta1ne , was y way o act1on. Furthermore, as was 
observed by Dixon J, the remedy by way of compensation 
was confined to those having a specific interest in land 
·or proprietary right and did not extend to injuries 
26 
which were merely personal. . 
A similar view was taken by Myers CJ in Irvine v Dunedin 
City CorporatioJ
7 
who held, in relation to a clause · 
23. (1934) 52 CLR at 150. 
24. (1934) 52 CLR at 151. 
25. (1934) 52 CLR at 142 et seq. 
26. (1934) 52 CLR at 150 and 155. 
27. [1939] NZLR 741. 
providing full compensation for damage suffered by 
lands in the exercise of the powers given, that the 
possibility of damage resulting by reason of water 
escaping from mains under a street into adjacent 
premises was too improbable, speculative and remote a 
ground to form the. subject of compensation.28 
Furthermore, as the remedy was confined to injury to 
land, no claim lay in respect of injury to goods. 
3. Nonfeasance 
Where a statutory remedy is provided for a 
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particular class of damage or damage arising in a 
particular way, the courts will asslline that the common 
law remedies remain·in respect of damage falling outside 
the statute. This. is strikingly illustrated by the 
decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Coe v Wise
29 
where it was held that where a statutory right to 
compensation is given in respect of "acts", the 
appropriate remedy for an "omission" is by way of 
common law action which is not thereby excluded. 
28. [1939] NZLR at 757. 
29. (1866) 1 LRQB 711. 
CHAPTER VII 
NONFEASANCE 
In Hesketh v Birmingham Corporatiort Scrutton LJ 
said: 
-The general rule is that a local authority is 
liable for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance.2 
This proposition, it shall be shown, insofar as it 
suggests that local authorities have a special general 
immunity from tortious liability, is not good law. The 
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extent of its validity will be determined in the following 
pages. 
This enquiry will include a brief introduction to the 
theoretical basis and historical origins of the conception 
of nonfeasance. Various aspects of the concept will be 
examined insofar as is relevant to the context, the 
general principles of nonfeasance will be considered in 
relation to the conclusions to be drawn from the 
principles of liability discussed in earlier chapters. 
Part-icular attention will be paid to the categorisation 
of cases in terms of the causes of action upon which they 
were pleaded, argued and decided, with an assessment of 
the extent to which such categorisation defines the 
1. [1924] 1 KB 260. 
2. [1924] 1 KB at 271. 
limits of immunity upon the ground of nonfeasance. 
In the light of this discussion the question of the 
existence df a special drainage nonfeasance rule may 
be answered. There will also be a discussion of the 
effect and relevance of the special highway nonfeasance 
rule and of the extent to which the liability of 
o~ainage authorities in the inheritance situation has 
been affected by statutory provision. 
A. Theoretical Basis 
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Common law duties are generally duties of forbearance, 
duties not to do harm to one's neighbour but not duties 
to do him positive good. Only exceptionally have the 
courts imposed duties upon ~ersons which have the effect 
of conferring a benefit upon others. Judges have 
refrained from introducing such rules for fear of 
placing an undue burden upon the resources of the 
individual and in their reluctance to fetter freedom 
of action. In the context of the law relating to local 
authorities, these considerations appear in the guises 
of "limited resources" or "undue burden" and "discretion". 
The analogy between individuals and local authorities is 
not wholly apposite; an important difference is that 
local authorities are usually established to provide 
benefits to the inhabitants. But the courts' antipathy 
toward imposing liability for inaction has in this context 
found expression in.the conception of nonfeasance. 
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The terms "misfeasance" and nonfeasanc~" are used in 
law to denote the wrongful exercise and the wrongful 
.,.: 
non-exercise, respectively, of legal powers. 3 The 
distinction between the two terms reflects the 
philisophical distinction between 11 acts" and 11 omissions 11 
and attracts similar difficulties in respect of the as 
yet inadequate theories of causation and responsibility. 
The terms may refer to a particular act or omission or 
to course of action or inaction. 
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance 
does not conclusively mark the boundary between 
liability and nonliability, for there may be liability· 
for nonfeasance. Nonactionable nonfeasance is often 
referred to as 11 mere 11 nonfeasance. As a matter of 
formulation of legal principle, the immunity for non-
feasance may be expressed as an absence of a legal duty 
to act (including the absence of an obligation to 
exercise a statutory power), or as an absence of 
liability for breach of a duty to act. Duties to 
act may be derived from the common law in respect of such 
factors as the ownership and occupation of property, 
action, and the control of property and activities, 
or they may also be imposed by statute. The 
determination of the existence of such a duty or of 
the actionability of .breach of duty is affected by 
various considerations of judicial policy. 
3. Cf. "Malf easa.nce", which is the commission of some 
act which is in itself unlawful. 
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B. Historical Origins 
The concept of "nonfeasance" has a long history in 
English common law and a glance of this history shows 
that whilst failure to perform a duty to repair public 
works has traditionally been classified as "nonfeasance", 
the courts have for centuries admitted private claims 
based on such public wrongs. 
In mediaeval times, duties to repair roads, bridges, 
ditches, sewers, sea-walls etc. were imposed by custom, 
were prescriptive incidents of tenure and were also 
4 
conditions of royal grants or charters. A failure to 
perform such an obligation to repair was remediable by 
the quasi-criminal procedure of presentment, indictment 
and distress. But, due to the inadequacies of the then 
existing tortious remedies; private individuals had no· 
general right to recover damages until the development 
6 
of the Action of Trespass on the Case. This action came 
to be widely used to establish civil liability in such 
cases. It extended civil liability for nonfeasance and 
4. See Kiralfy The Action on the Case 59. 
5 • Trespass did not lie because there was no direct inter-
ference with possession. The Assize of Nuisance did not 
lie for omissions. There were special writs of Nuisance 
for nonrepair of ditches and sea-walls, but these were 
available only where the repairs were to be executed on 
the defendant's own land. (Kiralfy pp.55, 56, 59.) 
6. For the origins of the Action on the Case, see Kiralfy, 
Chapter 1. 
"And a man shall have an action .of trespass upon the case 
against his neighbour who hath lands betwixt him and the sea 
and ought to make banks and mound certain ditches and 
sewers betwixt him and the sea, and he doth not cleanse 
them as he ought to do, by reason whereof his land is 
surrounded etc.; he shall have his action upon the case 
for this nonfe.asance." - Fitzherbert: New Natura Brevium, 
Writ de Trespass sur le Case, (93 G), see Fifoot History 
and Sources of the Common Law Tort and Contract p.88. 
See also the cases cited by Kiralfy at p. 61. 
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8 
gave a remedy where previously there was none. 
Liability was first based on duties arising at common 
law; the first example, relating to the nonrepair of 
sea-walls, arose in the fourteenth century.
9 
From the 
sixteenth century the Action on the Case superceded an 
earlier kind of action
10 
and the courts allowed actions 
based on criminal wrongs created by statute. 
The action on the case was eventually extended to render 
individuals civilly liable for breach of a duty to 
. dll repa1r a roa . , but where the duty lay not on any 
particular individual or individuals but on the inhabit-
ants at large, there was no civil remedy. Thus where, 
12 
as became the general rule, the parish was the body 
liable for the repair of highways; this duty could be 
enforced by presentment and indictment, but no civil 
13 
action could be brought. When the Legislature 
8. "[T]he method of the Action on the Case was to take some 
ancient remedy, the value of which was impaired by some 
technical restrictions, and cut away those restrictions, 
by making the remedy universally applicable under the 
guise of analogy, or 'like case'.": Jenks A Short History 
of English Law 94, 95. 
9. "In 1342 it was wrong for a riparian owner not to maintain 
a sea-wall, but there was no civil remedy provided for his 
neighbours (Y.B. 18 Edw III, T pl 6, f23. It was held that 
he was liable civilly for failure to repair since 'by right 
he ought to do so')." Kiralfy p .11. The pleadings (1341) 
(Y.B. 16 Edw III, vol 1) are set out by Kiralfy at p.208. 
10. Previously, actions based on statutory duties were of 
"trespass and contempt against the form of the Statute". 
Kiralfy p.lO. 
11. Thomas v Sorrel! (1674) Vaughan at p.340. 
12. This general principle was introduced by legislation, 
beginning with a statute of 1555: see 10 Holdsworth p.311. 
13. Thomas v Sorrell (1674) Vaughan at 340-341; Russell v Men 
of Devon (1788) 2 TR 667. 
transferred the duty to repair from the parish to 
some other body, that body, the courts held (with little 
. . 
. t . f . t . ) . h . d h . . 14 JUS 1 1ca 1on , 1n er1te t e 1mmun1ty. But the 
reasons for the immunity of the parish from civil 
action15 have limited or no application in respect of 
the liability of individuals or corporations. 
Reference may also be made to the dozen or so cases 
relating to the nonrepair of ditches and sea-walls 
16 
cited by Kiralfy from the Year-Books and Plea Rolls, 
and to Keighley's Case
17 where Coke LCJ held that an 
action on the case would lie against one bound by 
prescription or otherwise to repair a sea~wall "if 
any fault is in him" and that those damaged should 
recover according to their loss.
18 In 1774 in Lynn v 
19 . 
Turner it was held that the defendant corporation 
was bound by prescription. to repair and cleanse a 
creek, and that an action on the case lay even though 
14. Young v Davis 2 H & G 197; Cowley v Newmarket Local 
Board [1892] AC 345; Cf. Borough of Bathurst v 
MacPherson 4 App Cas 256. 
15. Holdsworth summarises the various reasons given for this 
rule at different periods: that the complaint concerned 
a matter which affected the public; that no action will 
lie against unincorporated bodies; the law had always 
been so; that a further remedy could only be given by the 
Legislature; that it would be difficult to collect 
damages from each individual in the parish. - History of 
English Law Vol.lO p.315. And see Denning (case note) (1939) 
55 LQR 343. 
16. Kiralfy The Action on the Case 59, 60. 
17. 10 Co Rep 139a; 77 ER 1136. 
18. 10 Go Rep at 139b. 
~9. (1774) 1 Cowp 86; 98 ER 980. 
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special damage was not pleaded. In 1834 in Lyme Regis 
20 
v Henley the defendant borough was held to be in 
breach of a duty imposed by charter to repair a sea-
wall and was held liable to the plaintiff in damages. 
It was said: 
[I]t is clear and undoubted law that, wherever 
an indictment lies for ~~n~repair, an action 
on the case will lie at the suit of a party 
sustaining any particular damage.21 
It may be concluded, therefore, that actions against 
local authorities (other than highway authorities) 
for nonrepair have a sound historical basis in law, 
whether the duty to repair is imposed by statute or 
otherwise. 
c. Aspects of Nonfeasance 
170 
There are various aspects of the doctrine of Nonfeasance, 
or rather, there are various classes of case in which 
local authorities are not liable for failing to exercise 
their powers or to perform their duties. Some allusions 
to nonfeasance have been made incidentally to the 
discussion of the principles of liability, but here 
an attempt will be made to determine the extent and 
limits of the immunity in its several contexts. 
20. (1834) 2 Cl & F 331; 6 ER 1180. 
21. Per Park J delivering the opinion of the judges; 
affirmed by the House of Lords. 
1.· "Primary" Nonfeasance 
Nonliability for inaction has tak~n various 
forms, but the principal form is not confined in its 
application to local authorities. The "primary" or 
"basic 11 nonfeasance rule may be expressed thus: 
Where a person (including a public body)· has a 
. legal power (whether common law or statutory) 
to take certain action but is under no legal 
duty to act, a failure to act is not actiqnable 
at the suit of a person who suffers loss in 
consequence of such inaction. 
Liability for inaction, therefore, depends upon the 
establishment of a legal duty to act, whether such 
duty be imposed by statute or derived from the common 
law. 
(a) Failure to Exercise Statutory Power 
The mere failure to exercise statutory 
powers, or inadequate exercise of such powers, is not 
actionable at the suit of a person who suffers loss in 
consequence. This principle applies in respect of the 
powers of drainage authorities to maintain and repair 
drainage works and is illustrated by cases already 
referred to. 
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Thus in Smith v Cawdle Fen Commissioners
22 the defendants 
were held not liable in respect of their alleged failure 
to keep drainage works in good repair whereby the plaintiff's 
land was flooded. 
22. [1938] 4 All ER 64. 
Similarly, in Gillett v Kent Rivers Catchment Board23 
it was held that the defendants' failure to clear a 
drain of weeds was not actionable. 
The decision of the House of Lords in East Suffolk 
Rivers Catchment Board v Keni4 not only endorses the 
principles upon which the two preceding cases were 
decided, but authoritatively lays down the rule that 
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if the authority embarks upon an execution of its powers, 
it is not liable for negligence unless it adds to the 
plaintiff's damage. There, the plaintiffs suffered 
damage in consequence of a breach of a tidal wall. 
The defendants were empowered, though not under a duty, 
to repair the wall. It was agreed that if the defendants 
had remained entirely passive, if they had taken no 
steps at all to repair the breach, the plaintiffs 
25 could not have succeeded. But the defendants had 
in fact attempted to repair the breach and, as the 
result of their failure to exercise reasonable skill, 
the time taken to effect the repair was greatly 
lengthened. The plaintiffs sought damages in respect 
of the period of flooding which would not have occurred 
23. [1938] 4 All ER 810. 
24. [1941] AC 74. 
25. [1941] AC at 83 per Viscount Simon LC. 
had the defendants not been negligent. Thus, the main 
issue in the case was whether the defendants, having 
commenced the work of abatement owed a duty to the 
plaintiffs to conduct the work with reasonable 
dispatch. The majority rejected the proposition that 
a public body which owed no duty to provide a service, 
may become liable, if it takes upon itself to render 
a service, for negligently failing to fully provide 
that service .26 
Viscount Simon LC concluded: 
It is admitted that the respondents would have 
no claim if the appellants had never intervened 
at.all. In my opinion, the respondents equally 
have no claim when the appellants do intervene, 
save in respect of such damage as flows from 
their intervention and as might have been 
avoided if their intervention had been more 
skilfully conducted.27 
Lord Romer said: 
Where a statutory authority is entrusted with a 
mere power it cannot be made liable for any 
damage sustained by a member of the public by 
reason of a failure to exercise that power. 
If in the exercise of their discretion they 
embark upon an execution of the power, the 
only duty they owe to any member of the public 
is not thereby to add to the damages that he 
would have suffered had they done nothing.27a 
The majority of the Law Lords gave weight to the 
26. [1941] AC at 87 per Viscount Simon LC at p.97 and 
p.l02 per Lord Romer; at p.l05 per Lord Porter. 
27. [1940] AC at 88. 
27a. [1940] AC at 102. 
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consideration that local drainage authorities have 
limited resources and favoured an approach which 
gave a discretion to the authority in deciding the 
choice, time and extent of the exercise of its powers. 
Such a decision, it was said, involves matters of 
policy and a balancing of the rival claims of efficiency 
and thrift.
28 
It may be objected that these consider-
ations are more appropriately regarded as matters 
affecting the standard of care demanded in such circum-
29 stances, and not the duty issue. Furthermore, as Lord 
30 
Atkin pointed out, it is in the public interest 
that local authorities should be under a duty to act 
with reasonable dispatch as Rart of the duty to act 
without negligence or not carelessly or improperly. 
(b) Causation 
In the case of nonfeasance it is more 
difficult to support the assertion that the damage 
complained of was actually caused by the defendant's 
conduct. The defendant's activities may not have been 
a link in the mechanical chain of events which resulted 
28. [1941] AC at 86 per Viscount Simon LC at p.l03 
per Lord Romer, at p.106 per Lord Porter. 
29. See [1941] AC at 95 per Lord Thankerton. 
30. [1941] AC at 91. 
in the damage. Thus, in the East Suffolk case
31 
three Law Lords of the majority of four toqk the view 
that the defendants had not caused the flooding which 
gave rise to the damage, they merely failed to abate 
it. In the words of Viscount Simon LC: 
In the present case the damage done by the flooding 
·was not due to the exercise of the appellants' 
statutory powers at all. It was due to the forces 
of nature which the appellants, albeit unskilfully, 
were endeavouring to counteract.32 
But, to adopt the words of Hart and Honore, " ••• this 
is no reason for denying in an attributive context 
that the damage was the consequence of the defendant's 
carelessness, or even that the defendant's failure to 
do the work properly was the cause of the flooding 
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lasting SQ long Indeed, Lord Atkin (dissenting) 
was prepared to accept that the extra damage was caused 
by the defendants' failure to repair with reasonable 
d . h 34 1spatc • 
(c) Special Relationship 
In the East Suffolk case
35 Lord Atkin 
took the view that there was a special relationship 
between the defendant board and the plaintiff which 
31. [1941] AC 74. 
32. [1941] AC at 85. See also p.96 per Lord Thankerton, 
at p.105 per Lord Porter. 
33. Causation in the Law p.l33. 
34. [1941] AC at 93. 
35. [1941] AC 74. 
gave rise to a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
affecting repairs to the tidal wall. The relations 
between the board and the plaintiffs were closer than 
the general relations of members of the public to a 
local authority, for the board was endeavouring to 
repair the wall to prevent flooding of the plaintiffs' 
36 
land.- Although this view did not find favour wi 1:h 
the other members of the House, it has a great deal 
of merit. 
(d) Anterior Acts 
It is clear that where)drainage authority 
has failed to carry out remedial works which it might 
have executed by a reasonabl~ exercise of its statutory 
powers, they cannot avail themselves of the nonfeasance 
principle as applied in the East Suffolk case 37 where 
the defect complained of arose as a result of their 
own (authorised and non-negligent) acts. It is 
sufficient that their acts interfered with the common-
law rights of the plaintiff. 
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Thus in Bligh v Rathangan Drainage Board 38 the defendants 
were held liable for failing to periodically cleanse a 
river bed, the necessity for which was caused by their 
acts. As was indicated in that case, the application 
36. [1941] AC at 
37. [1941] AC 74. The obverse of this proposition, that 
where the damage was not inflicted by the exercise of 
statutory powers the Geddis principles do not apply, 
was explained by Lord Romer at P.99. 
38. [1898] 2 IR 205. 
of the principle in Geddis v Proprietors of the Bann 
River Reservoir, 39 is not affected by the cases 
relating to mere nonfeasance: 
It will be observed that in Geddis' Case in the 
House of Lords there is not a word said about 
commission or omission, misfeasance or nonfeas-
ance. The only question was, was there a power 
to do the particular thing?40 
2. Nonfeasance in Relation to Specific Torts 
(a) Breach of Statutory Duty 
A breach of statutory duty is commonly 
not actionable by private persons and where the conduct 
which comprises such breach is inaction a person who 
suffers damage in consequenc~ may be without a remedy. 
The conception of non-actionable duties supplements the 
primary nonfeasance rule. In a situation where the 
courts are not disposed to impose a common law duty to 
177 
act though the defendant has power to act, as in the 
basic nonfeasance situation, there may be equally cogent 
reasons for the denial of a private right of action in 
respect of an equivalent statutory duty imposed by the 
Legislature. It is convenient and useful to refer to 
the principles which admit this line of defence as the 
"secondary" nonfeasance rules and the situation in which 
they apply as the "secondary" nonfeasance situation. 
39. 3 App Cas 430. 
40. [1898] 2 IR at 216. 
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Thus, where the performance of a statutory duty requires 
the expenditure of large sums of public moneys and the 
construction of public works such as drainage and 
sewerage systems., the courts will not admit private 
claims for damages where the essence of the action is 
the mere failure to provide a public service. Persons 
so aggrieved must instead avail themselves of such 
extra-ordinary remedies as may be available or of any 
statutory remedy provided. 
The proper application of these principles is sufficiently 
illustrated by the decision of the House of Lords in 
Pasmore v Oswaldtwistle U. c.41 Their inappropriate 
application is illustrated by Robinson V Workington 
. 42 
Corporation in which case the plaintiff complained of 
damage actually caused by the operation of the sewerage 
system. 
The secondary nonfeasance rules do not apply to all 
actions against drainage authorities where inaction is 
the gist of the complaint. Actions founded upon duties 
relating to the maintenance of such public works have 
succeeded where the plaintiff proved positive damage 
arising from the condition of the works. In such a 
case, the negligent failure to fulfil such obligations 
is not mere nonfeasance. 
Thus, rural drainage authorities were held liable in 
Coe v Wise, 
43 
Rex v Marshland Smeeth and Fen District 
41. [1898] AC 387. 
42. [1897] 1 QB 619. 43. (1866) LR 1 QB 711. 
e . . . 44 ommJ.ssJ.oners, 45 Bohen V elements, Boynton v Ancholme 
Drainage and Navigation eommissioners:6 A-G v St Ives 
RDe:7 Sephton v Lancashire River Board~8 and 
Rippingdale Farms Ltd v Black Sluice Internal Drainage 
Board. 49 
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Urban sewerage authorities were held li·able for non-
repair in· A-G v Lewes Corporatior?0 and Baron v Portslade 
u~1 and that there is liability for negiigence in such 
. 52 
cases was acknowledged in Hammond v Vestry of St Pancras, 
Bateman v Poplar District Council Board of Works (No.2r
3 
ahd Stretton Is Derby Brewery eo •. V Derby Corporation.
54 
(b) Negligence 
Breaches of duties derived from the tort 
of Negligence are invariably actionable as misfeasance 
at the suit of the person to whom such duty is owed. 
In this class of case the determination of the existence 
of·the duty is subject to considerations of judicial 
policy, rather than the question whether such duty is 
actionable. Common law duties of care have been imposed 
in respect of the actual construction of drains and in 
respect of the maintenance of artifical drains. 
44. [1920] 1 KB 155. 
45. [1920] IR 117. 
46. [1921] 2KB 213. 
47. . [1960] 1 QB 312. 51. [1900] 2 QB 588. 
48. [1962] 1 WLR 623. 52. (1874) LR 9. CP 316. 
49. [1963] 1 WLR 1347. 53. (1887) 37 ChD 272. 
50. [1911] 2 Ch 495. 54 •. [1894] 1 Ch 431. 
Negligence in actual construction, whether in regard 
to the condition and capacity of the drain constructed 
or in regard to the additional burden placed upon 
recipient drains, is actionable rriisfeasance; See 
Collins v Middle Level Cornmissioners,
55 · Touzeau v 
Slough unc, 56 Willoughby Municipal Corporation v 
57 58 Halstead, Brown v Sargent, Dent v Bournemouth 
Corporation, 
59 Scott v Ellesmere Road Boarcf
0 and 
H h . 1 . k 61 awt orn Corporatlon v Kannu Ul . 
A duty of care in regard to the physical condition of 
drains is incidental to their ownership and control and 
_ negligent maintenance is actionable: Ruck v Williams ,
62 
Tamaki West Road Board v Appleton ,
63 Ham v Blenheim 
64 .• . 65 
Borough, Sargood v Dunedin City Corporatlon, 
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Essendon Corporation v McSweeney,
66 Willoughby Municipal 
Council v Halstead 
67 and Campisi v Water Conservation 
and Irrigation Commission.
68 In the three last-mentioned 
cases, the plea-of nonfeasance was expressly and 
specifically rejected by the courts. 
The ownership and control of sewers have not hitherto 
been regarded as sufficient to support a general duty 
55. (1869) LR 4 CP 279. 62. (1858) 3 H & N 307. 
56. "The Times" 6 February 1896. 63. [1916] NZLR 183. 
57. (1916) 22 CLR 354. .64. [1921] NZLR 358. 
58. (1858) 1 F & F 111. 65. (1888) 6 NZLR 489. 
59. [1897) 66 LJ QB 397. 66. (1914) 17 CLR 524. 
60. (1887) NZLR 5 SC 283. 67. (1916) 22 CLR 354. 
61. [1906] AC 105. 68. (1936) _36 SR (NSW) 631. 
to improve an inadequate system, although damage to 
private persons is the fors~eable conseque~ce 6f 
; 69 such incapac~ty; Hesketh v Birmingham Corporat1on 
is a case in point. 
In Negligence, therefore, in the absence of sufficient 
ground for the imposition of a legal duty, the basic 
nonfeasance situation arises. 
(c) Nuisance · 
In the context of the tort of Nuisance 
there may be discerned a tendency to treat the 
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nonfeasance/misfeasance issue as turning of the question 
whether the defendant authority's conduct may be 
categoriSed as inaction or action. The inaction/action 
dichotomy has influenced legal reasoning most markedly 
in regard to the "inheritance" and "development" 
situations. It is apparent that there has been a lack 
of appreciation of the principles upon which the 
secondary nonfeasance cases were actually decided and 
that those decisions haveunduly influenced the courts 
in dealing with cases in which the cause of action was 
pleaded in Nuisance. For some considerable time the 
possibility of liability arising for "continuance" 
was not explored and even now that that possibility 
has been acknowledged, there is some doubt as to whether 
mere passivity is sufficient. There has been no clear 
and authoritative recognition of the possibility that 
the ownership and control of a sewerage system may be 
69. [1924] 1 KB 260 CA. 
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a sufficient. basis for the imposition of liability for 
an escape arising in consequence of inaction, not merely 
in regard to the physical condition of sewers but also 
in regard to inadequacy not itself due to the acts of 
the local authority. 
Where the nuisance complained of may be attributed to 
the construction of sewers by the local authority, it 
will be liable, notwithstanding that it was inactive 
in the sense that it did not construct additional works · 
to cope with the increased burden thus arising; the 
act of construction is misfeasance: Foster v Warblington 
UDC}0 Jones v Llanrwst UDC. 71 
Defective construction has a-lso been treated as misfeasance, 
as in Hanley v Edinburgh Corporation 72 and Pemberton v 
73 Bright, and the modification of an existing system 
so as to cau~e a nuisance has been.similarly treated: 
see A-G v Metropolitan Board of Works 74 and Dent v 
Bournemouth Corporation!5 
Liability has been imposed upon private owners for 
"nonfeasance" in failing to keep premises and sewers 
in repair and it seems likely that a similar liability 
will be imposed upon local authorities. 
70. [1906] 1 KB 649. 
71. [1911] 1 Ch 393. 
72. (1913) 29 TLR 405. 
73. [1960] 1 WLR 436. 
74. (1863) 9 LT 148. 
75. (1897) 66 LJ QB 397. 
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Where a local authority may prevent a nuisance arising 
due to inadequate sewers by the exercise of control 
over connections or co~trol over building in the 
locality, a failure to exercise such control may 
constitute misfeasance. 
It now seems clear that a local authority may "continue" 
a drainage nuisance. A failure to remedy a recurring 
nuisance by improving the system may be sufficient: 
Craib v Woolwich Borough Council ,76 but cf. Smeaton v · 
. . 77 
Ilford Corporation. The point awaits review • 
. (d) Rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
It has never been suggested that the 
nonfeasance rules have any-application to the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher. 
It might be contended that where private persons have 
the right to make connections to the sewers of the local 
authority, the local authority should not be liable for 
an escape caused merely by the exercise of those rights, 
as where the existing drains are inadequate to carry 
the additional flow; in terms of the Rule, it might 
be said that the local authority does not, in those 
circumstances, "collect" the sewage. It has been 
Shown that this argument was specifically rejected by 
Upjohn J in Smeaton v Ilford Corporation.78 To that 
76. (1920) 36 TLR 630. 
77. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
78. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
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extent, it appears liability for mere inaction may 
be wider under the Rule than in Nuisance. 
(e) Distinguishing Causes of Action 
The secondary nonfeasance rules have no 
application where a cause of action is made out for 
misfeasance in some respect other than the mere failure 
to perform a statutory duty. 
It has been expressly held that the principles upon 
which Glossop v Heston and Isleworth Local Board 79 
do not extend to cases of negligent commission, even 
where the abatement of the nuisance complained of 
requires the exercise of statutory powers. 
h 
. 80 
In Dent v Bournemout Corporat1on the immediate 
cause of the nuisance was the insufficiency of a 
sewer, but the excessive burden had arisen in consequence 
of the acts of the defendants. Vaughan Williams J 
said: 
If it be true that the damage was caused by the 
negligence of the defendants, an action will lie 
against them for negligence in the execution of 
their statutory powers. It is said that Glossop 
is a decision to the contrary, but in my judgment 
this is not so. That decision only shews that 
if the complaint be that the local authority have 
insufficiently carried out the duties imposed upon 
them by the statute, no action will lie; but it 
does not shew that were a local authority in the 
course of their work create a nuisance, no action 
79. (1879) 12 ChD 102 (CA). 
80. (1898) 66 LJ QB 397. 
will lie against them. On the contrary, the 
judgment in that case is that if a legal wrong 
has been done an action will lie unless the 
81 legal wrong has been justified by statute .••• 
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Similarly, it has been held that the principles applied 
. b' k' . 82 1n Ro 1nson v Wor 1ngton Corporat1on are inapplicable 
where a common law right has been infringed, as where 
a nuisance has been crea~8d by the exercise of 
statutory powers. 
. . 83 
In Bligh v Rathangan Drainage Board it was contended 
by the defendants before the Irish Court of Appeal 
that on the authority of Robinson's case the only 
means of redress in respect of their failure to cleanse 
the bed of a stream was the statutory remedy. The 
Court rejected that contention. The Lord Chief 
Justice said: 
[That] doctrine •.• applies to a wholly different 
class of cases - it applies to cases where there 
was no original right, no common law right. 
It applies merely to cases where a new right if 
conferred and a remedy for its infraction 
prescribed by statute. Here, however, in the 
case before us there was an original common law 
right infringed.84 
81. (1897) 66 LJ QB at· 
82 • [1897] 1 QB 619 CA. 
83. [1898] 2 IR 205 CA. 
84. [1898] 2 IR at 217 per Sir P. O'Brien LCJ. 
See also Gibbings v Hungerford and York Corporation 
[1904] 1 IR 211 CA where Fitzgibbon LJ suggested that 
the remedy under the public health legislation was 
inappropriate where the cause of action related not to 
the want of sufficient sewers but to an active 
'trespass' by the discharge of sewage. 
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3. Drainage Nonfeasance Rule 
The area of nonliability indicated in the 
preceding pages is confined to the situation where 
the nuisance complained of arose in consequence of the 
inadequacy of sewers or drains, where the drains in 
question were inherited by the defendant authority in 
an .inadequate state or where the inadequacy was ("'aused 
by an uncontrollable increase in usage of existing 
sewers which were adequate when built (or inherited), 
such nuisance having been incapable of abatement by the 
taking of such action as might reasonably have been 
expected. -To this limited extent, there is no liability 
£or inaction, but the use of the term "nonfeasance" 
is hardly justified and might be dispensed with with-
out disadvantage. 
In one respect, however, a vestige of reasoning associated 
with nonfeasance remains. It arises in respect of 
the question whether, where the inadequacy is not other-
wise attributable to the acts or omissions of the 
defendant authority, it is obliged to abate the 
nuisance by the construction of new drains. The 
d . . . k h . . h t' 
85 
ec1.s1.ons 1.n Hes et v B1.rm1.ng am Corpora 1.on 
and Craib v Woolwich Borough Council 
86 
have been 
discussed and criticised in this regard. The view 
preferred here is that the ownership and control of 
a drainage system and its operation by the local 
85. [1924] 1 KB 260 CA. 
86. (1920) 36 TLR 630. 
authority ought to be regarded as sufficient to 
attract strict liability for escapes as we;Ll as a 
duty of care in the same respect. If, however, the 
. 87 
dicta of the Court of Appeal in Hesketh's case 
are good law, then it must be concluded that there is 
a special drainage nonfeasance rule. Such a principle 
would confer upon drainage authorities an immunity not 
enjoyed by private persons. It goes beyond the basic 
and secondary nonfeasance rules and is comparable in 
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effect to the now equally anomalous highway nonfeasance 
rule. 
4. The Highway Nonfeasance Rule 
(a) Application i~ Drainage Context 
The immunity of highway authorities from 
civil liability, whether in Nuisance, Negligence or for 
Breach of Statutory Duty, for damage suffered by an 
individual in consequence of the nonrepair of roads, 
88 
while abrogated in England, survives in New Zealand 
d 1
. 89 
an Austra 1a. In appropriate circumstances a high-
way authority may invoke the immunity in respect of 
the disrepair of drains or culverts, even where the. 
damage is sustained by an adjacent occupier and where 
it is caused by flooding from the drain in question. 
87 • [1924] 1 KB 260. 
88. Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961, 9 & 10 
Eliz 2 c.63, s.l. 
89. See generally, Sawer Nonfeasance Under Fire 2 NZULR 115. 
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Thus in Irving v Carlisle RDCW the defendants 
negligently failed to clean out a ditch which ran 
alongside a highway and in consequence the plaintiff's 
fields were damaged by flooding. It was held that the 
defendants' conduct was nonfeasance and not misfeasance 
and that as they were the highway authority, they were 
not liable. 
91 
In Fortescue v Te Awamutu Borough the appellant 
sued in respect of damage suffered from flooding due to 
the inadequacy of a culvert under a road. The function 
of the culvert and the tributory channels v1as the 
drainage of the street. The road and culvert had 
been constructed by a sub-~ivider and subsequently 
vested in the respondents. It was held that this was 
nonfeasance for which the defendant authority was not 
liable. 
(b) Capacity and Function 
A local authority may avail itself of the 
immunity only in respect of its capacity as a highway 
authority and only in respect of drains fulfilling a 
highway function. These principles were first 
established in cases relating to the dangerous condition 
of drains and were later extended to cases of escapes 
and flooding. 
90. (1907) 71 JP 212. 
91. [1920] NZLR 281 CA. 
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Thus where a local authority performs both a highway 
and a separate drainage function, it cannot.shelter 
behind the highway immunity in performing its drainage 
function. 
. . 1 92 This rule was laid down in Wh1te v H1ndley Loca Board 
where the plaintiff sued in respect of injury sustained 
by his horse when it put a hoof through a defective 
grating over a sewer when travelling along a highway. 
The defendants were both the surveyors of the highways 
and the local board of health and, as the latter, had 
all the sewers in the district vested in them. The 
defective grid had two purposes; it prevented the road 
from being dangerous and it p~evented stones from falling 
into the sewer. Blackburn J held that the defendants, 
so far as they were surveyors of the highways, were not 
liable for the nonrepair of the grid. They were, 
however, under an obligation as proprietors of the 
sewers to keep the grids in order. Counsel for the 
defendants submitted that the cause of action was nOt 
misfeasance but nonfeasance and for that the defendants 
were not liable; Blackburn J said: 
The question is not whether the act was one of 
omission only or of commission; but whether 
there is any duty on the defendants for the 
violation of which an action will lie at the 
suit of the person injured by it. 93 
92. (1875) LR 10 QB 219. 
93. (1875) LR 10 QB at 220. 
This decision was affirmed by the English Court of 
Appeal in Blackmore v Vestry of Mile End Old Town.94 
The rule was accepted by the High Court of Australia 
in Buckle v Bayswater Road Board 95 where a divergence 
of judicial opinion on the facts illustrates the 
difficulty of determining whether a particular drain 
serves a highway or agricultural purpose. This case 
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left unresolved the question whether the drainage function 
must be a substantial function of the drain in question, 
or whether it is sufficient that a drainage function is 
incidental to the highway function. 
These principles have found approval in New Zealand also. 
In St Kilda Borough v Smith 96 -williams J held that the 
drain in respect of which the action for nonrepair was 
brought was made for the purpose of draining ·the borough 
and not a roa~ and that accordingly the highway nonfeasance 
rule did not apply. More recently, in Petone Borough v 
97 Da.ubney Cooke J affirmed that a local authority may 
be both a highway authority and a drainage authority 
and that its liability depends on the particular 
94. (1882) 9 QBD 451 CA (Nuisance caused in capacity of water 
authority). Cf. Thompson v Brighton Corporation (1894) 
1 QB 332 CA. (Defendant road authority and sewerage 
authority - disrepair of road around manhole relating to 
highway capacity.) 
95. (1936) 57 CLR 259 (Injury to user of highway). 
96. (1902) 21 NZLR 205. 
91. [1954] NZLR 305 at 324 CA. 
capacityin which it committed the act or omission 
complained of. 
98 
A similar rule was laid down, without reference to 
earlier authority, in A-G v St Ives RDc.
99 
In that 
case the plaintiff (and relator) sought damages in 
respect of flooding arising from a breach of statutory 
duty to repair certain drains. It was contended that 
the failure to maintain and repair the drains was 
nonfeasance and that the plaintiff had no cause of 
action. Salmon J traced the history of the highway 
nonfeasance rule and said: 
This rule has long been established in our law, and 
no doubt has the soundest historical justification. 
It is, however, an archaic and anomalous survival 
into modern times. It would be difficult indeed to 
think. of any sound reason why today highway 
authorities should enjoy this immunity. Neverthe-
less, there can be no doubt that in law they do 
enjoy the immunity, and I must applr the law; 
but I.am not obliged to extend it. 
It was held that the drains in question formed part 
of a land drainage scheme and not part of the drainage 
of the highway. The learned judge indicated that if 
the drains had been designed to drain the highway, he 
98. These principles appear to have been overlooked in 
J. w. Birnie v Taupo Borough Council ((1975) (unreported) 
Haslam J) where it appears to have been assumed that the 
highway nonfeasance rule applied. While the culverts 
in question lay under a highway, there is every 
indication that the problem arose out of the defendant 
borough's drainage function. It was so treated by the 
borough itself and by the Waikato Valley Authority 
which exercised general supervisory powers in respect of 
the drainage functions of local authorities in the 
district. The highway itself was unaffected by the 
inadequacy of the culverts. 
99. [1960] 1 QB 312. 
1. [1960] 1 QB at 323. 
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would have felt bound to apply the highway nonfeasance 
rule, but there was only a tenuous connection between 
the rule and the facts of the case. The duty of 
repairing the drains had formerly fallen on the 
highway authority, but the duty had originally been 
cast on the Surveyor of highways and not on the 
inhabitants at large from whom the Surveyor derived 
his immunity in respect of highways. Accordingly, 
Salmon J could "see no reason for extending the 
immunity from liability for non-feasance to the 
defendants." 2 
(c) Artificial Structures 
A more doubtful restriction upon the 
immunity is the imposition of liability for disrepair 
of "artificial structures" constructed in the highway. 
This proposition has its genesis in Borough of Bathurst 
v MacPherson
3 
· where the Judicial Committee held the 
defendants liable for damage resulting from their 
failure to repair a drain which they had constructed 
192 
under a street. This principle - that having constructed 
or obtained control of a drain, a municipality is bound 
to keep it in such a condition that no nuisance would 
be created - was applied in Tamaki West Road Board v 
4 
Appleton where the defendants had negligently failed 
2. [1960] 1 QB at 323. 
3. (1879) 4 App Cas 256. 
4. [1916] NZLR 183. 
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to clear a choked culvert under a road in their 
district and were held liable for damage caused by 
flooding of the plaintiff's land. But that case was 
subsequently disapproved by the Court of Appeal in 
Fortescue v Te Awamutu Borough? The weight of authority 
for and against the "artificial structure" rule has been 
6 
thoroughly canvassed by Sawer and need not be gone into 
here. It might be noted, however, that more recently 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal has expressly .held that 
a culvert under a highway is not an "artificial 
structure" but part of the highway and the Court 
indicated that the Bathurst case may no longer be 
7 
regarded as good law. 
5. Transfer of Tortious Liability by Statute 
A local authority which succeeds to the 
property and functions of another local authority does 
not at common law inherit the tortious liability of its 
predecessor. Such liability may be transferred by 
statutory provision. Statutes relating to local 
authority succession usually provide for the transfer 
of powers, rights, duties, capacities, liabilities 
and obligations as well as for the transfer of property 
and functions and it is a question of construction in 
each case whether liability is transferred in respect 
5. [1920] NZLR 281 CA. 
6. Nonfeasance in Relation to "Artificial Structures" 
on a Highway (1938) 12 ALJ 231; Nonfeasance Under 
Fire 2 NZULR 115. 
7. Hocking v A.G. [1963] NZLR 513. But see the full 
discussion of the Bathurst case by Dixon J in Buckle v 
Bayswater Road Board (1936) 57 CLR 259. 
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of the torts of the predecessor. 
The possibility of such a transfer was acknowledged 
by the Court of Appeal in Glossop v Heston and Isleworth 
Local Board 8 although it is not apparent why the 
principle was not actually applied in that case.
9 
In that case the transfer of (inter alia} liabilities 
was effected by s.l2 Public Health Act 1875 which 
provided that liabilities incurred by the predecessing 
authority might be enforced against the succeeding 
authority. In the course of his judgment Brett LJ 
acknowledged in regard to an earlier case
10 
the 
possibility that responsibility for the predecessors' 
act might have been carried ~own by an enactment to the 
defendants and so made them liable under the ordinary 
• rule, and said: 
So, indeed, I am inclined to think that in the present 
case, under this statute, if the former board had done 
an act that would have given the Plaintiff a right to 
damages or some other remedy, and the effect of that 
act continued in the Defendants' time, the Defendants 
would have been liable for the continuance of the 
consequences of that act, and would have been liable 
to an injunction. 11 
8. (1879) 12 ChD 102. 
9. The point appears not to have been raised in the pleadings 
or in argument, it may not have been supported by the 
evidence. 
10. A-G v Basingstoke Corporation 24 WR 817; 45 LJ Ch 726. 
11. (1879) 12 ChD 102. The word "continuance" is not used 
here in its technical sense. 
Cotton LJ specifically referred to s.l2 and affirmed 
that if the former body had by any done by them given 
a right of action, or incurred any liability, then that 
. rz 
could be enforced against the defendants. 
The decision in Jones v Llanrwst Urban Council
13 
illustrates the application of the principle of 
transferance in regard to liability arising under the 
rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The defendants' liability 
was derived from the acts of two predecessors. The 
sewerage system had been constructed by the Guardians 
of the Poor of the Llanrwst Union. The Guardians were 
succeeded as the sanitary authority for the district 
by the Llanrwst Rural District Council and their 
1 . b '1' . f d 
14 
1a 1 1t1es trans erre • Subsequently, part of the 
district was transferred to the Llanrwst Urban Council, 
15 
the present defendants and the relevant liabilities 
also passed. Parker J held that on both instances 
of succession common law duties and liabilities were 
195 
t f d 11 d . d 1' b '1' . 
16 
rans erre , as we as statutory ut1es an 1a 1 1t1es. 
The point is also illustrated by Haigh v Deudraith Rural 
. . . 17 1 . 1 . D1str1ct Counc1l, a so a r1ver pol ut1on case. The 
12. (1879) 12 ChD at 129. 
13. [1911] 1 Ch 193. 
14. S.25 Local Government Act 1894. 
15. By virtue of an Order under the Local Government Acts. 
16. [1911] 1 Ch at 408, 409. The learned judge mis-interpreted 
the Glossop case on this point and was led to distinguish 
the relevant statutes on the manifestly incorrect ground 
that the Public Health Act 1875 said nothing. of 
the transfer of duties and liabilities. 
17. [1945] 2 All ER 661. 
sewer giving rise to the nuisance had been constructed 
some seventy years previously by a rural sapitary 
authority, the liabilities of which the defendants had 
succeeded by statute. The sewer had become inadequate 
through greatly increased usage and was in urgent need 
of.reconstruction. Upon the authority of the Llanrwst 
case., 
18 
Vaisey J held the defendant authority liable. 
A similar principle was acknowledged in Smeaton v 
Ilford Corporationf9 In that case the soil sewer 
in question had been constructed by the defendants' 
predecessors, the Urban District Council of Ilford. 
On the basis of the charter which incorporated the 
district council into the bo~ough, the terms of which 
obliged the borough to assume all the liabilities of 
the council, the action proceeded on the footing that 
the defendant corporation were to be treated as the 
builders of the sewers vested in them as sanitary 
th . 20 au or1ty. 
In two cases the relevant provision has been construed 
restrictively, so as to preclude liability where the 
cause of action did not arise until after the transfer. 
18. [1911] 
19. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
20. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
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The first case. was a decision of the English Court of 
Appeal. In Nash v Rochford Rural Council21 it was 
contended that the defendants were liable for the 
negligent construction by their predecessors of a 
drain under a highway. The liabilities of the former 
authority had been transferred by statute22 to the 
defendants. The Court heJd, having regard to the 
. t t t'" . 23 1n erpre a 10n sect1on, that the meaning of 
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"liabilities" did not include a case where the damage 
and hence the cause of action, had not arisen until the 
former authority had gone out of existence, that 
negligence not followed by damage does not create a 
"liability" to be tran~ferred. The eff~ct of this 
decision is anomolous, for it means that recovery may 
depend on the fortuitous event of damage occurring prior 
to the transfer. This restrictive construction may be 
explained, though not justified, by reference to the 
court's clear expression of its ·reluctance to hold the 
defendant authority liable in a case of "nonfeasance". 
~n Craib v Woolwich Borough Council 24 the defendants 
were sued in their capacity as sewerage authority. 
The predecessor authority had permitted and approved 
the construction of a sewer which discharged into a 
manhole with an outflow drain of insufficient size, 
21. [1917) 1 KB 370. 
22. S.25 Local Government Act 1894. 
23. S.lOO Local Government Act 1888. 
24. (1920) 36 TLR 630. 
thus causing flooding of the plaintiff's property by 
the escape of sewage. The damage evidently did not 
occur until after the defendants took office. 
Shearman J held that the defendant authority was 
not liable for the misfeasance of its predecessors, 
this advantage having been conferred on the defendants 
by th hf d d . . 25 h 1" t . . 26 · e Roe or ec1.s1.on, t e re evan prov1.s1.on~ 
b . . .1 27 e1.ng s1.m1. .ar. 
25. [1917] 1 KB 370. 
26. Metropolis Management Act 1855. 
27. It will require very clear expression before the courts 
will be prepared to accept that a provision vesting the 
liabilities of a former authority in a succeeding 
authority, will pass an obligation attaching under an 
injunction. A-G v Birmingham, Tame and Rea Drainage 
Board (1881) 17 ChD 685. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE DEFENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The effect which legislative authority for the 
nuisance-creating enterprise has on the rights 
of an injured individual as often raises the 
delicate problem of delineating the spheres 
between administrative discretion and judicial 
control as the question to what extent the 
public interest may legitimately demand a 
private sacrifice from the affected individual. 
These difficulties in point of policy, no less 
than variations in the relevant legislative 
scheme, account for the rather uncertain and 
complex pattern of legal rules.l 
Modern local authorities are invariably creatures of 
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statute and their special powers, duties and liabilities 
are defined in the relevant empowering Act. Their civil 
liability for escapes rests upon the general law of 
Torts except in rare instances where statutory liability 
is imposed. .The courts have admitted, however, a 
defence to this tortious liability which is based upon 
mere inferences drawn from the grant of statutory 
powers to a nuisance-creating enterprise. From 
provisions clearly intended to regulate the affairs of 
statutory bodies and having nothing to do with tortious 
liability, the courts have sought to discover a non-
existent Legislative intention in order to overcome an 
apparent conflict between the provision of such powers 
and the imposition of strict liability by the common law. 
l. Fleming Torts 4th ed 365, 366. 
Even where by express provision the Legislature has 
sought to affirm the applicability of the rules of 
strict liability, such provisions, in some instances, 
have been read restrictively. 
The defence thus developed has precluded recovery in 
actions based upon strict liability where private 
individuals would have been held legally responsible. 
Thus from at least 1888 commercial gas undertakings 
have found protection. In that year Denman J applied 
the rule; as did Lord Russell CJ in 1895
3 and more 
recent decisions shown that gas companies have retained 
the immunity •4 Within the last decade, regional gas 
boards have found protection~ The applicability of the 
immunity to water supply companies had been affirmed 
by the Court of Appeal in 1894
6 and was also endorsed 
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in the decision just mentioned. 
7 Sewerage8 and drainage9 
2. Jackson v Carshalton Gas Co. (1888) 5 TLR 69, see the 
argument of Jelf QC. 
3. Price v South Metropolitan Gas Co. (1895) 65 LJQB 126. 
4. Hanson v Wearmouth Coal Co. and Sunderland Gas Co. [1939] 
3 All ER 47; Benning v Wong (1969) 43 ALJR 714. 
5. Dunne v North Western Gas Board [1964] 2 QB 806 CA: 
Pearson v North Western Gas Board 1968] 2 All ER 669. 
6. Green v Chelsea Waterworks (1894) 70 LT 517. 
7. Dunne v North Western Gas Board, Liverpool Corporation 
second defendant [1964] 2 QB 806. 
8. Smeaton v Ilford Corporation [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
9. Madell v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board 
(1935) 36 SR (NSW) 68. 
authorities have also sheltered behind the rule. 
However, there are instances also where the defence has 
been rejected in favour of strict liability, though 
upon specific statutory provision. Thus a commercial 
supplier10 and a municipal authority 11 have been held 
liable without fault for the escape of·gas. A similar 
l1ability has been imposed upon the supplier of water 
12 . for hydraulic power and upon a municipal water supply 
authority!
3 
Similarly, strict liability was imposed 
upon a municipal authority in a drainage case by the 
House of Lords. 14 
A. Negligence 
Although, as has been noted earlier in this work, 
attempts have been made from time to time to establish 
immunity from actions for negligence in the case of 
statutory bodies, such attempts were consistently 
rejected by the courts in decisions culminating in 
C . 15 d h k 16 oe v W1se an t e Mersey Doe s cases. Thus in 
1878 Lord Blackburn was able to authoritatively state 
10. Batcheller v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co. (1901) 84 LT 365. 
11. Shell-Mex B.P. Ltd v Belfast Corporation [1952] NI 72 CA. 
12. Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co. v Hydraulic Power Co. 
[1914] 3 KB 772. 
13. Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741. 
14. Hanley v Edinburgh Corporation (1913) 29 TLR 404. 
15. (1866) LR 1 QB 171. 
16. (1866) LR 1 HL 93. 
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in the leading case of Geddis v Bann Reservoir17 
I take it, without citing cases, that it is 
now thoroughly established that no action will lie 
for doing that which the Legislature has at,Ithorized, 
if it be done without negligence, although it does 
occasion damage to anyone; but an action does lie 
for doing that which the Legislature has authorized, 
if it be done negligently .18 
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The principle that an action will lie for the negligent 
execution of statutory powers has never since b€en 
seriously challenged. It has been applied or implicitly 
accepted in all those cases mentioned in Chapter III 
where liability was imposed.for negligence and which 
need not again been referred to. It is, however, in 
effect partly qualified by the rule that the courts 
will not review the exercise of discretionary powers 
for negligence where statutory compensation is provided 
19 
for the resulting damage. 
It is noted that the Geddis principle has sometimes 
been treated by the courts as exhaustively stating the 
principles of tortious liability, including the 
exclusion of the principles of strict liability }
0 
but this is incorrect. As shall be explained presently, 
in cases of strict liability a different and more complex 
17. (1878) 3 App Cas 430. 
18. (1878) 3 App Cas at 454. 
19. See Chapter VI. 
20. E.g. Burniston v Bangor Corporation [1932] NI 178; 
Benning v Wong (1969) 43 ALJR 741 (Majority of High 
Court.) 
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formulation of liability is applicable and it is 
observed that the Geddis case was neither pleaded nor 
argued as a case of strict liability. 
B. Nuisance 
The courts might have taken the view that mere general 
1egislative authorisation of an enterprise no more 
provided immunity from action at common law for nuisances 
than for negligence. Express authorisation might have 
been demanded. However, the introduction of railways 
on a large scale in the mid-nineteenth century, at a 
time when the prevailing economic doctrine was lassez 
faire, presented the courts with the problem of proceedings 
taken against the railways in respect of nuisances by 
smoke, noise, vibration and sparks which were an unavoid-
able concomitant of the enterprise. The running of 
1ocomotives and nuisances were synonymous. Immunity 
from strict liability was established in criminal 
d . 
21 d d d . '1 1' ab. 1. t 22 procee 1ngs an was exten e to c1v1 1 1 1 y. 
It was with less justification that the immunity was 
extended to the case of escapes from the works of 
public utilities, for unavoidable as some escapes may 
be, there is nothing like the same degree of certainty 
in frequency or in time, place and circumstance, that 
2l. R v Pease (1832) 4 B & A 30 (Criminal prosecution for 
public nuisance for frightening of horses on highway.)' 
22. Vaughan v Taff Vale Ry Co. (1860) 5 H & N 679; 
Hannnersmith Ry v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 171. 
a nuisance will occur. Nor do awards of damages or 
injunctions threaten to bring the enterpr~se to an 
end. 
If one thing is clear from the multitude of cases, 
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it is that there has been no authoritative and 
exhaustive formulation of the scope of the defence. 
Indeed the process of determining the issue is the 
weighing of various factors. The following pages are 
an attempt to state within a short space the law as it 
applies to the case of escapes from the works of public 
utilities. 
1. Variations in the Legislative Scheme 
In their attempts to elicit from the general 
provisions of empowering statutes the Legislature's 
intention regarding liability :fior nuisances, whether 
interference with private rights was impliedly authorised 
or whether the authorised activity was to be carried on 
in strict conformity with private rights, the courts 
have relied on certain features of the statutory 
provisions as indicia of authorisation. It is to be 
noted that although there has been a tendency to treat 
the presence or absence of one of these indicia as 
conclusive of the question, the better approach and 
that which more accurately reflects the actual effect of 
the decisions is that preferred by Bowen LJ in London, 
Brighton Ry v Truman23 and expressly adopted by Lord 
. 23. 29 ChD 89 at 109. 
. 24 Blackburn on appeal. Bowen LJ said: 
I do not ••• think that the absence of one 
particular indication of an intention to 
interfere with private rights, or the presence 
of any one indication of such an intention, 
is necessarily decisive. 
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Of such indicia, the two most important here are these, 
the_granting of the statutory powers in the mandatory 
or permissive form and the presence or absence of 
compensation provisions in respect of damage done. 
(a) Mandatory or Permissive Powers 
The adoption of the mandatory (duty) or 
permissive (power) form in the conferring of statutory 
authority was a distinction which was treated by the 
courts as a weighty factor in determining whether or 
not a nuisance was impliedly authorised in several 
cases decided in other contexts in the second half of 
the nineteenth century and notably in Metropolitan Asylum 
Districts v Hill.
25 
Thus it was held by the House of 
Lords _that a duty to operate a railway indicated 
authorisation of a nuisance by vibration from passing 
. 26 
tra1ns and of a nuisance caused by the noise of 
cattle traffic in a station yard 27 whereas it was held 
that a nuisance was not authorised where there was a 
mere power to provide a fever hospital. 28 Similarly, 
24. 11 App Cas 45 at 64. 
25. (1881) 6 App Cas 193. 
26. Hammersmith Ry v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 171. 
2 7. London, Brighton Ry v Truman ( 1885) 11 App Cas 45. 
28. Metropolitan Asylum Districts v Hill (1881) 6 App Cas 193. 
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the Privy Council held that a mere power to bring water 
on to land for the purposes of irrigation did not 
authorise a nuisance caused by run-off. 29 
The distinction between mandatory and permissive 
powers was noticed in Dixon v Metropolitan Board of 
30 
Works, a drainage case, where Lord Coleridge CJ 
held that as the duty of making and maintaining the 
sewer in question was absolutely imposed upon the 
defendants, they were not liable in respect of 
inevitable damage. But the point does not appear to 
have been at issue. 
It is of interest that the distinction was not 
referred to in either of the two earliest water-
1 f 1 th . . h . k 31 supp y cases o B y v BJ.rmJ_ng am Waterwor s eo. 
. 32 
or Snook v Grand Junction Waterworks eo. where the 
defendant companies were held not liable in the absence 
of negligence for the escape o£ water from their mains, 
but in both cases there was a statutory obligation to 
keep the mains charged with water. The decision in 
33 
Green v Chelsea Waterworks may be explained upon 
similar ground. It was there held by Mathew J at 
first instance and by the Court of Appeal that there 
29. Canadian Pacific Ry v Parke [1899] AC 535. 
30. (1881) 7 QBD 418. 
31. (1856) 11 Ex 780; 156 ER 1047. 
32. (1886) 2 TLR 308. 
33. (1894) 70 LT 547. 
207 
was no liability for an escape in the absence of 
negligence. It is evident from the report that in 
both courts counsel for the plaintiff placed a great 
deal of reliance on the distinction between mandatory 
and permissive authorisation in this respect, but the 
argument failed. It seems 1 however, that although there 
was a mere power to construct the works, once they were 
constructed there was an obligation to continue to supply 
the Publl·c.
34 A d' 1 th d · · d t b ccor 1ng y, e ec1s1on nee no e 
read as authority against strict liability where all 
th 1 . . . f 35 e re evant powers are perm1ss1ve 1n orm. The 
decision of Lord Russell CJ in Price v South Metropolitan 
36 
Gas eo. is distinguishable upon a similar ground. 
It was held that the defendant gas supplier was not 
liable for escapes in the absence. of negligence and 
no qualification was made in respect of permissive 
powers. Again, although this does not appear from the 
report, the defendant company appears to have in fact 
been under a duty to lay pipes and to supply gas to 
37 
consumers. 
34. See (1894) 70 LT at 548 per Mathew J. 
35. See also the decision of Kekewich J in National Telephone 
Co. v Baker [1893] 2 Ch 186 where the defendants were held 
protected by their statute from liability in respect of 
the escape of electricity from their tramway. Plaintiff's 
counsel raised the mandatory/permissive powers distinction 
but Kekewich J accepted the defendants contention that the 
use of electricity being expressly authorised, injury 
arising from a reasonable exercise of the powers was 
condoned - [1893] 2 Ch at 203. 
36. (1895) 65 LJQB 126. 
37. See ss 14-17 Metropolitan Gas Act 1860 (23 & 24) Vict 
c 125.) 
The distinction between mandatory and permissive 
. 
powers was first adopted (in actions of this kind) 
as a point of distinction between cases where there 
was no strict liability and cases where there was 
strict liability in 1914. In Charing Cross Electricity 
Supply eo. v Hydraulic Power Co. 38 the ·court of Appeal 
held that the defendant company was strictly liable 
for damage caused by the escape of water from its 
hydraulic mains. Lord Sumner said: 
[The defendants] are not incorporated as waterworks 
supply companies with an obligation to supply water 
to the public, but they are given powers of taking 
water and of laying mains without being under an 
obligation to keep their mains charged at high 
pressure or at all. This s~rves at once to 
distinguish the cl~~s of cases of which Green v 
Chelsea Waterworks was an illustration, where 
the principle is that if the Legislature has 
directed and required the undertaker to do that 
which caused the damage, his liability must rest 
upon negligence in his way of doing it, and not 
upon the act itself.40 
The distinction asserted by Lord Sumner was rejected in 
Burniston v Bangor Corporation 
41 
where it was pointed 
out that in Green v Chelsea Waterworks the defendants 
38. (1914] 3 KB 772. 
39. 70 LT 547. 
40. [1914] 3 KB at 781, 782. 
41. [1932] NI 178 at 187 CA. 
208 
were not compelled to lay down pipes, but merely to 
keep them charged with water when laid, as in the 
instant case. 
The only comment noticed in the New Zealand cases is 
against the distinction. In Irvine v Dunedin City 
Corporation
42 
Ostler J expressed the opinion that the 
1aw relating to the defence of statutory authority is 
209 




More recently in Dunne v North Western Gas Board 
the Court of Appeal maintained the distinction drawn by 
d h h 
. 45 
Lor Sumner between t e C ar1ng Cross case and the 
. 46 
Chelsea Watenvorks case and held that where there is 
a mandatory obligation there is no liability without 
negligence. 47 However, the court extended this principle 
to the case where there is a "nuisance" clause and, as 
shall be shown, it is extremely doubtful whether this 
extension was sound. 
Outside of this series of cases, which indeed forms a 
weighty line of authority, there is a little noticed 
42. [1939] NZLR at 769. 
43. The judge noted that in Green's case the Court of Appeal 
did not advert to this point or endeavour to found its 
judgment upon it. 
44. [1964] 2 QB 806. 
45. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
46. 70 LT 547. 
47. [1964] 2 QB at 835. 
drainage decision of the House of Lords in 1913 
upon a Scottish appeal which is out of accord with it. 
In Hanley v Edinburgh Corporation48 . it seems that the 
appellant's market had been flooded on two occasions by 
reason of an insufficient culvert constructed by the 
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respondents. Delivering the judgment of the House, Lord. 
Shaw was of the opinion th~t the statute, which imposed 
a duty upon the corporation to provide effective drain-
age for the city, was no defence for such a nuisance. 
Rather than relieving the corporation of its conunon law 
obligations, the statute imposed a statutory obligation 
to provide effectual drainage. In the judge's view, 
authority was to be found in two decisions of high 
authority 
49 
which, it might ne noted, were cases 
concerning permissive powers. 
It is difficult to find a satisfactory rationale for the 
extension of the mandatory/permissive powers distinction 
as a determinant of liability to the present context. 
It is not sufficient to say that the imposition of a duty 
is an indication that the legislature intended the 
powers to be exercised notwithstanding inevitable damage 
or that the granting of a discretionary power allows the 
person or body authorised to avoid a nuisance even to 
the extent of non-exercise of the powers. The imposition 
48. (1913) 29 TLR 404. 
49. Canadian Pacific Ry v Parke [1899] AC 535; Metropolitan 
Asylums District v Hill (1881) 6 App Cas 193. 
of duties clearly arose out of the need to ensure that 
commercial enterprises fulfilled the conditions of the 
monopolies granted and did not simply take up statutory 
powers to service large areas in order to exclude 
competitors or to service only the more lucrative 
suburbs. Duties were imposed upon local authorities 
in respect of drainage ana sewerage and water-supply 
and upon commercial water undertakers to ensure that 
the objects of the public health reforms (of which the 
supply of water was part) were realised. So far as the 
liability of these bodies for nuisances by escapes was 
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concerned the form of the power conferred was fortuitous 
and irrelevant. 
(b) Statutory Compensation 
The second indication of the implied 
authorisation or non-authorisation of nuisances is more 
soundly based. If there is a compensation provision in 
the empowering Act capable of applying to nuisances this 
affords some indication that such damage was contemplated 
by the legislature and that the common law remedy is 
abrogated. In 1881 Lord Blackburn said: 
[I]f no compensation is given it affords a reason, 
though not a conclusive one, for thinking that the 
intention of the Legislature was, not that the thing 
should be done at all events, but only that it 
should be done, if it could be done, without injury 
to others.SO 
50. Metropolitan Asylum Districts v Hill (1881) 6 App Cas 
193 at 203. 
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There is some English authority for the proposition that 
if no compensation is provided, there is a presumption 
against authorisation of a nuisance or to otherwise 
affect private rights. 51 But the existence of such a 
presumption has also been denied.52 It has also been 
declared that where there is no compensation clause, a 
court will be vigilant to see that an injured party is 
not deprived of his remedy unless such a conclusion is 
necessitated.53 However, in a New Zealand case the 
view has been expressed that the legal position relating 
to the defence of statutory authority is the same, 
whether or not there is a right to compensation,54 
but a more flexible approach is to be preferred. 
2. "Inevitableness" 
Proof that a nuisance is the inevitable result 
of the exercise of statutory powers is relevant to the 
defence of statutory authority in two respects.: First, 
it is an indication that interference with private 
rights in this manner is authorised. Second, it is a 
condition of the applicability of the immunity in any 
case. Emphasis on this second function has obscured 
5L Price's Patent Candle Co. v London County Council [1908] 
2 Ch 526 at 544 per Cozens Hardy MR; approved Farnworth v 
Manchester Corporation [1929] 1 KB 533 at 540 per Scrutton LJ. 
52. Edginton v Swindon Corporation [1939] 1 KB 86 at 90 per 
Findlay LJ. 
53. Marriage v East Norfolk Catchment Board [1950] 1 KB 284 
at 294 per Tucker LJ. 
54. Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1.939] NZLR at 754 per 
Myers CJ. 
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the significance of the first and has obscured also the 
criteria discussed in the foregoing pages~ 
(a) Indication of Immunity 
The courts have been prepared to infer, 
with little justification, that an inevitable nuisance 
would have been contemplated by the Legislature in 
granting the relevant statutory powers and that the 
nuisance· is therefore impliedly condoned. Although 
inevitableness and authorisation are commonly equatel
5 
it has been held on high authority that although a 
nuisance could not be avoided, that was not a sufficient 
ground to legalise the injury. 5
6 
It must be conceded, 
however, that in escape cas~s inevitableness (or the 
absence of negligence) has often been treated as a 
sufficient condition of the applicability of the 
immunity without regard to any other criteria. An 
attitude so entrenched may be difficult to displace. 
(b) Limit of Immunity 
Insofar as the immunity, where made out, 
extends only to inevitable nuisance, the reasoning 
would seem to be that while the authorised enterprise 
55. Notably Fleming Torts 4th ed p.366 and Evershed MR 
in the Pride of Derby case [1953] 1 Ch at 176. 
56. Metropolitan Asylum Districts v Hill (1861) 6 App Cas 
193 HL; Canadian Pacific Ry v Parke [1891] AC 535 PC. 
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is to be carried on notwithstanding the creation of a 
nuisance or nuisances, such injury must be minimised 
and where it is not shown to be inevitable - in the 
required sense - then the local authority will be held 
liable. 
It has yet to be affirmatively stated by the courts 
whether in the case of an isolated escape the test of 
inevitableness applies to the class of escape (bursting 
of mains generally) or whether it applies to the partiqular 
escape complained of. The rule has been expressed, in 
57 58 59 the case of water, gas and sewage as if it were 
the former. Indeed, it was specifically held in Irvine 
v Dunedin City Corporation
60 that the escape of water 
is not the inevitable consequence of the construction and 
maintenance of a water supply. The better view and that 
which is more in accord with Manchester Corporation v 
F . th 61 . h h d f d h . h arnwor 1s t at t e e en ant aut or1ty must prove t at 
the particular nuisance complained of was inevitable. The 
Northwestern Utilities case
62 supports that conclusion.
63 
57. Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZ~R 741. 
58. Benning v Wong (1969) 43 ALJR 714 Windeyer J. 
59. Smeaton v Ilford Corporation [1954] 1 Ch 450 at 477 . 
. 60. [1939] NZLR 741. 
61. [1930] AC 183 (Smoke from electricity station). 
62. [1936] AC 108. 
63. See also Powrie v Nelson City Corporation [1976] 
2 NZLR 247. 
215 
(c) Definition 
It remains to determine what is meant, in 
this context, by "inevitable". In Manchester Corporation 
v Farnworth64 Viscount Dunedin authoritatively defined 
the term in this way: 
[T]he criterion of inevitability is not what is 
theoretically possible but what is possible 
according to the state of scientific knowledge 
at the. time, having also in view a certain common 
sense appreciation, which cannot be rigidly defined, 
of practical feasibility in view of situation and 
expense. 
Proof of the absence of negligence falls upon a defendant 
authority sued in the torts of strict liabilitl
5 and 
(upon the predominant view that the test of inevitability 
applies to inqividual cases and not to classes of case) 
it is clear that the absence of negligence is an essential 
element of proof of inevitableness. The one term might 
·simply be reg~rded as the obverse of the other, provided 
that "negligence" bears the extended meaning which it 
has acquired in relation to the exercise of statutory 
powers. 
3. Nuisance Clauses 
. 66 
From about the middle of the nineteenth century 
the legislature commonly expressly qualified the empowering 
64~ [1930] AC 171 at 183. 
65. Seep.242. 
66. Nuisance clauses can be traced back to 1817, to the 
Act for better Lighting the Streets and Houses of 
the Metropolis with Gas, 57 Geo Ill c23 s55 and 
thence to the Lighting and Watching Act 1833. 
provisions of public service-enterprises by adding a 
proviso to the effect that the Act was not to be 
construed as authorising a nuisance. Thus the Towns 
Improvements Clauses Act 1847 provided: 
Nothing in the Act contained shall be construed to 
render lawful any act or omission on the part of 
any person which is, or but for this Act would 
. be, deemed to be a nuisance at common law. 67 
Similar provisions were inserted in the Gas Works 
Clauses Act of 1847 68 and 1871 and in the Public Health 
Acts of 1848, 1872 and 1875, but notably omitted 
from the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847. The practice 
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was adopted in Austra.lia 69 and also in New Zealand, at 
first only in relation to dr~inage wo~ks?0 but later 
extended to all "public works" of municipal authorities?1 
(a) "Duty Clause" Distinguished 
Prqvisions imposing or retaining liability 
for nuisances are to be distinguished from those which 
merely impose a·statutory duty not to create a nuisance. 
The former limit the powers given so as to impose strict 
liability whereas the latter impose only a duty of care?2 
67. 10 & 11 Vie c34. 
68. S29 10 Vict cl5. But see Price v South Metropolitan Gas 
Co. (1895) 65 LJQB 126 where this provision appears to have 
been overlooked. 
69. See Benning v Worig (1969) 43 ALJR 467. 
70. Municipal Corporations Act 1876 
71. Municipal Corporations Act 1900. No nuisance clause 
. ever appears to have been inserted in the Public Works 
Acts, nor in the Counties Act until 1956. 
72. Bryan v Swan Hill Sewerage Authority [1960] VR 573 575 
per Smith J. 
Thus English public health authorities have imposed 
upon them the duty to "so discharge their ~unctions 
under the • 11 73 Act as not to create a nu1sance • 
d 
. . 74 
An aca em1c wr1ter has written of this particular 
provision as if it were an example of a nuisance 
clause, but that is not the case. As has already been 
shown in this paper?
5 
only negligent breaches of such 
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duties are actionable, but the effect of such provisions 
. . . . 76 . ld 
is not to exclude strict l1ab1l1ty where 1t wou 
otherwise apply. 
(b) Strict Liability Imposed 
From the outset the various authorities acting 
under statutory powers qualified by a nuisance clause 
have sought to persuade the courts to read such 
provisions restrictively, to hold that there is liability 
only for negligence and that the authority is exonerated 
from liability for nuisances necessarily or inevitably 
arising from the exercise of the statutory powers. 
Until recently the courts consistently rejected all 
such arguments, taking the view that i.f the powers 
provided could not be exercised without creating a 
nuisance, then the authority should seek additional 
7.3. S31 Public H~alth Act 1936. 
74. Jennings Local Government Law at 276. 
75. See Chapter II. 
76. Contra Smeaton v Ilford Corporation [1954] 1 Ch 450 at 
477 per Upjohn J. See p.38. 
powers from the legislature which would undoubtedly 
make provision for compensation in respect of inter-
ference with private rights. 
The principle of strict liability was established and 
repeatedly reasserted in those cases where a sewerage 
authority was authorised or compelled to effectually 
drain its district and empowered to drain into the 
sea, rivers or streams, but with a proviso against 
. . 77 caus1ng a nu1sance. Of these decisions, the leading 
cases might be specifically mentioned. 
78 In A.G. v Birmingham Borough Page-Wood V.C. held that 
if it should prove impossible to drain the town without 
·-
creating a nuisance by pollution, then the town must 
remain undrained or the defendant would have to obtain 
additional powers. 
A similar view was taken irr A.G. v Leeds Corporation 
b J VC t f . . 
7 9 d b th c f y ames· a 1rst 1nstance an y e ourt o 
71. Oldaker v Hunt (1854) 19 Beav 485; A.G. v Luton Local Board 
of Health (1856) 2 Jur NS 180; A.G. v Birmingham Borough 
Council (1858) 4 K & J 528; Manchester, Sheffield, etc. Ry 
Co. v Worksop Board of Health (1857) 23 Beav 198; Bidder v 
Croydon Local Board of Health (1862) 6 LT 778; A.G. v 
Metropolitan Board of Works (1863) 9 LT 139; A.G. v 
Kingston-on-Thames Corporation (1865) 34 LJ Ch 481; Cator 
v Lewisham Board of Works (1864) 5 B & S 115 127; Goldsmid 
v Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners (1866) 1 Ch 
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App 349 352; A.G. v Richmond (1866) LR 2 Eq 306; A.G. v 
Leeds Corporation (1870) 5 Ch App 583; A.G. v Dorchester 
Corporation (1905) 93 LT 290; Harrington v Derby Corporation 
[1905] 1 Ch 205; Foster v Warbling ton Urban Council [1906] 
1 KB 468 CA; Owen v Faversham Corporation (1908) 72 JP 
404; 73 JP 33 CA; Price's Patent Candle Co. v London County 
[1908] 2 Ch 526 CA. 
78. (1858) 4 K & J 528 at 543. 
79.. (1870) 39 LJ Ch 254; LR 5 Ch 587 (n.). 
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Appeal. 80 Lord Hatherley LC said that it would be 
inconsistent with the powers given (to drain into the 
river without creating a nuisance) to hold that the 
parties were not to be restrained from creating a 
nuisance~1 The Lord Chancellor observed that according 
to the contrary construction of the Act, there may have 
been a number of people who might have had a serious 
injury inflicted upon them and said that that was not 
. 1 . bl . 82 a rat1ona or reasona e construct1on. 
In a third river pollution case, Price's Patent Candle 
Co. v London County Counci1
83 
Neville J rejected ·the 
argument that the defendants could rely on a case of 
necessity, for they were expressly prohibited from ... 
creating a nuisance. The Court of Appeal agreed. 
Cozens-Hardy MR said: 
[If a] statute expressly confers a power but adds 
a proviso that no nuisance must be created, it is 
no defence to say that the work, in truth, cannot 
be done without creating a nuisance~4 
Kennedy LJ observed that if it were impossible or very 
difficult for the defendants to maintain the drainage 
without statutory powers, such powers would probably be 
80. (1870) LR 5 Ch at 583. 
81. (1870) LR 5 Ch at 593. 
82. (1870) LR 5 Ch at 593. 
83. [1908] 2 Ch 526. 
84. [1908] 2Ch at 544. 
given by the legislature subject to compensation 
for interference with private rights. 85 
The principle that a nuisance clause imposes strict 
liability has been applied by the Court of Appea1 86 
and recognised by the House of Lords 
87 in cases 
concerning nuisances created·by producers of gas or 
electricity. 
In Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co. 88 
Lord Halsbury LC expressly declined to accept the 
contention that notwithstanding a nuisance clause, 
the use of all skill and care was sufficient or that 
nuisances necessarily created by the carrying on of the 
statutory undertaking were authorised. 
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Lord Halsbury's view was expressly applied by Collins MR 
in Midwood v Manchester Corporation.
89 That case 
closely resembles the kind of case with which we are 
here concerned. The defendant Corporation - the under-
85. [1908] 2 Ch at 550. 
86. Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 
1 Ch 287; Jordeson v Sutton, Southcoates and Drypoo1 Gas 
Co. [1899] 2 Ch 217; Midwood v Manchester Corporation 
TI905] 2 KB 597. 
87. Manchester Corporation v Farnworth [1930] AC 171. 
88. [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 309. 
89. [1905] 2 KB at 606, 607. 
takers of the electricity supply - had their mains in 
the streets. Somehow the insulation of the 90nductors 
failed; a short circuit took place and the heat so 
generated volatilized the bitumen in which the main 
was laid, which gave off an inflammable gas. The 
gas accumulated and presently found its way into the 
house adjoining the plaintiff's, where it exploded and 
caused the fire by which the plaintiff's property 
was damaged. Collins MR said: "If that was not a 
90 nuisance, I do not know what would be one." The 
defendants were held liable though negligence was 
not relied on. 
In the course of delivering his judgment in Midwood v 
h . 91 Mane ester Corporat1on, Mathew LJ explained the 
imposition of strict liability upon the defendants by 
the legislature in the following terms: 
A concession is granted to the undertakers, 
giving them the right to carry on a dangerous 
business, to which latent risks may be 
incidental that cannot be prevented by any 
degree of care; and, that being so, it was 
thought reasonable that those who are 
empowered to carry on that business for 
their profit should have to bear the 92 inevitable loss arising from such risks. 
90. [1905] 2 KB at 605. 
91. [1905] · 2 KB 597. 
92. [1905] 2 KB at 610. 
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Strict liability first appears to have been imposed 
on a gas supply authority for an escape of gas upon 
the basis of a nuisance clause in Batcheller v Tunbridge 
Wells Gas Co. 93 where Farwell J 94 rejected evidence 
tendered to show that the escape of a certain amount 
o:t gas was unavoidable and held that the defendants 
had no statutory authority to create a nuisance. 
Liability was imposed without proof of negligence upon 
the defendant company for the escape of water from its 
mains in Charing Cross Electricity Supply eo. v 
Hydraulic Power Co.
95 
where the Court of Appeal followed 
its earlier decision in Midwood v Manchester Corporation?
6 
The nuisance clause provided, in brief, that nothing 
in the empowering Act should exempt the company from 
any proceedings in respect of any nuisance caused by 
them.
97 
Bray J held that the effect of the section was 
93. (1901) 84 LT 765. 
94. Following Jordeson v Sutton, Southcoates and Drypool 
Gas Co. [1899] 2 Ch 217. 
95. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
96. [1905] 2 KB 597. 
97. The full text read: "Nothing in this Act shail exempt 
the company from any indictment, suit, action, or other 
proceeding at law or in equity in respect of any nuisance 
caused by them." 
this: 
You may put your pipes on this land, but you are 
not to be entitled by reason thereof to any 
protection against claims by other persons who 
have sustained injuries arising from any action-
able nuisance which you may commit, and, therefore, 
if it be shewn that the plaintiffs have sustained 
an injury by an actionable nuisance committed by 
the defendants, then they have no protection.98· 
A similar view of the law has been taken in Ireland 
and applied in respect of the escape of gas from a 
Corporation's mains. In Shell-Mex v Belfast Corpor-
ation99 Porter LJ referred to the nuisance clauses 
contained in the Gasworks Clauses and Electricity 
Supply Acts and said: 
Our law regards gas and electricity as dangerous 
things which cannot be manufactured, transmitted 
or used without very considerable risk of injury 
and damage, and therefore undertakers who cause 
a nuisance in the exercise of their statutory 
powers, privileges and duties; are subject to 
the same common law liability as an ordinary 
citizen.l· 
However, in the face of the English courts' 
refusal to compromise private rights, AustraliaJ and 
98. [1914} 3 KB at 786. 
99. (1952] NI 72 CA. 
I. [1952] NI at 7 5. 
2. Fullarton v North Melbourne Tramway and Lighting Co. 
(1916) 21 CLR 181 at 188 per Griffith CJ. 
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3 New Zealand courts have suggested that a nuisance 
which "necessarily" results from the exercise of 
sta.tutory powers is not prohibited by a nuisance 
4 
clause. 
Thus in Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation
5 Myers CJ 
held that a nuisance clause could not apply without 
modification to every public nuisance, for "it would 
be in hopeless conflict with the statutory provisions 
authorising the construction and maintenance of 
public works" .6 The illustrations given of such a 
conflict are not convincing~ In any event, the court 
held that the escape of water from burst mains was not 
a "necessary" incident of the exercise of powers to 
provide a water supply. On this view, the limitation, 
even if sound, is of no importance in the present context. 
3. Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741 (obiter); 
Referred to, but not actually applied (cf. headnote) in 
Nobilo v Waitemata!County [1961] NZLR 1064 at 1069 per 
Haslam J. See also Powrie v Nelson City Corporation 
[1976] 2 NZLR 247. 
4. The headnote suggests that an "inevitable" nuisance is 
similarly not prohibited and this appears to have been 
accepted by Haslam J in the case just noted, but this is 
supported only by the judgment of Smith J, and the learned 
judge was clearly in error in thinking that the principle 
of non-liability for inevitable nuisances, propounded in 
the Farnworth case, applies where there is a nuisance clause. 
5. [1939] NZLR 741. 
6. [1939] NZLR at 755. 
7. The erection of poles in streets, the construction of 
sewerage or drainage systems, the laying of water mains 
under private lands; the first simply need not be a nuisance, 
the second is in direct conflict with the English cases 
previously discussed in this paper, the.third is more in 
the nature of a trespass for which compensation would be 
available. 
It is of interest to note in passing that the Court 
of Appeal appears to have been influenced by 
reasoning found in earlier8 cases which it had in 
other respects overruled. The court seems to have 
adopted in relation to 11 necessary 11 nuisances the 
reasoning used by earlier courts in a wider context 
j~ relation to nuisances generally: 
If the act done is authorised by the statute 
then, although apart from the authority given 
by the statute it would be a nuisance, it 
cannot be a nuisance within the meaning of 
[the nuisance clause].9 
The fallacy here lies in the failure to recognise 
that the nuisance clause qualifies the general 
·-
authorisation granted by the statute; if an act 
creates a.nuisance, it is not authorised, whether 
or not the nuisance is 11 necessary 11 • 
(c) Mandatory Powers 
The long line of cases already cited 
concerning sewerage authorities shows that a 
statutory body is strictly liable under a nuisance 
clause, whether its powers are granted in the 
mandatory or permissive form, for the Public Health 
Acts imposed upon the local health authority a 
duty to drain the district. 
8. See p.228 n.22. 
9. Lyttle v Hastings Borough [1917] NZLR 910. 
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In A.G. v Birmingham Borough Councir0 Page-Wood VC 
said in an oft-cited passage: 
It is true that [the Defendants] are compelled 
by the Act thoroughly to drain the town; but 
they are also compelled so to drain it as to 
bring themselves within the provisions of the 
Act, which says that it shall not be lawful for 
them to do anything which at common law would 
be deemed to be a nuisance. How the town is to 
be thoroughly draincu without causing a nuisance 
is the business of the Defendants to discover~l 
226 
That a statutory duty to carry on a nuisance creating 
enterprise does not derogate from the strict 
liability imposed by a nuisance clause was not 
questioned until doubt was cast upon the rule, 
less than convincingly, by the Court of Appeal in 
1963. 
h . dl2 In Dunne v Nort Western Gas Boar the court 
held that notwithstanding the presence of a ~uisance 
clause, in familiar form, the defendant Board was 
not liable in the absence of negligence for damage 
caused by the escape of gas from its mains. The 
Court in effect extended the scope of the mandatory/ 
permissive powers distinction supported by only meagre 
authority, as has been shown, where there is no nuisance 
clause, to the quite difference case where there is 
such a clause. It said: 
10. (1858) 4 K & J 528. 
11. (1859) 5 K & J at 543. 
12. [1964] 2 QB 806. 
Where there is a mandatory obligation with a 
saving or nuisance clause, as here, or without 
one as in the Chelsea Waterworks case, 13 there 
would be, in our opinion, no liability {f what 
had been done was that which was expressly 
required by statute to be done or was 
reasonably incidental to that requirement and 
was done without negligence.l4 · 
227 
15 
The court distinguished Midwood v Manchester Corporation 
and Charing Cross Electricity Supply eo. v Hydraulic 
16 
Power eo. on the ground that the defendants in 
those two cases had permissive and not mandatory 
powers. It appears to have been influenced by the 





as recor e ear 1er, it was held that a duty not to 
create a nuisance imposed only a duty of care; but a 
provision of that kind is quite different from a 
saving clause and Smeaton's case is of no authority 
on the point. Thus the opinion expressed by the Court 
of Appeal in Dunne's case is without authoritative 
support; indeed, it runs counter to the construction 
placed on nuisance clauses for over a century. 
Some judicial support for this criticism of Dunne's 
case may be found in the subsequent case of Pearson v 
19 
North Western Gas Board where the plaintiff also 
sought to recover damages against the North Western 
13. 70 LT 547 CA. 
14. [1964] 2 QB at 835. 
15. [1905] 2 KB 597 CA. 
16. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
17. [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
18. See pp 38 and 217. 
19. [1968] 2 All ER 669. 
Gas Board in respect of injury caused by the escape 
of gas from mains. In the face of the decision in 
Dunne's case, counsel for the plaintiff felt obliged 
to concede that he· could not succeed under the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher or on the ground of Nuisance. The 
action for negligence failed. Referred to counsel's 
concession, Rees J coromented in the course of his 
judgment: 
Whether at another time and in the highest tribunal 
the Dunne case will find favour as a matter of 
principle and when examined afresh in the light of 
the decision also of the Court of Appeal in 
Charing Cross, West End and City Electricity Supply 
Co. Ltd-v London Hydraulic Power Co. is not for me 
to express an opinion.20 
Accordingly, Dunne v North Western Gas BoarJ
1 
awaits review. 
(d) Private Nuisance 
Prior ·to 1939 there were a number of New 
Zealand decisions in which it was stated by way of 
dicta that the nuisance clauses in the Municipal 
Corporations Act did not extend to private nuisances 
(for which, it was though·t, statutory compensation 
was available} but prohibited·only public nuisances.
22 
20. (1969] 2 All ER at 672. 
21. [1964] 2 QB 806. 
22. · Bank of New Zealand v Blenheim Borough (1885) NZLR 4 
SC 10 at 12 per Prendergast CJ; Lyttle v Hastings 
Borough [1917] NZLR 910 at 917 per Edwards J; 
Fortescue v Te Awamutu Borough [1920] NZLR 281 at 288 
per Stout CJ; O'Brien v Wellington City Corporation 
[1933] NZLR at 1114, 1115 per Ostler J. 
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However, these dicta must now be taken to have been 
overruled by the decision of the Court of. Appeal in 
23 
Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation where the court 
considered the weight of the earlier c~ses and the 
majority preferred the contrary view, that the 




The restriction of nuisances clauses to public nuisances 
has not found favour in the English courts. The point 
1 
. 25 was argued before the Court of Appea on one occas1.on 
but appears to have been summarily rejected by 
Lindley MR as a 'minor contention' to which the court 
found it unnecessary to ref~r in view of the wide 
. k . 1 26 v1.ew ta en of the nu1.sance c ause. 
However, it is noted that a distinguished Australian 
judge has expressed the view that liability under a 
nuisance clause is limited to plaintiffs who have an 
27 
interest in land, but this view appears to be without 
foundation. 
23. [1939] NZLR 741. 
24. [1939] NZLR at 752 et seq. 
25. Jordeson v Sutton, South-coates and Drypoo1 Gas Co. 
[1899] 2 Ch 217. 
26. [1899] 2 Ch at 237. 
27. Windeyer J in Benning v Wong (1969) ALJR 467 at 494. 
(e) Specific Authority 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has imposed 
a limitation upon nuisance clauses which might 
conceivably affect the kind of case with which we are 
here concerned and which should not in any event be 
overlooked. 
The effect of the decision in New Brighton Borough v 
A-G 28 is that the true effect of a nuisance clause is 
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that general authority to construct public works is not. 
a statutory authority to construct any work which apart 
from that authority would be a nuisance, but where 
specific authority or consent is given under any statute 
for the construction of a particular work in a particular 
place and where the creation of such nuisance is a 
criterion in the granting of or in imposing conditions 
on such authorisation, then the nuisance will be regarded 
as authorised and outside the nuisance clause. 29 Thus, 
an express prohibition is negatived by an implied 
authorisation. Such a construction grants to the 
local authority or government department, as the case 
may be, a discretion as to the creation of nuisances 
and pays scant regard to the conservation of private 
rights. The strong dissenting judgment of MacGreagor J 
is to be preferred. 
28. [1927] NZLR 593. 
29. Thus where consent had been given by the Governor, 
pursuant to the empowering Act, to the construction 
of a bridge which would othenvise amount to a public 
nuisance, such nuisance was held to be authorised and 
outside the nuisance clause, although such clause 
prevented the construction of the bridge under the 
general powers to construct public works. 
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(f) Benning v Wong 
30 
In Benning v Wong the High Co';Irt of Australia 
declined to hold the defendant gas company strictly 
liable for the escape of gas from its mains, notwith-
standing the presence of a nuisance clause in the 
empowering Act. While Windeyer J, dissenting, was 
prepared to hold that a nuisance clause prevented the 
31 gas company from sheltering behind its s_tatute, the 
majority preferred the view that there was no liability 
without negligence. The principles upon which this 
aspect of the decision was determined warrant specific 
mention. 
McTiernan and Owen JJ were of the opinion that the 
issue of the construction of the nuisance clause was 
not raised by the pleadings, that the declaration raised 
counts of Negligence and Rylands v Fletcher, but not 
. 32 NuJ.sance. But the better view is that the Rule is a 
species of Nuisance and the nuisance clause was accordingly 
relevant. 
Owen and Menzies JJ also took the view that statutory 
bodies are altogether beyond the scope of strict 
liability and from this doubtful33 premise the learned 
30. (1969) 43 ALJR 467. 
31. (1969) ALJR at 492. 
32. The pre-Judicature Act form of pleadings then survived 
in New South Wales. 
33. This point is discussed at P·234. 
judges reasoned that as the nuisance clause did not 
"create" a cause of action where none existed at common 
law, only negligence was actionable!
4 
Again, the better· 
view is statutory bodies are prima facie within the 
rules of a "nuisance clause" precludes the body from 
invoking the statute as a defence to an action in 
Nuisance. 
Barwick CJ conceded that little, if any, significance 
would attach to a nuisance clause unless it was read as 
maintaining strict liability, but nonetheless suggested 
that there was no liability for nuisance proven to be 
unavoidable even by the use of due care and skill and 
that a nuisance clause was merely "a useful emphasis 
. . . 35 
1.ncluded J.n a statute for more abundant caut1.on". 
It is to be noted, however, that the Chief Justice found 
l.. t d .. d h . 
36 
unnecessary to ecJ. e t e po1.nt. 
It will be seen, therefore, that insofar as the decision 
turned upon a point of pleading, it is of little 
relevance, and that insofar as the case was determined 
upon alleged principles of substantive law, it is 
unsatisfactory. 
34. Owen J at p.496; MenZies J at p.481. 
35. (1969) 43 ALJR at 469. 
36. (1969) 43 ALJR at 472. 
I p.233 omitted. 
232 
C. Rylands v Fletcher 
1. Prima Facie Liability 
It is of interest that .in Cattle v Stockton 
37 
Waterworks eo. Blackburn J passed over an opportunity 
to express an opinion on the question whether the rule 
in Rylands v .Fletcher applies to a statutory water 
supply authority. In that case water had escaped 
from a main which had been laid under a turnpike road. 
The plaintiff had been engaged by the owner of the 
land adjoining the road to construct a tunnel under 
the road. As a consequence of the escape the work was 
slowed and the plaintiff suffered financial loss. 
It was contended for the pl~intiff before the Court 
of Queen's Bench that according to the doctrine laid 
down in Fletcher v Rylands, the defendants were under 
an obligation to keep in the water in the pipes and 
therefore it was not necessary to prove negligence in 
fact in the defendants, though negligence was also 
alleged. Defendants' counsel contended that the 
doctrine of Fletcher v Rylands did not apply to such 
234 
a case, where the defendants were authorised by statute 
to make and maintain the pipe. 
The judgment of the Court was delivered by Blackburn J 
who said that if it were necessary to decide these 
questions, the Court would require further time to 
37. (1875) 10 QB 453. 
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consider, as the judges were not as then quite agreed 
as to the principle of law applicable to such a case. 
The question whether the landowner might himself have 
maintained an action was pu~posely left undecided. 
The case was determined upon the ground that the 
damage complained of, financial loss, was in any event 
+-.oo · remote . 
The questions left open in Cattle v Stockton Waterworks 
have not been finally resolved by judicial decision. 
In particular, it is not clear whether a local authority 
exercising statutory powers is altogether outside the 
rule, or whether it is prima facie within the rule, 
subject to the defence of s_!:atutory authority. In 
Smeaton v Ilford CorporatioJ
8 
Upjohn J declined to 
express a concluded view on this question. However, 
the law may be inferred from the approach which the 
courts have actually taken in determining the question 
of liability where the rule has been pleaded. 
There are two decisions which are inconclusive in this 
regard. 
39 
In Green v Chelsea Waterworks the defendants' 
water main had burst, flooding the plaintiff's premises. 
The Court of Appeal held that the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher did not extend to companies having statutory 
authority to carry water. In Price v South Metropolitan 
. 40 . . . 
Gas eo. Lord Russell CJ stated that the rule had no 
38. [1954] 1 Ch 450 at 478. 
39. (1894) 70 LT 54 7. 
40. (1896) 65 LJ QB 126. 
application to a gas company having statutory 
authority to lay pipes. Even if these cases are read 
as excluding the rule altogether, there is, as shall 
be shown, later authority against it. 
The preponderance of authority supports the view that 
statutory authorities are prima facie liable under the 
rule, subject to the defence of statutory authority. 
That was the terminology used by Lord Coleridge CJ 
in Dixon v Metropolitan Board of Works~1 a case 
concerning a drainage authority. It is clearly the 
approach adopted by the Privy Council in Northwestern 
Utilities ~ London Accident and Guarantee Co. 42 
In that case the liability of. the defendants was 
ultimately based on a plea of negligence, but in the 
course of delivering its opinion, the Judicial 
Committee made certain observations on the question of 
liability which made it clear that the statutory gas 
undertaker was to be treated as prima facie within the 
Rule in Rylands v Fletcher, though proof that the 
damage was not brought about by negligence wo~ld be a 
good defence. 43 
The judgment of Evershed MR in the Pride of Derby 
case also follows this reasoning~4 Furthermore , 
liability has actually been imposed under the rule 
41. (1881) 7 QBD 418. 
42. [1936] AC 108. 
43. [1936] AC at 118 119. 
44. [1953] 1 Ch 149. 
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(pursuant to nuisance clauses} against statutory 
auth.ori ties for escapes in three cases. Thus it was 
applied against a company for an escape of gas in 
Batcheller v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co~5 and against 
a municipal authority in Irvine v Dunedin City 
Corporation 
46 
and a commercial supplier in the 
47 
Cha~ing Cross case for escapes of water. In 
addition, the rule has been applied aga,inst sewerage 
authorities on at least four occasions where liability 
was imposed for injury caused by the discharge of 
48 sewage. 
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Particularly having regard to the Northwestern Utilities 
49 th . . .h h b k ttl d case e po~nt m~g t ave een ta en as se e • 
However, an element of uncertainty was introduced into 
the law by the decision of the High Court of Australia 
. 50 
~n Benning v Wong. The Court was sharply divided. 
The miriori ty preferred the approach taken by the Privy. 
Council. The majority, with less than persuasive 
reasoning and deriving support from Green and 
Price, concluded that the rule had no application 
whatever to statutory authorities such as the 
defendant gas company. 
45. (1901) LT 765. See also Pearson v North Western Gas Board 
[1963] 3 All ER 196. 
46. [1939] NZLR 741. 
47. [1914] 3 KB 772. 
48. Hobart v Southend-on-Sea Corporation (1906) LJ KB 305; 
Foster v Warblington UDC [1906] 1 KB 648 (CA); Jones v 
Llanrwst UC [1911] 1 Ch 393; Haigh v Deudraeth RDC 
[1945] 2 All ER 661. 
49. [1936] AC 108. 
50. (1969) 43 ALJR 467. 
2. Nuisance Clauses 
Whether a nuisance clause imposes or retains 
liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
should logically depend on whether the Rule is to 
be regarded as a species of Nuisance or as a distinct 
tort. In this context, however, it seems that the 
differences between the t<;o kinds of liability51 
are irrelevant; the Rule and the law of Nuisance 
(public and private) have similar effect and may be 
invoked indifferently, even in the case of an isolated 
escape. h . . h b h h . . 
52 
T 1.s 1.s s own y t e C ar1.ng Cross case, 
where the Court of Appeal held the defendant hydraulic 
· power company liable for the escape of water on the 
·-
grounds of both Rylands v Fletcher and Nuisance. 
Although the Court did not expressly state that the 
nuisance clause applied to the Rule, this is clearly 
implied, for the Court held that Rylands v Fletcher 
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applied and rejected two grounds of distinction suggested. 
In Irvine v Dunedin City Corporation
53 
the Rule was 
applied in similar circumstances. Smith J said that 
"the very presence of a nuisance clause seems to· imply 
that the Legislature regards a municipal corporation 
as a fit subject for the application of the doctrine 
54 
of Rylands v Fletcher". Support for this view may 
51. Conveniently listed by Winfield Torts 8th ed at 435. 
52. [ 1914] 3 KB 772. 
53. [1939] NZLR 741. 
54. [1939] NZLR at 777. 
be derived from the judgment of the Privy Council in 
Northwestern Utilities v London Guarantee and Accident 
Co. 55 where it was held that it was a question of 
construction whether a statutory undertaker remains 
subject to the strict and unqualified rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher~6 In Irvine's case, Johnston J 
went:. so far as to hold th~t the Privy Council had 
"determined" that the inclusion of a nuisance clause 
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in such a statute limits the immunity statutory authority 
would otherwise give and re-establishes the conunon law 
doctrine as determined by Rylands v Fletcher.57 
This is also the view rejected by the majority of 
the High Court in Benning v~ong 58 (on grounds 
mentioned earlier 59 ) but substantially taken by 
Windeyer J (dissenting) , who rejected the contention 
that the relevant nuisance clause related only to 
actions for nuisance as understood at the time of 
the passing of the relevant empowering Acts, 1837 or 
1858, and did not comprehend the Rylands v Fletcher 
kind of nuisance as expounded by the Exchequer Chamber 
in 1866. The learned judge said: 
55. [1936] AC 108. 
56. [1936] AC at 
57. [1939] NZLR at 
58. (1969) 43 ALJR 471. 
59. See p. 231. 
••. - [T]hat is, I think, contrary to principle and 
in conflict with authority. Moreover, it does not 
fit the facts-of this case; for by keeping up the 
pressure of gas in its pipes the Gas Company 
created and maintained a nuisance. It is true 
that every case now falling within the principle 
of Rylands v Fletcher would not before that 
decision have been considered an actionable nuisance. 
But nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher overlap. 
Such distinctions as there are, appear to 
me irrelevant to the immediate question. 60 
Barwick CJ disposed of the same point by saying that 
"as of the date of the decision in Rylands v Fletcher, 
the suggested distinction would have no substantial 
validity." 61 
The absence of continuity or recurrence in the 
escape of the dangerous thing or substance which 
might distinguish the cause of action from 
nuisance, strictly so-called_, having no bearing 
whatever, in my opinion, upon the requisites of 
a defence or justification. 62 -
This also seems to be the law in Northern Ireland. 
In Shell-Mex & B.P. Ltd v Belfast Corporation 63 
it was held by the Court of Appeal, following the 
Midwood and Charing Cross cases, that as the defendants 
were subject to the provisions of a nuisance clause, 
they could not claim exemption on the ground of 
statutory authority from the strict liability imposed 
by the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.64 
60. (1969) ALJR at 492. 
61. (1969) ALJR at 471. 
62. (1969) ALJR at 471, 472. 
63. [1952] NI 72 CA. 
. 64. [1952] NI at 75 per Porter LJ ,at p.86 per Black LJ. 
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It seems too, that a nuisance clause will extend to 
all escapes which will found an action in Rylands v 
Fletcher, even where the acts of the defendant do not 
in the strictest sense amount to the "creation" 
. 65 
of a nu1sance. 
D. Special Statutory Defences 
Quite apart from the general defence of statutory 
authority, the Legislature may specifically provide 
that the risk of damage from an escape from a public 
utility service should be borne not by the local 
authority but by the persons whose property is at risk. 
In New Zealand the Legislature has granted protection 
of this kind to municipal corporations. It is thus 
provided that a corporation may grant its consent 
(where required) to the construction of any cellar 
subject to a condition that neither the owner nor the 
occupier, nor their successors in title, shall be 
entitled to claim against the corporation for "any 
damage caused to the cellar or any property therein 
arising, whether directly or indirectly, from any 
defect in any water-supply system, sewerage system, 
or other public utility service under the control of 
66 
the council." 
65. Bryan v Swan Hill Sewerage Authority [1960} VR 573, 
5 77 per Smith J. 
66. S203A Hunicipal Corporations Act 1954. 
must be registered against the title; 





Such statutory protection might be thought justifiable 
upon the grounds that the extra-ordinary risk created 
by cellars, particularly where used for the storage of 
valuable goods,ought to be born by the owner or occupier. 
Such escapes may be guarded against by design, in 
construction, and by special precautions, such as the 
provision of automatic pure~s. Moreover, risks of this 
kind are insurable and the owner has notice of the risk 
recorded on the title. 
E. Burden of Proof of Negligence 
Where negligence is pleaded as the cause of action, then, 
following the general rule, the burden of proof falls 
upon the plaintiff. But where the cause of action is 
pleaded in the torts of strict liability and statutory 
authority is pleaded as a defence, the defendant must 
affirmatively establish that defence by proving that the 
damage complained of was an inevitable consequence of 
the exercise of the statutory powers, that there was an 
b f 1
. 67 a sence o neg 1gence. 
This rule, which gives a valuable tactical advantage 
to a plaintiff who pleads his case carefully, was 
affirmed by the House of Lords in Manchester Corporation 
67. Failure to distinguish these two kinds of case led to the 
patently erroneous decision in Madell v Metropolitan Water, 
Sewerage and Drainage Board (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 68. 
v Farnworth. 68 The rule was applied by the Privy 
69 
Council in the Northwestern Utilities case and by 
the English Court of Appeal in Hanson v Wearmouth 
Coal eo. and Sunderland Gas co?
0 and received support 
in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Irvine v Dunedin 
. c . 71 C1ty orporat1on. 
72 In Benning v Wong, however'; the majority of the High 
Court of Austalia preferred the view that statutory 
authority precluded the application of strict liability 
altogether and that accordingly the burden of proof 
of negligence fell on the plaintiff. 
68. [1930] AC 171 at 183 per Lord Dunedin, at p.l87 per 
Viscount Sumner, at p.206 per Lord Blanesburgh. Applied 
Provender Millers (Winchester) Ltd v Southampton County 
Council [1940] 1 Ch 121 CA. 
69. [1936] AC 108 at 119, 121 per Lord Wright. 
70. [1939] 3 All ER 47. 
71. [1939] NZLR 741 at 784 per Smith J. 




In addition to the general exposition of the.law which 
forms the foundation of this work, two features of 
judicial reasoning have become apparent which also 
justify some comment by way of conclusion, viz. the 
limitations of tortious remedies in this context (as 
evidenced by the various aspects of the doctrine of 
nonfeasance) and the differing attitudes toward strict 
liability. These factors, upon which there has been 
much difference of opinion, have, in various guises, 
affected or determined the decisions in particular 
cases. 
A. Conclusions of Law 
1. Breach of Statutory Duty 
The courts have consistently refused to allow 
actions for breaches of statutory duties to construct 
sewerage systems. It has been held in such cases 
that the statutory remedy usually provided is more 
appropriate, notwithstanding that the statutory remedy 
does not provide compensation for damage caused. 
The courts foresaw that if such actions were allowed, 
many actions might be brought by persons seeking to 
compel local authorities to provide their properties 
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with drainage, whereas their obligation is to the 
community at large. It was implicitly recognised 
in these cases that the provision of satisfactory 
drainage and sewerage for all inhabitants was then 
beyond the resources of most local authorities. 
This problem has now been greatly diminished, but 
the economic and political factors associated with 
the expenditure of large sums of public moneys make 
it unlikely that the courts will ever be prepared to 
review these questions in context of an action in 
tort. These rules, and the reasoning upon which they 
are based, are inappropriate where a person has 
suffered positive damage in consequence of an escape 
-
due to the local authority's neglect. They have 
nonetheless been applied to that kind of situation. 
A different attitude has prevailed in regard to actions 
for breaches of statutory duties relating to the 
maintenance of sewerage and drainage systems. These 
duties were readily recognised as having been imposed 
in order to protect private persons from unnecessary 
damage. In the case of artificial drains, the common 
law duty to take care is duplicated. In the case of 
natural watercourses, such duty goes beyond what the 
common law requires. There could be no suggestion that 
the admission of such actions would confer any 
advantage upon the plaintiff, except to compensate 
him for loss caused. Such duties are enforceable 
against urban and rural drainage authorities. 
Whatever the nature of the obligation, statutory duties 
are almost invariably expressed as requiring strict 
compliance, but the courts have held that breaches 
of duty are actionable only upon proof of negligence. 
The reasoning leading to this rule illustrates the 
continuing pre-occupation with fault. 
It is now well established that the mere failure to 
exercise statutory powers, as distinct from duties, is 
not actionable. Where, however, it is not clear whether 
the statute granted a power or imposed a duty, it seems 
that the courts will be ready to find that an obligation 
was intended. 
2. Negligence 
In regard to statutory bodies there is an 
extended meaning of negligence which in essence means 
that the question of negligence is to be determined 
having regard to. any special statutory powers granted. 
Where the acts of a sewerage authority give rise to 
the possibility of damage, this principle would seem 
to require the authority to exercise its powers of 
construction; an unreasonable failure to do so would 
amount to culpable negligence. This broad principle 
might be prayed in aid of the view that arguments 
based on nonfeasance have no application where some 
basis for the imposition of a common law duty is 
established. 
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In constructing additional drains and sewers, local 
authorities must pay proper regard to the consequences 
of the acts of construction for the whole system. The 
drain constructed must be of sufficient capacity for 
its intended purpose and the recipient drains must be 
of sufficient capacity to receive the additional flow. 
This responsibility extend~ to all alterations in or 
modifications of the system. Where, however, the system 
becomes inadequate in consequence of development beyond 
the control of the local authority, it is a matter of 
some doubt whether the authority is bound to improve 
the system to meet the increased burden. There is 
English authority against liability, but the point is 
open for reconsideration. Where negligence is proved, 
there is no substantial reason why a private individual 
should be denied a remedy for damage suffered. The 
only satisfactory explanation for the fact that the 
question was ever raised at all·appears to be that the 
Courts failed to perceive the limited scope of the 
so-called nonfeasance rules. Ordinary principles 
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of liability are applicable in regard to the maintenance 
of drainage systems, whether in regard to the physical 
state of the drain it~elf or to its state of cleanliness. 
A drain need not be kept entirely free of silt, so long 
as it is sufficiently free to carry any flow that might 
be reasonably anticipated. The requirement of clean-
liness extends to all artificial drains, whether urban 
or rural, and to natural watercourses where the 
necessity for the cleansing was caused by the acts of 
the authority. 
In constructing and maintaining its various systems, 
a local authority must make provision for ordinary 
conditions but not for extraordinary natural phenonema, 
such as frosts of extreme severity or extraordinary 
storms or earthquakes. 
An authority is not ordinarily required to excavate and 
inspect underground pipes for defects. Clearly gas 
and water authorities must promptly attend to any 
escape which might be discovered. The weight of 
authority indicates that regular inspections should 
be made of water mains for escapes and that authorities 
are not entitled to rely on reports from the general 
public. Periodic tests for escapes from gas mains 
might now be expected and authorities will no doubt 
be required to take advantage of any technological 
advance which improves their ability to detect 
escapes of gas. 
Where a local authority knows or ought to know that its 
mains might be disturbed by the activities of third 
persons, it must take stringent precautions. It must 
keep itself informed of excavations which might affect 
its mains and ensure that the mains are properly 
protected. It is apparent in all the decisions relating 
to escapes of gas that in view of the danger created by 
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escapes, every possible precaution must be taken. 
I 
This obligation extends to service pipes as well as 
to mains. 
In the case of drainage authorities, the negligent 
exercise of powers to control communications with the 
public drains, may give rise to liability. 
3. Nuisance 
Where an escape of gas or water occurs as the 
consequence of a burst main, due to a latent defect 
or some such similar cause, the authority will be 
prima facie liable for any resulting nuisance. The 
maintenance of pressure in the main is a sufficient 
ground of liability, and jointly operating causes, 
such as subsidence, do not exonerate the authority. 
But if it can be shown that the fracture was solely 
and effectively caused by some extraneous force, such 
as the acts of activities of third persons, that may be 
a good defence. This state of law represents an unsat-
isfactory resolution of the conflicting demands of the 
strict liability associated with Nuisance and of fault 
liability. The fact that the immediate cause of an 
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escape was the act of a third person is not a compelling 
reason not to impose liability upon the authority as 
part of the risk taken in the operation of the system. 
The principle of compensation would be better implemented 
by the imposition of liability, leaving the authority 
to recover, if it can, from the third party, for the 
I person injured may not have a good cause of. action 
against the third party. 
1 
A .different view has been taken of sewerage and 
drainage authorities. While it seems that an escape 
arising due to the physical condition of drains will 
attract strict liability, where a nuisance arises due 
to the inadequacy of the drain or system; it must be 
shown that the local authority is actually responsible 
for that state of affairs. An authority is not 
necessarily responsible for an excess flow through its 
drains, but such responsibility may be proved. The 
authority may itself be guilty of acts of which the 
excess flow is a consequence, or it may be held 
responsible upon the basis that its control of the 
system or of building in the locality enabled it to 
prevent or abate the nuisance. In those limited 
situations where the local authority is not liable 
for the creation of such a nuisance, as where it takes 
over a system from another authority or where the 
increased usage is uncontrollable, it may become 
liable if, having the ability to do so, it fails to 
abate the nuisance. The applicability of the ordinary 
principles of Nuisance to sewerage authorities has been 
acknowledged hesitantly, principally because of the 
1. Note that in respect to strict liability the usual form of 
defence based on the acts of third persons is "Act of 
a Stranger"; for the more stringent requirements of 
that defence, which is available in Nuisance, see p. 
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association of passive conduct with nonfeasance. More 
will be said on this aspect later, but it is to be 
noted that the conclusions reached here to some extent 
anticipate the direction of the law, for in certain 
respects there is presently no degree of certainty. 
4. Rylands v Fletcher 
Local authorities are prima facie within the 
rule in Rylands v Fletcher, subject to the defence of 
statutory authority. The fact that the plaintiff is 
a recipient of the service provided does not constitute 
a common interest in or consent to the activity and 
recovery is not precluded on either of those grounds. 
The enterprise may be of general benefit to the 
community but.that does not take it outside the ambit 
of the rule. The rule applies where both parties are 
licensees, or where one party is a licensee, except 
where the parties are occupier and licensee of the 
same land. Sewerage authorities are not exempt 
merely because they are under a duty to receive 
sewage, nor are drainage authorities exempt merely 
because the water remains in the drain for only so 
long as it takes to pass it on. Gas, water and sewage 
are substances the escape of which has attracted 
liability. The supply of gas and water are not 
activities which can be described as the "natural use" 
of land, nor is the provision of sewerage, nor land 
drainage other than the natural flow. Until recently, 
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the courts have shown a willingness to apply, prima 
facie, the rule iri Rylands v Fletcher to local 
authorities. It is significant that in one material 
respect the scope of the rule was extended in this 
context. This tendency may be attributable to an 
implicit recognition that strict liability is approp-
riate to enterprises engaged in the bulk supply of gas 
and water and having a high risk of damage due to 
escapes. However, the English Court of Appeal has 
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lately indicated that it has some aversion to applying 
the rule to a gas authority. Furthermore, antipathy 
toward strict liability is manifest in the law relating 
to the defence of statutory authority. In these respects, 
therefore, a conflict of judicial attitude is clearly 
discernable. 
5. Statutory Compensation 
The scope of compensation provisions is always 
a matter of construction in each case, but certain 
principles emerge from the cases which are probably of 
general application. Compensatable damage need not 
otherwise have been actionable at common law. Where 
statutory compensation is provided, the courts \'lill be 
more ready to hold that the creation of a nuisance is 
authorised, but compensation does not extend to damage 
caused in contravention of a nuisance clause. Compens-
ation may extend to damage caused by negligence in the 
construction of drainage works, including consequential 
flooding. But there is a distinction between negligence 
in the mode of cotlstruction, which is comp~nsatable, 
and negligence in the operation of construction, which 
is actionable. Where compensation is provided for 
damage caused in the exercise of statutory powers, 
common law remedies are available only in exceptional 
circumstances. 
A compensation clause which provides a remedy for 
damage caused in the maintenance of public works, is 
not applicable to damage caused by bursts of water 
mains. In this respect, the courts have sought to 
avoid construing compensation provisions so as to 
impose absolute liability fo~ accidental loss. Further-
more, damage caused by escapes from mains may be too 
remote to be compensatable .. In certain limited 
circumstances, therefore, where a nuisance results from • 
the active construction of drainage works, compensation 
may be available. Otherwise, it seems, compensation is 
not available for escapes from the mains of local 
authorities. 
6. Nonfeasance 
The courts have resisted all attempts to 
establish a cause of action in tort against drainage 
authorities for mere failure to provide drainage 
works and maintain them in efficient operation. Such 
inaction (or inadequate action) is categorised as 
nonfeasance for which no action will lie. The doctrine 
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is applicable where the damage complained of is properly 
attributable to the natural situation, whe~her or not the 
local authority has made some attempt to deal with it. 
A different situation arises where artifical drains are 
brought into existence, for such drains are a potential 
source of damage and the duty of the authority is to 
take .reasonable care to prevent the escape of water 
thus accumulated. To provide a drain an~ fail to take 
due care of it is negligence in the exercise of statutory 
powers. The effect of the doctrine is that special 
statutory powers and duties relating to the provision 
of drainage do not, in themselves, attract tortious 
responsibility. Not only is there ordinarily no super-
added common law duty to exercise a statutory power, 
but there is no right of action for breach of a statutory 
duty. The reasons for these rules have already been 
discussed. 
In the context of the tort of negligence, the actual 
effect of the doctrine is, upon an analysis of the cases, 
debatable. The question whether control of a drainage 
system is sufficient to create a duty to improve an 
inadequate system, at least where damage is suffered, 
has yet to be decided. The preferable view is that 
control gives rise to a common law duty to exercise 
statutory powers to prevent damage~ 
In regard to maintenance functions, the position is 
clear. Nonfeasance is not a good plea, if negligence 
is proved, whether the action is upon the statute or 
upon common law duties. 
In Nuisance the problem whether control is a sufficient 
basis for liability again appears. The imposition of 
strict liability for creation of a nuisance usually 
involves some active conduct on the part of the local 
authority. But where the complaint relates to non-
repair, mere passivity, without negligence, may be 
sufficient. In respect of the inadequacy of drains, 
not due to active conduct, it seems probable that the 
qourts will hold that liability rests upon continuance, 
that passive conduct is sufficient but that there must 
be negligence. In fact, mere passivity in regard to 
continuing escapes resulting from inadequacy due to 
development has been admitted as a good defence, but 
recent cases indicate that that view is no longer 
tenable, if it ever was. 
It seems that some advantage may be gained by pleading 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, for the rule may be 
sufficiently wide and sufficiently rigid to preclude 
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the introduction of notions of nonfeasance. It would be 
remarkable, however, if, on the broadest view of the 
doctrine, nonfeasance ruled out· the possibility of 
liability in Negligence or Nuisance but if liability 
could be established via the route of Rylands v Fletcher. 
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The number of opportunities for invoking the doctrine 
of nonfeasance have been considerably dimipished by 
widening concep:tions of what is sufficient to constitute 
misfeasance. In this respect, the various elements 
of control have provided the key. 
Two additional matters might be mentioned. First, 
where a drain performs a highway function, the highway 
nonfeasance rule may be invoked. That rule provides 
an immunity from ordinary principles of liability. 
Unlike the drainage rules, it excuses local authorities 
from duties of maintenance; there is no liability for 
a failure to repair, whether or not negligence is shown. 
Second, a local authority which inherits a nuisance from 
its predecessor may be liable notwithstanding its 
inaction lf subh liability is transferred by statute. 
7. Defence of Statutory Authority 
Statutory authority is. not a good defence to 
negligence in the exercise of statutory powers or in 
the performance of statutory duties. Negligence is 
not authorised. 
In regard to strict liability, the law is difficult 
and confused. The following conclusions as to the 
present state of the law are drawn according to the 
predominance of authority and are confined to the 
liability of statutory bodies for escapes. 
Certain features of the empowering Acts have been taken 
as indicia of whether interference with private rights 
is authorised. There is authority for the proposition· 
that where a local body acts pursuant to permissive 
powers, there is strict liability, whereas if the 
authority acts pursuant to a mandatory obligation to 
carry on the enterprise in question, it is liable for 
negligence only. In contrast, there is a competing 
rule which indicates that where a drainage authority 
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is under an obligation to provide effectual drainage, 
that duty cannot be called in aid in reduction of common 
law liability. The point is subject to considerable 
doubt. The view is commonly taken that statutory 
authorisation, whether in the mandatory or permissive 
form, may be a defence to the torts of strict liability 
and, to the extent that any trend in the cases is 
discernable, it seems that this view is likely to 
prevail. The explanations attempted of these rules are 
unsatisfactory and the conflicting decisions may be 
seen as the product of opposing viewpoints as to the 
merits of strict liability. 
In respect of compensation provisions, the predominant 
view is that the provision of compensation is an indication 
that the nuisance was authorised. For reasons already 
mentioned, this factor is likely to arise only in regard 
to drainage works. 
The inevitability of a nuisance occuring in consequence 
of the exercise of statutory powers also suggests that 
the damage was contemplated by the Legislature and 
accordingly impliedly authorised. The criterion of 
inevitableness also governs the extent of the defence 
and the weight of authority favours the view that the 
onus_is on the defendant to prove that the nuisance 
was inevitable, in the relevant sense, in the 
particular case. 
A critical assessment of the decisions relating to 
escapes from water and gas mains, having in mind the 
utility of strict liability in providing compensation 
.for loss, leads to the concl~sion that the courts have 
been too ready to imply authorisation of nuisances 
from express authorisation of the activity giving rise 
to the nuisance. Insufficient attention has been paid 
to the nexus between the activity and the nuisance. 
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It is one thing to hold 
2 that where a nuisance is the 
intrinsic direct, immediate and continuous result of the 
authorised activity, that it is impliedly authorised; 
it is another to hold that the relatively remote and 
uncertain prospect of spontaneous escape from gas and 
water mains justifies the implication that such 
nuisances are condoned by the Legislature. There is 
2. As in the railway cases. 
some (though not conclusive) justification for the rule 
in the former case insofar as an injunction might be 
obtained and accordingly the legislature's intention 
(that the activity should be carried on) might be 
defeated, but in the latter class of case there would 
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be insufficient grounds for an injunction. Even if there 
is any actual inconsistencv between statutory authority 
and a continuing liability to an injunction, or even 
to damages, there is little or none in regard to 
occasional awards of damages arising from isolated 
escapes. That there is no necessary or unresolvable 
inconsistency in the respects indicated is shown by the 
fact nuisance clauses may be given full effect without 
any apparent illogicality. 
The insertion of a nuisance clause in the empowering 
Act puts the question of strict liability beyond question. 
Nuisances, such as escapes, are thereby actionable 
without proof of negligence. It is no defence that the 
~~ powers conferred cannot be exercised without creating 
~ a nuisance. The courts have from time to time noted 
that the effect of such clauses is that the authority 
must bear the inevitable loss arising in consequence of 
the risks taken incidentally to carrying on the 
enterprise. There is a long line of sewerage cases 
which supports the view that there is strict liability 
under a nuisance clause even where the defendant carries 
on the activity under mandatory powers. A recent decision 
to the contrary was apparently decided per incuriam as 
to this aspect and in any event awaits rev,iew. 
The preponderance of authority supports the view that 
local authorities are prima facie liable under the rule 
in Rylands v Fletcher, subject to the defence of 
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statutory authority. For the purposes· of the co.nstruction 
of nuisance clauses, the rule is regarded as a species 
of the law of Nuisance and a nuisance clause imposes 
liability under the rule. 
Finally, in regard to the defence, where the defence 
is pleaded the onus is on the defendant to prove the 
absence of negiigence. That rule confers on the 
plaintiff a major tactical advantage. 
B. Limitation of Tortious Remedies : Nonfeasance 
The doctrine of nonfeasance is primarily concerned with 
the failure to provide a public service, a convenience 
or a benefit, in exercise of a statutory power or duty. 
The refusal of the courts to admit actions in tort 
based on the mere failure to exercise powers {or to 
perform duties} to construct sewerage systems is 
justifiable having regard to the factors which may 
affect such a decision on the part of a local authority. 
On the other hand, whilst a remedy in damages may be 
inappropriate, proven neglect on the part of a local 
authority to its statutory duties may, in the absence 
of a satisfactory statutory remedy, legitimately be 
made the subject of a mandatory order. 
/ 
In. considering the atittude of the courts to. actions 
brought by private persons seeking the provision of 
public sewers, appropriate weight must be given to the 
administrative and financial difficulties faced by 
public authorities, particularly in the nineteenth 
century when modern drainage and sewerage systems were 
first developed. Sawer has rightly concluded that the 
courts have "shown sociological as well as doctrinal 
acumen" when handling the large volume of litigation 
3 
.consequential upon such development. 
Where a nuisance is created in consequence of the 
operation of_a sewerage sys"Eem, a private person should 
not be deprived of his common law remedy merely because 
expenditure upon capital works to improve the system is 
the only practical alternative to the cessation of the 
service provided to the community or part of it . 
. The fact that the abatement of a nuisance may require 
the exercise of statutory powers of construction is of 
itself not a sufficient ground for the denial of a 
remedy. In such a case the reasoning adopted in the 
nonfeasance situation is inappropriate. 
If a public body takes over from another the control of 
a badly constructed or inadequate drainage system, the 
doctrine of nonfeasance may reasonably be invoked where 
3. Nonfeasance Under Fire (1966) 2 NZULR 115, cmmnenting 
on his survey Nonfeasance Revisited (1955) 18 MLR 541. 
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the only effectual course of action open is the 
provision in whole or in part of a new system, 
provided that the authority has notbeen guilty of such 
delay as would justify a finding of negligence. 
In the case of public roads, historical reasons have 
led to the adoption of the general rule that in relation 
to the state of repair, the local authority is liable 
for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance. But there 
is no reason why such a plea should be available to 
exempt sewerage and drainage authorities from liability 
for damage caused by a failure to give proper attention 
to normal maintenance. There is no reason in principle. 
why an authority which has ~he control of a system of 
drains or pipes should not be obliged to take reasonable 
care to see that they do not cause a nuisance so far 
as this can be done by ordinary upkeep and repair. 
In regard to·the non-exercise of statutory powers, the 
courts may now be less receptive to arguments founded 
upon nonfeasance than formerly. The common law conception 
of control has gained an as yet limited acceptance as 
a basis for the imposition of a duty to exercise 
4 
statutory powers. It remains to be seen whether this 
reasoning will be extended from inspectorial functions 
to functions relating to the construction and maintenance 
of public works. Such extension ~ay be precluded by the 
relatively high administrative and financial burdens 
4. Dutton v Bognor Regis UDC [1972] 1 QB 373. 
involved in the exercise of the latter kind of power. 
/ 
It was a feature of judicial thinking of the nineteenth 
century, influenced by the prevailing economic doctrine 
of lassez faire, that injury to person and property is 
bound to occur as part of the price of an increasingly 
industrialised society and that the only persuasive 
reason for shifting losses is fault. It was thought 
that only where a person had shown an intention to 
cause such damage, or was negligent in failing to 
exercise a due standard of care in his activity, should 
an action against him succeed, lest productive 
enterprises be discouraged. Compensation for morally 
culpable conduct aside, it was argued that strict 
liability for.inciderital damage would be financially 
too burdensome. This latter argument was especially 
persuasive in the case of local authorities, which 
were notoriously short of funds. 
However, while it is accepted that some losses to person 
and property will inevitably occur in modern society but 
the notion is rejected that the criterion of fault is 
appropriate or wholly appropriate for the legal 
determination of how these losses ought to be borne, 
such losses ought to be borne by the agency which is in 
the best position to absorb them or spread them across 
the community. 
263 
c. Strict Liability Appraised 
/ 
What is needed ••• is a reappraisal of the scope 
and function of strict liability in the law today 
and the imposition of strict liability upon a 
defendant whenever the risk of injury or damage 
ought rightly to be his. 
What must be got rid of is the false corollary 
of liability for fault, that there shouid not be 
· liability without fault.S 
1. Enterprise Liability 
It is apparent from the cases discussed that 
the risk of escapes is incidental to the supply of gas 
and water and that such escapes commonly occur without 
negligence on the part of the supplier. Escapes from 
public sewers and drains are, it seems, mostly caused 
by inadequacy in some form and are not unavoidable. But 
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escapes due to the physical condition of drains may occur 
without negligence. To the extent that escapes are the· 
inevitable result of the operation of such systems, the 
operators wittingly create the risk of escapes. 
The degree of risk is acceptable having regard to the 
object of the operation, whether commercial profit or 
for the benefit of the community. It is appropriate, 
therefore, that losses suffered in consequence of 
escapes should be regarded as part of the cost of the 
provision of the service and should be absorbed as such. 
5. Jolowicz Liability for Accidents [1968] CLJ at 59. 
The inevitability of damage is not a sufficient reason 
for depriving persons suffering damage of a remedy. 
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If a scheme for the benefit of a community cannot be 
established and carried on without injury to individuals 
then they ought to be compensated by the community and 
their right to recover should not be dependent on their 
losshaving been caused by negligence. These are the 
principles of enterprise liability. 
Losses imposed upon local authorities are not usually 
absorbed by the local authority itself; in the long 
term, it suffers no irrecoverable depletion of its 
resources. Local bodies are financed by various forms 
of taxation and, in the cas~ of trading activities, by 
selling its commodity at a price. Losses incurred in 
providing services are ultimately passed on to the 
community at large, as taxpayers or consumers. The 
true financial cost of the provision of the service 
includes the payment of compensation for damage caused 
and the taxing and pricing mechanisms facilitate the 
distribution of such losses or, to look at it another 
way, provide a form of social insurance. 
An additional reason for imposing strict liability 
on an enterprise is that it provides an economic incentive, 
for those best able to do so, to minimise accidents. 
It is apparent that in a number of respects, but notably 
in the regard to the expansion of the defence of statutory 
authority, the courts have sought to accommodate the 
precepts of the doctrine of fault at the expense of 
strict liability. This trend has greatly diminished 
common law protection from losses caused by the 
activities of local authorities. It is appropriate 
at this point to consider whether the risk of damage 
from escapes ought rightly to be borne by the local 
authority regardless of negligence. 
2. Compensation 
The primary object of an award of damages is 
to compensate the victim of a tort, not to punish the 
tortfeasor. The availability of a compensatory remedy 
in the situation where mora~ly culpable conduct is 
proved probably indicates a tacit acceptance of the 
principle of "ethical compensation", as explained by 
Glanville Williams~ That principle emphasises that 
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the payment of compensation is a benefit to the victim 
of a wrong and declares that justice requires that the 
victim should receive compensation? but it fails to 
recognise that compensation may also be due to the 
victim of a morally acceptable risk. Modern conceptions 
of justice require that moral culpability should no 
longer be regarded as the sole criterion of liability. 
Strict liability more consistently provides compensation 
for those who would otherwise bear a loss for no better 
6. The Aims of the Law of Torts (1951) 4 CLP 137, 140-144. 
7. Jolowicz Liability for Accidents [1968] CLJ at 56. 
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reason than that that where the loss fell. 
It is of particular interest that the courts.have 
expressly recognised that a grant of statutory authority, 
with the retention of strict liability by means of a 
nuisance clause, represents an acceptance by the 
Legislature of the principles of enterprise liability. 
But there is in any event no basis for believing that 
a Legislature which refrains from expressly granting an 
immunity from strict liability, meant to do so by 
implication. There is no logical inconsistency in 
granting statutory powers and permitting strict liability 
for damage caused in exercise of those powers to remain. 
Furthermore, _there is no real justification for exempting 
a local authority from strict liability merely because 
it is a statutory body, or because it is carrying out 
something beneficial to the community, or even because 
it is providing a service pursuant to a statutory duty. 
If the rationale of strict liability in the common law 
is accepted, it would be illogical to allow that those 
best able to bear it, public corporations proceeding 
under statutory authority, should be exempted. 
D. Final Comment 
The matters studied in this work are, taking the 
broadest perspective, aspects of the increasingly 
important public law problem of dealing with loss 
arising in consequence of the exercise of administrative 
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functions. The arguments and issues relating to 
discretion and compensation, familiar in the wider 
context of the execution of public works by governmental 
agencies, are relevant here. 
The case of damage arising in the due exercise of powers 
has been brought into contrast with the situation where 
such powers are exceeded and it is suggested that a 
reassessment of the dividing line, in respect of the 
torts of strict liability, is warranted. Furthermore, 
a full reappraisal is needed of the position, in tort, 
of local authorities which neglect to exercise their 
statutory powers. 
In the present context, the lack of an elaborate and 
coherent review and evaluation of the various consid-
erations has no doubt conduced to the formulation by 
the courts o:j: unsatisfactory principles. The present 
work, because of its comparatively narrow scope, goes 
only part of the way toward this end, but it may at 
least provide an advanced starting point for further, 
more comprehensive research. 
